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In the German philosophical tradition that begins with Kant and grows into Romanticism
and Idealism, philosophical understandings of personal subjectivity underwent drastic changes. I
argue in this dissertation that these new understandings of personal subjectivity exercised an
important influence on how the Catholic theologian Franz Anton Staudenmaier and the Lutheran
theologian Isaak August Dorner conceived of the personal subjectivity of the divine, particularly
on how they rendered the divine as a triune personal subject.
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INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century is often regarded as inaugurating a renewal of trinitarian theology.
Although the works of theologians such as of Barth, Moltmann, Pannenberg (on the Protestant
side), Balthasar and Rahner (on the Catholic side), and Bulgakov (on the Orthodox side) all
embody a centrality of the Trinity, such a claim can nonetheless be questioned through an
examination of the works of the Catholic theologian Franz Anton Staudenmaier (1800-1856) and
the Lutheran theologian Isaak August Dorner (1809-1884). Although there are differences in the
ways in which these two thinkers execute their theological systems, they both share a broad
agreement on the importance – indeed, the centrality – of the doctrine of the Trinity for Christian
theological reflection.
As I hope to show, for both of these theologians the Trinity gets to the heart of one of the
most fundamental questions of theology, for it is that by which we can make sense of divine
personal subjectivity. Staudenmaier and Dorner regard the Trinity not simply as a matter of
soteriological significance (although, of course, it includes this), but in addition they see it as
grounding something even much more basic. For both, the Trinity is the ground by which God
can engage that which is other than Himself without divesting Himself of transcendence. To put
it in somewhat stark terms, the Trinity is that by which God can be God for that which is not
God.
Staudenmaier’s and Dorner’s renditions of divine subjectivity cannot be understood
without grasping some background philosophical considerations. In the German philosophical
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tradition that begins with Kant and grows into Romanticism and Idealism, philosophical
understandings of personal subjectivity underwent drastic changes. I argue in this dissertation
that these new understandings of personal subjectivity exercised an important influence on how
Staudenmaier and Dorner conceived of the personal subjectivity of the divine, particularly on
how they rendered the divine as a triune personal subject. Therefore, we will examine some of
the changes in how personal subjectivity came to be understood during this period.

1. Subjectivity in the German Philosophical Tradition
Broadly speaking, the modern German philosophical tradition moves further and further
away from a Cartesian understanding of what constitutes subjectivity – as that which is merely
located in the individual rational agent – and moves toward a view of subjectivity seen as
constituted by otherness. The novel view of subjectivity inaugurated by the modern German
philosophical tradition can be seen by first recalling the Cartesian method of skepticism
regarding the external world.
Skepticism regarding the external world can be described as subjectivist in the sense that
the subject’s belief in the reality of the external world is inferred from the subject’s inner
representations. Insofar as those inner representations can be doubted, the reality of the external
world can be doubted. What cannot be doubted, Descartes shows, is that the subject thinks. It is
from this foundation of the subject as thinking that one eventually arrives at the reality of the
external world. Thus, in such a system, one begins with a subject and from there deduces that
which is other than the subject.
This picture begins to change beginning with Kant and continuing with Fichte and Hegel.
Kant departed significantly from his predecessors through his philosophical ‘Copernican
revolution,’ wherein he argued that experience is not simply a matter of a subject passively
2

receiving data through her senses, but rather an application of a priori forms and concepts by the
subject to received sensible data.
While Kant surely brought to the fore the active role that the subject plays in her own
experience, and while such a construal of personal subjectivity might seem to have pushed the
conception of the subject in a more Cartesian – and so subjectivist – direction, the exact opposite
was the case.1 As we will see below, in his “Refutation of Idealism,” Kant offered an argument
against Cartesian subjectivism (which he referred to as “problematic idealism”), namely, “the
theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be…merely doubtful and
indemonstrable…”2 Although Kant highlighted the active role which the subject takes in the
constitution of her experience, he nevertheless also argued that there must be a reality beyond
mere representations for the possibility of experience at all.3 Kant’s argument, in short, is that
while the Cartesian skeptic infers the reality of the external world from her inner representations
(which are subject to doubt), the very sequence of such representations for a numericallysingular subject is possible only if the subject indexes those representations to a persistent reality
that is linked via laws of causality and interaction. Such a reality is possible only amongst

1

Indeed, Frederick Beiser narrates the early history of German Idealism (in which he includes Kant) as precisely
anti-subjectivist. As he puts it, the development of German Idealism “is not the culmination but the nemesis of the
Cartesian tradition.” See Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781–1801
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 2.
2

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), B 274 (p. 326) (hereafter abbreviated as CPR). The lines of the first edition are indicated by an “A”
and the second edition by a “B,” followed by the page number of the Guyer and Wood translation in parenthesis.
The Refutation of Idealism appears only in the second edition of the CPR.
Whether or not Kant’s Refutation of Idealism is actually a successful argument is much debated among Kantian
scholars. For helpful assessments of the argument, see the following: Dina Emundts, “The Refutation of Idealism
and the Distinction between Phenomena and Noumena,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 168–89; Paul Guyer, Kant, 2nd edition
(London New York: Routledge, 2014); Paul Guyer, “Kant’s Intentions in the Refutation of Idealism,” The
Philosophical Review 92, no. 3 (1983): 329–83.
3

3

substances which are external to one another (i.e. in space), and thus possible only as external to
the subject herself.

1.1 Kant’s Analogies of Experience and Refutation of Idealism
Kant’s argument against Descartes’ “problematic idealism” is located in the second
edition of The Critique of Pure Reason. Many background assumptions for the Refutation of
Idealism are established in the “Analogies of Experience,” where Kant establishes what relations
are necessary of things given in space and time, so we will begin our examination there.
In the First Analogy, Kant considers what is necessary in order to perceive change.
Empirical experience, of course, is constituted by representations. Yet, as we experience different
representations, our experience can be said to form a sequence of representations. If the
experience of representations as a sequence is due to a difference between representations, then
the experience of representations as a sequence is precisely an experience of change. However,
Kant argues, the very notion of change requires a notion of persistence: “Our apprehension of the
manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always changing. We can therefore
never determine from this alone whether this manifold, as object of experience, is simultaneous
or successive, if something does not ground it which always exists, i.e., something lasting and
persisting…”4 Put differently, if it is not the same object across change, there are just different
objects (and so there actually is no change at all). The explanation for the experience of change,
and thus the experience of representations as a sequence, is that there is some sort of persistence
across change (which Kant refers to as ‘substance’). As Kant puts it, “Persistence is accordingly

4

CPR A 182 / B 225 (p. 300).
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a necessary condition under which alone appearances, as things or objects, are determinable in a
possible experience.”5
The Second Analogy considers the order of representations. As occurring in sequences,
our representations occur in a particular order. In perceiving the various parts of a house, for
example, I might first have a representation of the basement followed by a representation of the
roof. Why does my representation of the basement precede my representation of the roof? In this
case, there is no rule explaining why this representation preceded that representation (other than
my directing my attention here and then there). Thus, logically speaking, in such a case the
succession of my representations could have occurred in any order (first the basement then the
roof, or first the roof then the basement). There is nothing about my representation of the one
part of the house which necessitates that I have a representation of another part, and so there is
nothing which necessitates that the sequence of my representations occurs in a certain order.
That there is no necessitated order of my representations is due to there being no objective
change in the house, but only a change in where I direct my attention.
But consider a case in which there is a change in the empirical object. In perceiving
someone kicking a ball, for example, I first have a representation of a ball sitting motionless on
the ground, followed by a person’s foot making physical contact with the ball, followed by a
representation of the ball in the air.6 If a representation in and of itself contains only the content
of that particular moment and so, in and of itself, is independent of any successive
representations, what makes for the ordering of this series of representations? In other words,
why does this representation (that of the foot touching the ball) precede that representation (that

5

CPR A 189 / B 232 (pp. 303-04)
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In the Second Analogy, Kant uses the example of a ship sailing downstream.
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of the ball in the air)? Why does the representation of the ball in the air not precede the
representation of the foot touching the ball?
In the case of the ball, we are perceiving something which was not previously the case
but subsequently came to be the case: the ball was not previously in the air but subsequently
came to be in the air. Unlike in the case of the house, here we are perceiving an occurrence. And
in an occurrence, Kant says, the order of representations is determined. This is because, in order
to even perceive the occurrence, we must have a representation which is preceded by its lack:
“That something happens, i.e., that something or a state comes to be that previously was not,
cannot be empirically perceived except where an appearance precedes that does not contain this
state in itself; for a reality that would follow on an empty time, thus an arising not preceded by
any state of things, can be apprehended just as little as empty time itself.”7
That the order of my representations was first that of the motionless ball on the ground,
then of a foot touching the ball, and then that of the ball in the air is explained by a causal
relation. “Thus, the relation of appearances (as possible perceptions) in accordance with which
the existence of that which succeeds (what happens) is determined in time necessarily and in
accordance with a rule by something that precedes it, consequently the relation of cause to effect,
is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments with regard to the series of
perceptions, thus of their empirical truth, and therefore of experience.”8 Thus, the possibility of
our perception of objective change is expressed in the principle of causality. The principle of
causality explains not only why the representations occurred in a sequence, but why they
occurred in the sequence that they did.

7

CPR A 191-92 / B 236-37 (p. 306).
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Ibid., A 202 / B 247 (p. 312).
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Finally, the Third Analogy treats simultaneous causal relations. Some substances appear
to be causally affected by other substances and yet we are unable to have representations of the
two substances simultaneously (e.g., substances which are separated in space to a degree such
that one would not be able to simply observe them simultaneously – Kant uses the example of
directing one’s attention first to the moon then to the earth, and vice versa). We assume that the
states of such substances occur simultaneously (e.g., that the earth and the moon exist
simultaneously), but since our representations afford us access to content only in a particular
temporal and spatial location, we cannot observe simultaneous states of substances as
simultaneous: “The synthesis of the imagination in apprehension [can] only present each of these
perceptions as one that it present in the subject when the other is not, and conversely, but not that
the objects are simultaneous, i.e., that if the one is then the other also is in the same time…”9
For example, say I know based on scientific experiments that the gravitational pull of the
moon affects the ocean tide. However, the moon and the tide are sufficiently separated in space
such that I cannot perceive both simultaneously. Although I know that the moon’s gravitational
force affects the tide, when I focus my perception on the tide (rather than on the moon), and
perceive the tide of the ocean as causally affected, the causal relation between the moon and the
tide is not something which I am able to have representations of. However, I know that the moon
is causally affecting the tide. The only way to account for such simultaneous causal relations is
to infer a law of interaction or community between them, such that although I cannot perceive
them as located within a singular spatial plane (and thus as able to interact), they nonetheless are:

9

CPR A 211 / B 257 (p. 317).
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“Thus it is necessary for all substances in appearance, insofar as they are simultaneous, to stand
in thoroughgoing community of interaction with each other.”10
As a whole, therefore, our experience, which is constituted by a series of representations
(by which we perceive change), presupposes a persistent reality which is linked via laws of
causality and interaction. That is, our experience is such that it can only be made coherent by
assuming a persistent reality of substance which is governed by relations of causality and
interaction in a lawlike regularity.
With this background in place, we can now look at Kant’s Refutation of Idealism proper.
The first step in the argument is: “I am conscious of my existence as determined in time.”11 More
precisely, I am conscious of my representations as forming a temporal order. This is a premise
even the Cartesian skeptic would accept.
The second step of the argument is “All time-determination presupposes something
persistent in perception.”12 In other words, my awareness of my representations as forming a
temporal order is possible only if I have something permanent against which their temporality is
measured. This brings us to the third step: “This persisting thing, however, cannot be something
in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persisting
thing.”13 Thus, this permanent framework against which the change of representations is
measured obviously cannot itself be a representation. Or better put, since my representations are
in me, and since this permanent framework cannot itself be a representation, it cannot be in me.

10

CPR A 213 / B 260 (p. 318).
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Ibid., B 275 (p. 327).

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid.
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Therefore, the fourth step runs: “Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible
only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside
me.”14 Here, the claim is not that this persistent thing is something outside the empirical I (e.g.,
in some object I perceive as other than myself), for in this case it would still be part of a
representation. This would not defeat skepticism because, as the skeptics insist, representations
are subject to doubt. (This was the burden of the third step.) Doubt regarding the truth of my
representations can be overcome only through something which is determined by laws, since
laws are relations of necessity.
Something which is persistent and is determined through laws, which is not itself a
representation, is possible only amongst substances which are external to one another (i.e. in
space), and thus possible only as external to the subject herself (the first Analogy). Such laws are
precisely those established in the second and third Analogies (the laws of causality and
interaction). If there must be a non-representational reality constituted by space and subject to
laws for there to be a succession of representations, then skeptical doubt – to even get off the
ground – must presuppose a non-representational reality constituted by space and subject to laws,
for skeptical doubt itself presupposes a succession of representations. Thus, the conclusion of the
argument: “Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means
of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself.”15

14

CPR B 275 (p. 327).

15

Ibid.
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1.2 Fichte’s Argument for the External World and Other Rational Agents
If Kant sought to establish the subject’s capacity for orderly representations upon that
which is other than the subject herself, Fichte dug even deeper by seeking to ground the subject’s
very consciousness in her activity upon that which is other than herself (the ‘non-I’). Take, for
example, the basic activity of reading a book. As one reads a book, she does not think to herself,
“I am reading a book.” When she reads a book, her conscious activity is focused on the content
of the book itself and not on the activity itself which she is performing.16 “In acting,” Fichte says,
“the rational being does not become conscious of its acting; for it itself is its acting and nothing
else…”17
However, if someone interrupts this activity and asks her what she is doing, she replies,
“I am reading a book.” Her reply to another is an explicit declaration regarding that activity. But
if, when engaging in this activity, she was not explicitly conscious that “I am reading a book,”
how is it that she was able to have an explicit awareness that she was reading a book when asked
what she was doing? Although while reading, her explicit awareness was an awareness of the
content of the book (rather than of herself reading the book), when she moved to an explicit
awareness of something different than the content of the book (viz., the explicit awareness that I
was reading a book, prompted by the question posed to her), she knows that it was she who was
reading the book.

I owe this example to Allen Wood. See Allen W. Wood, “The ‘I’ as Principle of Practical Philosophy,” in The
Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, ed. Sally Sedgwick (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 96.
16

17

J.G. Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, ed. Frederick Neuhouser, trans. Michael Baur, 1st Edition (Cambridge,
UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Introduction, I.4 (p. 4). Hereafter this work will be abbreviated
as FNR.
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To know that it was she who was reading the book means that during her act of reading,
although she was not the object of her own explicit awareness, nonetheless there was some less
explicit awareness of herself as reading. If there could not be such a dual awareness, she could
never respond to a question of what activity she was doing, for she would never be able to know
that it was she doing it. Thus, no matter what sort of activity she is engaged in (which occupies
her explicit awareness), there is always an implicit awareness that it is she who is engaging in
this activity.
Self-awareness, then, requires that the agent engage in practical activity, for it is only
posterior to activity that the subject has something to be conscious of herself as doing: “The I
becomes conscious only of what emerges for it in this acting and through this acting…”18
Practical activity consists in setting an end and acting to conform the world (the ‘not-I’) to that
end. Because the performance of actions is what makes possible the subject’s self-consciousness,
and because the performance of actions involves setting an end to which the subject seeks to
conform the world, the subject’s self-consciousness is possible insofar as she conforms the
external world/the not-I to her ends. Self-consciousness, therefore, is possible for a subject only
if she posits a world, or a ‘not-I’, which exists outside of herself upon which she can exercise
practical activity: “Since the I can posit itself in self-consciousness only practically, but in
general can posit only what is finite, and hence must also posit a limit to its practical activity, it
follows that the I must posit a world outside itself.”19 The not-I is thereby the vehicle by which
self-consciousness is actualized.

18

FNR, Introduction, I.4 (p. 5).

19

Ibid., §2, Corollary 1 (p. 24).
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Thus far, Fichte has not gone much beyond Kant in positing what is other than the subject
as constitutive for the subject as such. Fichte made a radical move beyond Kant, however, by
making a transcendental argument not simply for an external world, but also for the existence of
other rational beings.20 We have seen that it is in virtue of a not-I that the agent can exercise her
subjectivity, that she can be an I. Acting involves acting for ends, and such acting is based on
reasons. But how does a being encounter reasons in the first place? Or better, how are reasons
for any particular act present to the subject precisely as reasons (as opposed to natural desires
which are the basis for actions of non-rational animals)?
Imagine, for example, a person whose every action had no reasons behind its
performance. Each act would appear arbitrary. To observe a series of actions performed by this
sort of person would make no sense in the eyes of others. In short, this person would appear to be
irrational or non-rational. It is in acting based upon reasons, then, that our acts have rationality.
Reasons, however, do not necessitate. If another offers me a reason for, say, reading this book
rather than that book, I am free to refuse. Reasons, therefore, have the unique quality, on one
hand, of providing rationality for a subject’s acts, while on the other hand not necessitating that
the subject perform the act.21 As Fichte puts it, “The rational being’s activity is by no means to
be determined and necessitated by the summons in the way that – under the concept of causality
– an effect is determined and necessitated by its cause; rather, the rational being is to determine
itself in consequence of the summons.”22

For a helpful treatment of Fichte’s argument, see Allen W. Wood, “Deduction of the Summons and the Existence
of Other Rational Beings,” in Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right: A Critical Guide, ed. Gabriel Gottlieb
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 72–91.
20

21

See Wood, “Deduction…,” 82-4.

22

FNR §3, V (p. 35).
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Insofar as they are rational grounds for acts, reasons presuppose the capacity for
understanding them as reasons. That is, the subject is rational only insofar as she acts upon
reasons as reasons. But reasons – because they do not compel but only invite action – appear
outside the subject, in the sense that they summon the subject to perform acts. Therefore, Fichte
concludes that if reasons presuppose the capacity of understanding them as reasons (if reasons
presuppose the subject’s potential for acting rationally), and if reasons address the subject from
outside, then reasons can come to a subject only from a source [1] that exists outside the subject
herself and [2] is itself rational:
The external being that is posited as the cause of the summons must at the very least
presuppose the possibility that the subject is capable of understanding and
comprehending; otherwise its summons to the subject would have no purpose at all. The
purposiveness of the summons is conditional on the understanding and freedom of the
being to whom it is addressed. Therefore, the cause of the summons must itself
necessarily possess the concept of reason and freedom; thus it must itself be a being
capable of having concepts; it must be an intelligence, and – since this is not possible
without freedom, as has just been shown – it must also be a free, and thus a rational,
being, and must be posited as such.23
We have seen that, for Fichte, self-consciousness is possible only through practical
action. Further, we have seen that practical action is rational only insofar as it is based upon
reasons. Finally, we have seen that reasons, because they summon a subject rather than compel
her, exist externally to the subject. Thus, Fichte’s argument is that an agent can be a selfconscious rational subject only if there are external sources of rationality present to her by which
she can receive reasons for her acts. Thus, an agent can be a self-conscious rational subject only
in the presence of other rational subjects, i.e. only in a community. As Fichte therefore puts it,
“The human being (like all finite beings in general) becomes a human being only among human
beings; and since the human being can be nothing other than a human being and would not exist
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at all if it were not this – it follows that, if there are to be human beings at all, there must be more
than one.”24
While Kant argued that what lies beyond the individual subject is constitutive of her
unified experience, in Fichte we see that what lies beyond the individual subject has a much
more robust role in the constitution of the subject as such. Hegel appropriates much from Fichte
regarding the role of others in the constitution of subjectivity.25 However, Hegel departs from
Fichte in one significant way, the presence of which we will see in Staudenmaier and Dorner.

1.3 Hegel and Mutual Recognition
Hegel approaches subjectivity not transcendentally but phenomenologically.26 In
everyday self-consciousness, one has a consciousness of oneself, but also a consciousness of
what is not oneself: “For the in-itself is consciousness; but equally it is that for which an other
(the in-itself) is; and it is for consciousness that the in-itself of the object, and the being of the
object for an other, are one and the same; the ‘I’ is the content of the connection and the
connecting itself. Opposed to an other, the ‘I’ is its own self, and at the same time it overarches
this other which, for the ‘I’, is equally only the ‘I’ itself.”27
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This introduces a paradox for self-consciousness. Self-consciousness can be what it is
only in relation to what is other than itself. Self-consciousness sees this as a contradiction and
tries to resolve this contradiction by turning away from otherness back onto itself. It can do this
because, although it certainly views its object as real, it nevertheless views it as subordinate to
itself, as existing for self-consciousness. Thus, self-consciousness affirms itself by turning away
from its object. Self-consciousness, in order to affirm itself, must continually negate other
objects.
Since self-consciousness can satisfy itself only through this continual negation of
otherness, it comes to realize that otherness has a degree of independence. Self-consciousness
must therefore relate to otherness in a new way: otherness can still be negated, but it is
something independent that can be negated: “Self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by
superseding this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life…”28
Another contradiction then arises. Self-consciousness is satisfied by being what it is, by
being conscious of itself alone. Yet such awareness must occur through something which is other
and independent. This contradiction can be resolved if the independent other is capable of selfnegation: this allows for the negation of otherness (leaving self-consciousness aware of itself
alone), yet without self-consciousness having to engage with otherness (which is what
precipitates the contradiction).
However, the only thing that is capable of self-negation is another self-consciousness. In
negating itself for the sake of the other, the second self-consciousness thereby enables the first
self-consciousness to have awareness of itself with minimal engagement with the second. The
second self-consciousness is merely a mirror for the first, for the first sees only itself in the

28

PS §174 (p. 109).

15

second. The second self-consciousness recognizes the first, but the first does not recognize the
second. Recognition is only one-sided.
In seeing itself in the other, however, the first self-consciousness feels alienated from
itself because its identity is located outside of itself. To remedy this, the first self-consciousness
recognizes the full independence of the second. By recognizing the full independence and
equality of the second, the first self-consciousness receives back its identity within itself.
However, in recognizing the full independence and equality of the second, the identity of the first
is not located solely within itself. Recognition of another as independent and equal is a
recognition that both possess a commonality: “A self-consciousness exists for a selfconsciousness. Only so is it in fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of
itself in its otherness become explicit for it.”29 Possession of a commonality in turn entails that
the rights of one are shared by the other, and thus that the preservation of one’s own rights is
dependent upon that one’s upholding the rights of the other.
The upshot of Hegel’s dialectic of recognition is that persons can achieve freedom in its
fullest extent only in relations of mutual recognition, i.e. in a community. This much we saw
with Fichte. Hegel departs from Fichte, however, in that the other does not resist the subject’s Ihood (as is the case for Fichte), but rather the other expresses the subject’s I-hood.30 For Hegel,
therefore, the subject’s freedom consists in an alignment between herself and what is other than
herself. She can recognize herself in what is other than herself because it is not alien to her. For
Hegel, therefore, the subject’s freedom consists in the willful alignment of herself with what is
other than herself.
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2. Staudenmaier and Dorner: Embracing Novelty and Tradition
The understanding of subjectivity outlined above, I argue, had an important influence on
the construction of the Trinity in the theologies of Staudenmaier and Dorner. Broadly speaking,
both present the divine persons of the Trinity in terms of a willful alignment of oneself with one
another. (Although we will see that Staudenmaier and Dorner render this willful alignment in
different ways.)
The idealist heritage of Staudenmaier and Dorner, however, is complicated. Neither
appropriated such idealist frameworks for subjectivity uncritically and unmodified, for such
frameworks for subjectivity – when applied to the divine unmodified – would have involved
costs which neither Staudenmaier nor Dorner were willing to pay.
For Fichte, as we have seen, subjectivity requires resistance or opposition to the I by the
not-I. Thus, in order to be an I, the I must be limited by a not-I. Personal subjectivity, in other
words, requires constraint by otherness as its condition of possibility. Thus, for Fichte, the only
possible personal subjects are those that are finite. Fichte, therefore, saves divine infinitude by
denying personhood to God. For Staudenmaier and Dorner, however, divine personhood is a
fundamental and so irrevocable feature of Christian religion.
For Hegel, the full subjectivity of the Absolute requires both the infinite milieu and the
finite milieu. To put the matter in representational terms (the register of discourse in which
Staudenmaier and Dorner operate but which Hegel seeks to transcend), complete divine
subjectivity, for Hegel, requires that God create and dwell within the finite.31 Staudenmaier and
As Cyril O’Regan puts the matter, “To be sufficient divine subjectivity, what is required, besides ahistorical or
metahistorical divine becoming, is becoming within the milieu of finitude, the divine history of creation, fall,
incarnation, redemption, and salvation. . . . The role of finitude in the self-development of the divine is impossible to
overestimate. Crucially, the milieu of finitude makes possible the genuine contrariety that cannot be established on
the level of the immanent divine.” Cyril O’Regan, The Heterodox Hegel (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1994), 141.
31
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Dorner, by contrast, want to see subjectivity as an immanent characteristic of the divine. Thus,
for Staudenmaier and Dorner, the created order cannot contribute to God’s subjectivity in any
way. As they see it, it is only because God is immanently a personal subject that He can freely
create and encounter the finite as its ultimate end.
My claim in this dissertation is therefore that Staudenmaier and Dorner both appropriated
this novel notion of subjectivity inaugurated by the German Idealist tradition, but critically
appropriated it. Specifically, both theologians took to heart that otherness is constitutive of
personal subjectivity, and yet, in the case of the divine, were unwilling to locate this otherness in
creation. Although taking seriously the notion that otherness is constitutive of personal
subjectivity, in their construal of God Staudenmaier and Dorner depart from Hegel in making the
locus of such otherness the immanent divine life itself.
The resource that Staudenmaier and Dorner draw upon in order to render otherness as an
immanent feature of the divine does not have its roots in Hegelianism but in Christianity: it is the
Trinity. (Hegel, of course, had his own construal of the Trinity but, as we will see, Staudenmaier
and Dorner depart from him in holding that the Trinity can account for immanent divine
subjectivity.) Throughout the mainstream Christian theological tradition, doctrinally established
at the councils of Nicaea and Constantinople in the fourth century, God is identified as ‘one’
with respect to the divine essence, and as ‘three’ with respect to the divine persons (who are
traditionally referred to as ‘the Father,’ ‘the Son,’ and ‘the Holy Spirit’). Or conversely, each of
the divine persons is identified as ‘God’ in virtue of their sharing one and the same essence, and
individually identified as either ‘the Father,’ or as ‘the Son,’ or as the ‘Holy Spirit’ (and so
identified as personally distinct from one another) in virtue of a uniquely-possessed property.
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Finally, the mainstream Christian theological tradition has asserted that the distinction of
the divine persons – and so divine otherness – is not a distinction merely in virtue of divine
revelation. Rather, the distinction of the divine persons is characteristic of the divine even apart
from divine revelation. Contra Sabellianism, the mainstream Christian tradition has insisted that
the distinction of persons within the Trinity is an eternal – and therefore immanent – feature of
the divine.
Mainstream Christian theological reflection, therefore, has held that there is indeed an
‘otherness’ present within the divine insofar as God is viewed with respect to the category of
persons, even though such otherness is not viewed as present within the divine insofar as God is
viewed with respect to the category of essence. It is this sense of otherness that Staudenmaier
and Dorner utilize in order to apply the insights regarding subjectivity made by their German
idealist predecessors .
My interpretation of Staudenmaier and Dorner, therefore, is that they have utilized the
resources of the Christian tradition while applying the insights of (what was then) modern
philosophical reflection. On one hand, the notion of ontological otherness immanent to the divine
(the category of persons), provides the means by which Staudenmaier and Dorner can affirm
otherness as constitutive for personal subjectivity, and thereby construe God as a personal
subject; on the other hand, because this otherness is nonetheless an eternal feature of the divine,
they can construe God as immanently a personal subject, irrespective of any encounter with the
created order.
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3. Research on Staudenmaier and Dorner
In this dissertation, I have focused on the dogmatic works of Staudenmaier and Dorner.32
My reasoning for this is that these works were written later in their life and so offer their most
mature thinking on the subject.
English-language research on Staudenmaier and Dorner is quite limited, particularly that
on the former. Further, while previous research has highlighted Staudenmaier’s and Dorner’s
debts to the German idealist tradition, none has given a comprehensive treatment of the issue in
terms of divine subjectivity. This dissertation, therefore, offers a treatment of nineteenth-century
trinitarian theology from a new angle.
For a brief treatment in English of Staudenmaier on the Trinity, particularly some ways in
which he related the Trinity to other theological loci, see Bradford E. Hinze, “Tracing Trinity in
Tradition: The Achievement of Franz Anton Staudenmaier,” Journal for the History of Modern
Theology / Zeitschrift für neuere Theologiegeschichte 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 34–57. See also
Aidan Nichols, “Catholic Theology of the Trinity in the Nineteenth Century,” in The Oxford
Handbook of the Trinity, ed. Matthew Levering and Gilles Emery (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014), 281–93. For a comprehensive treatment of Staudenmaier’s doctrine of God
(including the Trinity), see Karl Friedrich Reith, Die Gotteslehre bei Franz Anton Staudenmaier
(Bern: Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, 1974).
For a general overview of Staudenmaier’s theology and background, see the following:
Peter Hünermann, “Franz Anton Staudenmaier,” in Katholische Theologen im 19 Jahrhundert,
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Franz Anton Staudenmaier, Die christliche Dogmatik, 4 vols. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1844-52). All
translations of Staudenmaier are my own. For Dorner, all quotations come from the English translation: Isaak
August Dorner, A System of Christian Doctrine, trans. Alfred Cave and J.S. Banks, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1880), although I have altered the translation in some places. This translation is based on: Isaak August Dorner,
System der christlichen Glaubenslehre (Germany: W. Hertz, 1879).
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ed. Henrich Fries and Georg Schwaiger, vol. 2 (Munich: Kösel Verlag, 1975), 99–128; Peter
Hünermann, “Franz Anton Staudenmaier,” Theologische Quartalschrift 150 (1970): 52–54. For
the Hegelian background, see Peter Hünermann, “Die Hegel-Rezeption Franz Anton
Staudenmaiers,” in Kirche und Theologie im 19 Jahrhundert, ed. Georg Schwaiger (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck und Rupprecht, 1975).
There are some works on specific theological topics in Staudenmaier other than his
doctrine of God. See the following: Peter Hünermann, Trinitarische Anthropologie Bei Franz
Anton Staudenmaier (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1962); William E. McConville, Theology and
Encyclopedia: A Study in the Thought of Franz Anton Staudenmaier (Vanderbilt University,
1983); Philipp Weindel, Das Verhältnis von Glauben und Wissen in der Theologie Franz Anton
Staudenmaiers: eine Auseinandersetzung katholischer Theologie mit Hegelschem Idealismus
(Mosella-Verlag, 1940).
On the Catholic Tübingen School to which Staudenmaier belonged, see the following:
Bernhard Casper, “Der Systemgedanke in der späten Tübinger Schule und in der deutschen
Neuscholastik,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 72 (1964-1965): 161–79; Bradford E. Hinze, “Roman
Catholic Theology: Tübingen,” in The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century Theology,
ed. David A. Fergusson (Chichester, U.K.; Malden, Mass: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 187–213;
Peter Hünermann, “Der Reflex des deutschen Idealismus in der katholischen Tübinger Schule,”
Philosophisches Jahrbuch 73 (1965-1966): 48–74; Grant Kaplan, Answering the Enlightenment:
The Catholic Recovery of Historical Revelation (New York: Herder & Herder, 2006); Grant
Kaplan, “Did Schelling Live on in Catholic Theology? An Examination of His Influence on
Catholic Tübingen,” International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 80, no. 1–2 (2019): 57–
70; Thomas F. O’Meara, Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism: Schelling and the
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Theologians, 1st edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982); Philipp Weindel,
“Fr. H. Jacobis Einwirkung auf die Glaubenwissenschaft der katholischen Tübinger Schule,” in
Aus Theologie und Philosophie: Festschrift für Fritz Tillmann zu seinem 75. Geburtstag, ed.
Theodor Steinbüchel and Theodor Müncker (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1950), 573–96;
Bernhard Welte, “Beobachtungen zum Systemgedanken in der Tübinger Katholischen Schule,”
Theologische Quartalschrift147 (1967): 40–59.
The most comprehensive work in English on Dorner’s theology (including the Trinity) is
Jonathan Norgate, Isaak A. Dorner: The Triune God and the Gospel of Salvation (London; New
York: T&T Clark, 2011). See also Christine Axt-Piscalar, Der Grund des Glaubens: Eine
theologiegeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Glaube und Trinität in der Theologie
Isaak August Dorners (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990). Dorner’s trinitarian theology is briefly
touched upon in Samuel M. Powell, “Nineteenth-Century Protestant Doctrines of the Trinity,” in
The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity, ed. Matthew Levering and Gilles Emery (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 267–80. There is a chapter on Dorner’s doctrine of God in Dale M.
Schlitt, German Idealism’s Trinitarian Legacy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2016).
On Dorner’s doctrine of divine immutability, see Robert F. Brown, “Schelling and
Dorner on Divine Immutability,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 53, no. 2 (June
1985): 237–49; Robert R. Williams, “I. A. Dorner: The Ethical Immutability of God,” Journal of
the American Academy of Religion 54, no. 4 (1986): 721–38. For a general treatment of Dorner,
see Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (Grand Rapids, Mich: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002), 563-573.
Dorner is not identified as belonging to a particular ‘school’ in the way Staudenmaier is.
However, he was part of a wider current in nineteenth-century theology, known as ‘mediating
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theology’ (Vermittlungstheologie). The most comprehensive treatment of mediating theology is
Knut Ragnar Holte, Die Vermittlungstheologie. Ihre theologischen Grundbegriffe kritisch
untersucht., Studia doctrinae Christianae Upsaliensia, 3 (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1965).
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Chapter 1
FRANZ ANTON STAUDENMAIER AND THE CHRISTIAN GOD AS PERSONAL

Introduction
In the wake of idealistic philosophical systems wherein a relation to the finite is a
requirement of divine subjectivity (e.g., Hegelianism, as we saw in the introduction), Franz
Anton Staudenmaier claims to the contrary that the divine forms a complete world unto itself.
According to Staudenmaier, God does not need the finite in order to realize subjectivity, and this
is the case precisely in virtue of God being the Trinity: “Because only thereby, that God as triune
forms for Himself a complete world can He, without Himself becoming the world, posit a
creation outside of Himself, and stand lofty and elevated over this creation as its Lord, leader,
ruler, and sanctifier.”33 “For by being not one, but by being three divine persons,” Staudenmaier
insists, “is the divine life a world for itself, a whole and complete world, which stands by itself
over the finite world, as it does not require the latter for itself.”34
As a world for itself, the divine need not seek out something other than itself, i.e., some
other world (such as the finite order). Indeed, the divine can be described as a world precisely
because it is wholly sufficient to sustain its life without any mediation of the nondivine.
(Although of course, Staudenmaier insists, the Christian faith proclaims that God has in fact
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graciously shared His life – indeed His very person – with the nondivine. But it is precisely
because God is wholly sufficient to sustain His own life without the nondivine that His act of
interpersonal interaction with the nondivine can be described as gracious.)
What is responsible for the triune life of God being a complete world unto itself is that
the divine persons of the Trinity, although distinct from one another, nonetheless form a unity.
As Staudenmaier puts it, “The complete world which God is in Himself is just the divine unity as
a concrete [unity], i.e. the tripersonality of the one God.”35 It is in virtue of God being Trinity,
therefore, that God is a ‘living unity,’ and it is in virtue of being a living unity that God does not
need the created order in order to realize His subjectivity. Staudenmaier puts it this way:
Now also, when the unity of the divine essence is seen as a living [unity], according to
which the concept of the Godhead moves itself within itself as the divine love, and God is
a world within Himself, the Godhead does not need to mix itself with the world out of
hunger for life and concreteness, so to speak, to posit and to love itself as a world,
thereby at the same time to make itself dependent on the finite, and to grasp this
dependence as an essential and necessary element of the divine nature itself, like Hegel
who, without embarrassment, can grasp no God who can be known without the world.36
Over the next three chapters, we will explore how Staudenmaier understands God to be
able to freely relate to the nondivine only if God is Trinity. We will see that, for Staudenmaier,
an agent’s act of freely relating to what is other than itself is an act that can be performed only by
a personal subject, and a personal subject requires other personal subjects in order for each to be
free. In other words, agents achieve personal subjectivity, and thus their freedom, only within a
matrix of personal intersubjectivity (that is, within a relation to at least one other personal agent).
And for Staudenmaier, because the Trinity is just such a matrix of personal intersubjectivity, God
can freely relate to what is other than Himself.
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The next three chapters are arranged as follows. Here, in chapter one, we will examine
the notion that, for Staudenmaier, freely relating to what is other than itself is an act that can be
performed only by a personal subject, and we will observe how the aspects of divine personality
are treated by Staudenmaier. In chapter two, we will explore how the aspects of God’s personal
subjectivity are manifest in His relating to the nondivine. Finally, in chapter three, we will
examine how a personal subject requires other personal subjects in order for each to be free, and
demonstrate that such personal intersubjectivity characterizes Staudenmaier’s understanding of
the triune life of God.
The structure of the current chapter is as follows. First, we will examine how
Staudenmaier understands personal subjectivity, or ‘personality’ (section 1). Having examined
the notion of personality, we then examine how Staudenmaier understands the characteristics of
a personal subject – particularly those of intelligence and will – to be present in the divine.
Section 2, therefore, examines Staudenmaier’s treatment of the divine intelligence. Here we will
investigate God’s theoretical (as opposed to practical) knowledge (2.1), specifically God’s selfknowledge (2.1.1) and God’s knowledge of the nondivine (2.1.2). We will see that, for
Staudenmaier, it is crucial that God be able to distinguish between knowledge regarding Himself
and knowledge of the nondivine in order to preserve the free subjectivity of the divine vis-à-vis
the created order (2.1.3-5). Section 2.2 then treats God’s practical knowledge. Here, we will
explore how the divine wisdom orders creatures to God as their end.
Having covered the divine intellect, section 3 examines how Staudenmaier understands
the divine will. One of the important topics covered in the treatment of the divine intellect is that
God apprehends His proper relation to the nondivine. Our task in section 3, then, is to understand
what it is that demands that God will in accordance with His proper relation to the nondivine. We
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will see that the divine will can operate only in accordance with the divine essence, which
demands that God manifest Himself truthfully to the created order (3.2). This entails that God
always acts as God toward the created order, i.e., that God embody His proper relation to the
nondivine (the topic of 3.3).
In examining how Staudenmaier understands the divine intellect and the divine will, we
will have come to see how he understands God to be absolute personality. Thus, we will have
come to see how Staudenmaier understands the conditions that enable free personal interaction
of the divine with the nondivine. This, then, will set us up for chapter two where we examine
how Staudenmaier understands the elements of personality to manifest themselves in
interpersonal encounter with the created order.

1. Personal Subjectivity
The ability for an agent to freely relate to what is other than itself requires the possession
of a will that can determine itself freely. For Staudenmaier, the sort of agent that possesses this
capacity is a ‘person,’ that is, an individual who possesses the attributes of ‘personality.’
Staudenmaier describes the characteristics of a personal subject as following: “The elements of
personality are (a) organic being-for-self (Fürsichsein), (b) intelligence, and (c) free will.”37
Staudenmaier speaks of ‘being-for-self’ as indicating a thing’s irreducible individuality,
or its irreducibility to another. Thus, being-for-self indicates a thing’s difference from all that is
other than it, for only if a thing possesses some level of difference from all else can it never be
reduced to that which is other than itself. ‘Intelligence’ indicates the capacity for knowing. The
act of knowing, Staudenmaier says, is the process of agreement between mind and being. He

37

CD II §57.2 (p. 288).

27

says, “If…all intellectual striving goes toward truth and, as we have seen, the truth consists in the
accordance of thinking with that which is to be thought, or what is to be known by thinking, then
it does not hinder us to denote the process of knowing as that process through which the
accordance is worked…”38 Intelligence, then, is the capacity for intellectual agreement between
mind and being. In other words, intelligence is the capacity for the mind to accurately render
reality. Finally, ‘will’ is “the ability…to determine oneself and others…”39 One can think of will
as a capacity for causing agreement between mind and reality, but in the opposite sense of
intelligence: it is the capacity to determine reality in accordance with the content of the subject’s
intelligence.
Note that these three components are required for the performance of actions. Take, for
example, the act of drinking out of a cup. There must be an irreducible agent who performs the
act of drinking from the cup (being-for-self). There must be a capacity for the agent to accurately
render reality – e.g., to cognize that there are objects before it, to recognize the object before it as
a cup (intelligence). There must be a capacity to determine reality in accordance with the content
of the subject’s intelligence and intentions – e.g., to physically manipulate the cup by picking it
up so as to drink from it (will).
For our purposes, we can describe a subject’s free ‘acts’ or ‘actions’ as (1) its ability to
achieve accordance between its intellect and being and – based on such intellectual accordance –
(2) its ability to determine being in accordance with its intellect. A personal subject, then,
denotes an individual who has the capacity for achieving agreement between its intellect and
being and then determining being based on this agreement.
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Of course, in the performance of a free act, it is not only what is other than the subject
that is known and determined by the subject. The subject also must be able to accurately render
reality about itself (exercise of intellect upon itself): to cognize itself as a subject, as that which is
capable of acting. The subject must be able to determine itself in accordance with the content of
the subject’s intelligence and intentions (exercise of will upon itself): to manipulate itself in order
to pick up the cup (e.g., to direct its bodily movements, etc.). Personal subjectivity involves not
just the capacity to direct its intelligence and will to what is other than itself, but also the
capacity to direct its intelligence and will upon itself.
Interestingly, because personal subjectivity involves the capacity to direct its intelligence
and will upon itself, personal subjectivity, it seems, involves a duality vis-à-vis the self. The
subject cognizes itself as a subject and determines itself in accordance with the content of its
intelligence and intentions. Thus, there are two aspects of the self: (1) the aspect of the self
which cognizes and directs itself, and (2) the aspect of the self which is cognized and directed.
So, as Staudenmaier puts it, “The spirit thinking itself not only grasps itself, but also, by thinking
and grasping itself, posits itself. He, as he is subject, at the same time posits himself as object, as
thing, which he strives to know.”40
To render itself an object of knowledge for itself, however, the subject must also have an
acquaintance with what is other than itself. We saw that subjectivity involves a duality between
the aspect of the self which cognizes and directs itself (a transcendental self), and the aspect of
the self which is cognized and directed (an empirical self). If an empirical self is necessary for
subjectivity, there must be a place where the empirical self is such that it can express and
actualize subjectivity. Or perhaps more precisely, the empirical self must be rendered to the
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transcendental self as potentially determinate, and this is possible only as within relations to
things other than itself. Thus, an empirical self can be such only within a nexus of objects.41
Thus, at a minimum, the conditions for a subject’s free act of relating to something other than
itself includes knowledge of self and what is other than self, as well as the capacity to determine
self and what is other than self. And the capacity for knowledge of self and what is other than
self, as well as the capacity to determine self and what is other than self, are just the capacities of
an agent who possesses ‘personality.’
According to Staudenmaier, “because God appears in general universally as intelligence
and as holy good will, He not only takes to himself the attributes of a personal essence, but also –
as the highest intelligence and highest most holy will – is the absolute personality.”42 “The God
who exists out of Himself and who creates all being which subsists outside of Him,”
Staudenmaier claims, “is the personal God.”43 Staudenmaier regards God as personal because the
characteristics examined above are all predicable of Him: “We call the divine essence a personal
essence because being-for-self, intelligence, and free will befit Him, and indeed befit Him in an
absolute sense.”44
On the issue of whether or not God possesses the features of personality, Staudenmaier
often contrasts his own position with the towering thinkers of the early nineteenth century. The
personality of God, he argues, is often swallowed up in the systems of those thinkers. In
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criticizing Friedrich Schleiermacher, for example, Staudenmaier says, “Taking Spinoza as a
starting point, he can grasp the Godhead only as the causal substance. By combining his
Spinozism with the tenets of Schellingian nature philosophy, he comes merely only to a
Spinozistic-Schellingian identity, in which all real difference – and above all the personal – is
annulled” (aufgehoben ist).45 Likewise in Hegelian philosophy, Staudenmaier maintains, “The
subjectivity that [Hegel] maintained is far removed from being personality. Within this
[Hegelian] framework, even if it could ever become a matter of the truly subjective and personal,
this would only be the subjectivity and personality of man, who immediately enters into the place
of divinity.”46 For Staudenmaier, it is only insofar that the divine is personal – in possession of
being-for-self, intelligence, and will – that it can freely engage with the finite. Below, we will
examine how Staudenmaier posits these characteristics of personality in the divine.

2. The Divine Intelligence
In this section, we will explore the divine intelligence. The divine intelligence can be
divided into its two basic functions or aspects: theoretical and practical. The former is concerned
with God’s knowledge of the truth (e.g., of Himself and of created essences) and the latter is
concerned with knowledge of how things are to reach God as their end.
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2.1 God’s Theoretical Knowledge
2.1.1 Divine Self-Knowledge
In order to act freely, an agent must possess intellect. More specifically, the agent must
be able to make itself an object of its intellect so as to direct itself to perform specific acts. This
seems to be the way that Staudenmaier understands the concept of action. In this section, we will
explore Staudenmaier’s comments regarding the divine as an intellectual agent which, as we will
see, affects how God acts.
Staudenmaier follows the mainstream Christian theological tradition in asserting both that
God possesses an intellect and that intellect is an essential attribute of the divine: “Thinking in
God is not something which merely adheres to Him, accidental so to speak, but His substance is
an essentially (wesentlich) thinking and knowing substance.”47 As an essential attribute of the
divine, intellect is something which belongs to God by nature; it is not an addition which occurs
at some stage subsequent to divine existence or achieved by means of some divine act. Thus,
Staudenmaier says, “God thinks and knows according to His nature, which is spirit. His being is
therefore a thinking and knowing, and indeed, since His being is itself an eternal being, His
thinking and knowing is an eternal thinking and eternal knowing.”48
That intellect is an essential feature of the divine is important for Staudenmaier in
maintaining that the divine is a personal subject apart from the created order. Because intellect is
possessed by God essentially, and because creation is not an essential component of the divine,
God does not need the created order in order to possess intellect. Staudenmaier notes explicitly
that the created order does not act as a cause of intellect in the divine: “If God knows Himself
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eternally, He has, as an eternal being, an eternal self-consciousness; then any mediation of the
divine self-knowledge conditioned by finitude is excluded in [our] representation of God …”49
And again: “Just as little is the idea of God, i.e. the idea which God has of Himself, mediated
through finite ideas, so that the first [the idea which God has of Himself] has to be obtained only
through the latter.”50
The possession of intellect, of course, entails the capacity for knowledge, and so we must
explore what sort of knowledge, according to Staudenmaier, is possessed by the divine.
Staudenmaier divides his treatment of the divine intelligence into three categories: [1] divine
self-knowledge (CD II §63); [2] divine knowledge of extradivine being (§64); [3] divine wisdom
(§65).
Of the divine self-knowledge, Staudenmaier says, “We understand by the divine
intelligence, as it is directed in an active way to the divine essence itself as its object, the most
complete self-knowledge, the deepest and clearest self-grasping of the Godhead; the divine
nature is known in its entire scope from and through itself, both in the abyss and in the eternity of
its essence.”51 The divine intellect knows the divine essence in its entirety, both in terms of depth
and in terms of range. Thus, there is no degree of opacity in God’s knowledge of Himself.
This self-knowledge, Staudenmaier argues, is not a ‘relative’ knowledge but an ‘absolute’
knowledge. “God knows Himself in an absolute way all the more because it is not one which
knows and again another which is known. But there is here an absolute identity of the knowing
and the known, indeed an absolute identity of the absolute self-knowing and of that which is
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known absolutely through itself.”52 Unlike creatures, where there is a mediated gap between the
knowing subject and the object to be known, there is no mediated gap in the divine between
knower and known. (This gap between knower and known in human self-knowledge is due to the
fact that such knowledge “is mediated by world-knowledge and God-knowledge.”)53
In God, however, “is neither mediation through another nor a development out of itself
which becomes subject to time: but in God, self-knowing is a self-knowing which is an eternal
and eternally complete in unmediated absolute self-beholding, which excludes any further
revelation or any further self-revelation.”54 The lack of a mediated gap between knower and
known is why Staudenmaier claims that God’s knowledge – unlike creaturely knowledge – is
unmediated. This lack of mediation Staudenmaier attributes to divine simplicity, wherein divine
being and divine knowing are identical: “The self-knowledge of God can therefore also be taken
for the being (Sein) of God, since it is in the divine thinking, or the divine being (Sein), which as
spiritual, is foremost self-thinking [being].”55
Unfortunately, Staudenmaier does not elaborate on the lack of mediation between the
divine as object of knowledge and the divine as knowing subject in terms of whether such
‘identity’ between the two includes personal distinction between the divine persons and,
correlatively, whether the lack of mediation between the knower and the known occurs only at
the level of substance but not at the level of person (such that the divine persons’ knowledge of
one another is mediated in some way).

52

CD II §63.1 (p. 305).

53

Ibid.

54

Ibid.

55

Ibid., (p. 304).

34

More important than whether Staudenmaier treats the issue directly, however, is what is
at stake in his raising the issue in the first place. What he sees at stake in asserting a lack of
mediation between the divine as object of knowledge and the divine as knowing subject is
whether God – like creatures – needs something substantially different from Himself in order to
possess knowledge about Himself. It is clear that his answer is negative.

2.1.2 Divine Knowledge of the Non-Divine
Of course, God’s knowledge is not limited to knowledge of Himself. In line with the
orthodox theological tradition, Staudenmaier maintains that God’s intellect is not merely
perceptive of created being, but that it is causally efficacious vis-à-vis created being: “Everything
which has existence is itself only the thought of the Godhead, i.e., the work of divine thinking,
with which is one with the divine willing.”56
Because the divine intellect is a causal factor in bringing the created order into being,
God has an intimate knowledge – indeed, the highest possible knowledge – of the created order.
Just as God’s self-knowledge is unmediated, so also is God’s knowledge vis-à-vis the created
order an unmediated knowledge. “If above we have called the divine omnipresence the absolute
causality of God which extends itself and continually effects itself in the world, then…the divine
omniscience must be called the intellectual omnipresence of God in the universe. Indeed, it is
this absolutely and unmediatedly, i.e. without any mediation, which is necessary only for finite
knowing.”57 God’s knowledge of creation is unmediated precisely because it is His own
knowledge which has brought creation into being.
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Now that we have examined the sorts of knowledge possessed by the divine intelligence,
we will explore how they are related to God as the knowing subject (or perhaps more accurately,
how God, as knowing subject, relates these sorts of knowledge to Himself). Although here we
have designated these two sorts of knowledge as ‘self-knowledge’ and ‘knowledge of the nondivine,’ we have actually only presupposed that these referents of knowledge are correct. As we
will see below, that there actually is a distinction between the divine and the non-divine (and
therefore a distinction between divine self-knowledge and divine knowledge of the non-divine)
depends upon how God relates Himself to this knowledge.

2.1.3 The Divine Self-Conception
For Staudenmaier, it is crucial that God be able to distinguish between knowledge
regarding Himself and knowledge of the nondivine. This is crucial because, as Staudenmaier
reasons, if God is unable to distinguish between Himself and the finite order – if God does not
know Himself as God and the finite as created – then divine subjectivity cannot be regarded as
free from, and so independent of, the created order.

2.1.4 The Divine Thought of Self and of Otherness as not Identical in the Divine Mind
We have seen that God possesses knowledge of both Himself and creation. Further, we
have seen that God possesses knowledge both of Himself and of creation un-mediatedly. That
both knowledge of Himself as well as of the extradivine are related to the divine intellect
unmediatedly yields an important question: If God knows both Himself and creation
unmediatedly, is God able to distinguish between Himself and that which is other than Himself?
This issue is important to Staudenmaier since whether or not one ventures into pantheism
depends upon the answer to this question. It is one and the same divine mind which both makes
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itself an object of knowledge and which can create that which is other than itself. If God were
unable to distinguish between the contents of these two sorts of thought, then God would be
unable to distinguish between Himself and the nondivine.
Staudenmaier, however, asserts that God is able to distinguish between Himself and that
which is other than Himself. He speaks of the ‘divine idea’ – that is, God’s own thought (not our
thought of God) – as referring to two types of subject matter: God and creatures. As he puts it,
“The content of the divine idea is, according to the category of aseity, God Himself, according to
the category of causality, however, the creature. Therefore, there is posited an absolutely
essential distinction between the ideas themselves which, as the distinction is original, also can
never be negated nor would it become negated.”58 Indeed, in this same section he simply notes,
“The idea of God is absolutely distinct from the idea of the world…”59
Because there is distinction between God’s thought of Himself and His thought of the
extradivine, the content of God’s thoughts is not only about Himself: “The idea as thought of the
world is therefore a divine thought, i.e. God thinks this thought. But He thinks it not as the
thinking or as the idea of His own essence, but as the thinking and idea of another, as the essence
of the world.”60 Here we can see that the ‘as’ structure in the previous remark implies that, for
Staudenmaier, God explicitly recognizes the difference between His idea of Himself and His idea
of the created.
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Given the distinction between the divine thought of self and the divine thought of the
non-divine, if creation is included in the contents of the divine mind, and yet does not form the
entirety of contents of the divine mind, then the divine cannot be identified with creation. To put
the matter differently, God is not to be identified with the content of His own thought: “It is an
infinite perversity to draw the conclusion now all at once that…God is Himself also everything
which He thinks, every and all content of the divine thinking is God Himself.”61
Staudenmaier wants to hold to a traditional idea of God’s simplicity, for this text is
immediately preceded by him saying, “Since, according to our Christian conviction, God is a
thinking being (Wesen), we do not distinguish between a merely existing and a thinking God, but
God – who for us is existing – is for us also thinking, and conversely. Insofar as God is a
thinking being (Wesen), the thinking done by Him is not to be separated: the thought which He
thinks is His thought just because He thinks it.”62 (CD III p. 49) Staudenmaier does not want to
reject divine simplicity by saying that God’s being and God’s thought are separate.
Yet, Staudenmaier’s worry is that since the contents of the divine mind include that of
creation, if the contents of the divine mind are identified with the divine being, then creation is
identified with God. Thus, Staudenmaier says,
If God directs Himself in His thinking upon Himself in absolute beholding of Himself, so
certainly is there an identity between the thinker and the thought; God is the content of
His thought. If this is not the case, that is, if God does not turn in upon Himself but rather
turns away from Himself, upon the world as His not-I, then that identity of being between
the thinker and the thought ceases. It does not follow that when God thinks, that He is
Himself everything which He thinks…63

61

CD III §8.3 (p. 49).

62

Ibid.

63

Ibid.

38

Staudenmaier elaborates on the relation between the divine idea of creation and the being of
creation in CD III, and it would take us too far off track to investigate how he relates that relation
to divine simplicity. The main point to take away is that there must be a sharp distinction for God
between His thought of Himself and His thought of what is not Himself. Indeed, for
Staudenmaier, God not merely distinguishes His thought of Himself from His thought of the
non-divine but, more positively, thinks of Himself as an ‘I,’ as a subject, and that which is other
than Himself as the ‘not-I.’
Staudenmaier says, “The personality of God itself…is constituted by the divine I-ness
(Ichheit) and the intellectual and ethical abilities which rest in it.”64 “If personality consists in Ihood,” Staudenmaier says, “then personality is put on God by Holy Scripture as often as it
presents Him as expressing the word ‘I.’ This occurs either such that it is combined with other
words, as 2 Mos. [Exod.] 3:14, or such that ‘I’ is posited explicitly: ‘I, I am, I am Jehovah.’ . . .
For the expression ‘I am Jehovah’ also says, ‘Jehovah is an I,’ i.e. Jehovah is a personal God.”65
Further, Staudenmaier insists that God explicitly distinguishes Himself from creation.
“So greatly does God also recognize the creature as that which is thought, willed, and created by
Him…The idea of God is absolutely other than the idea of the creature; while beholding Himself
in His idea, God knows Himself as an absolute other than that which He has before Himself in
the idea of the world.”66 Staudenmaier’s language states not only that God perceives the
distinction between Himself and the world but, more strongly, God knows Himself as distinct
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from the world. We see this language of God knowing and willing Himself as independent from
all else in other places as well:
God is not only an absolute essence (Wesen) which exists from and for Himself, which
excludes from itself everything else as alien to it, but as this being-for-self (Fürsichsein)
God also knows and wills Himself, and thus He remains eternally distinct from creaturely
being which, therefore, remains forever the extradivine. As that which exists for Himself
(Fürsichseiende), or as a personal being-for-self (Fürsichsein), God is also the one of
whom it can be said neither that the world is an essential and necessary element for Him,
nor is He Himself an essential and necessary element of the world, and finally just as
little can it be said that He would not be God without the world, which definitions, as is
known, are the philosophy of modern pantheism.67
God, Staudenmaier insists, understands that-which-is-not God as that-which-is-not-God: “While
God knows and beholds Himself in eternal self-knowledge, He likewise knows and beholds that
which He is not, the extra-divine being, as the divine not-I.”68 As he puts it later, “For if God is
Himself the idea of the world, then He certainly does not need to behold the world from all
eternity as the other which is to be posited through becoming, to behold the world, consequently,
as his not-I, but He merely beholds Himself, until finally the thought comes to him as a kind of
accident of realizing himself as the world, of presenting himself and manifesting himself as the
world.”69
For Staudenmaier, then, it is crucial that divine knowledge of self and of the nondivine
not be confused in the divine mind. Why is this? If knowledge of self and knowledge of the
nondivine are identical in the divine mind, then, “According to this phrase, the world is no other
than the executed idea of the Godhead: God, who has only Himself in the idea of the world, has
actualized Himself in the world. The contents of the idea have become the contents of the
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world.”70 This effectively makes the world identical with the divine: “He who wills and beholds
Himself in the idea of the world has posited Himself as the world, so that we are just as much
able to say that God is the world as we are required to express that the world is God, God in
appearing, God in reality.”71
One way to look at the matter is that an intellectual agent must be able to individuate
itself from other objects so as to direct itself to perform actions. Individuating oneself requires a
sort of separation of the self: in a subject who undergoes the act of directing herself, there is an
aspect of the self that directs and another aspect of one and the same subject that is directed. To
direct oneself, then, requires a positing of oneself – namely, the aspect of oneself that is to be
directed. Staudenmaier’s worry is that, if God’s thought of Himself and His thought of the world
are identical in the divine mind, then the world is simply the divine itself, only in its posited
aspect.
2.1.5 God Knows Himself as ‘God’ and Knows Creation as ‘Creation’
In order for an agent to engage with another, that agent not only must know that he is
distinct from that other, but he must also know about himself. More precisely, the agent must
possess the proper knowledge about himself. In order to communicate Himself truthfully to the
non-divine, God must know the truth about Himself and the truth about His relation to a possible
created order. In other words, God must know Himself as God – as the creator, as the orderer, as
the final end of creatures – and the nondivine as created.
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According to Staudenmaier, God does not passively find Himself as God, but actively
affirms Himself as such. As we will explore in greater depth in the next chapter, God possesses
aseity – self-existence – which fundamentally distinguishes Him from all other being. Divine
aseity, for Staudenmaier, is constitutive of God’s status as ‘absolute’ vis-à-vis creation.
Thus, God actively affirms His status as ‘absolute’ vis-à-vis the created order: “Insofar
as, in God, the aseity of His own being (Wesen) becomes object of His knowing and willing, He
affirms that [aseity] as absolute, i.e., He acknowledges and wills it as that which it is, as the
innermost depth of His own being (Wesen).”72 Staudenmaier speaks of the divine self-affirmation
as under the category of ‘personality,’ which denotes the possession of intellect and will.73
Because divine self-affirmation involves intellect and will, in affirming Himself as absolute, God
can be said to be consciously and willingly affirming Himself as absolute. As Staudenmaier puts
it, “through this self-affirmation, however, God is what He is, with consciousness and will,
through which consciousness and through which will God posits Himself as that which He is
according to His being (Wesen).”74
In consciously affirming Himself as God, God also consciously affirms creation as
creation. In affirming creation as creation, as what He eternally knows as not-I, God excludes the
possibility that creation can be constitutive of His essence. “The self-affirmation of God is,
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however, not simply an affirmation inwardly, but also a negation outwardly through which God
excludes everything which He Himself is not, therefore all other as something which does not
belong to Him essentially (wesentlich), and therefore foreign to His being (Sein) and life.”75
Creation, therefore, can never be accorded a status whereby it transcends its status as creation,
for this would be for God to negate His status as God. “The divine self-affirmation,”
Staudenmaier says, “is the fidelity of God with respect to His own being (Wesen).”76 The divine
affirmation “is therefore the self-affirmation of the Godhead as the absolute substance which
exists from, in, and through itself, which as such has its principle in no other, and which does not
require another for its existing-in-itself, therefore also, since it does not exist from another, so
also excludes all other from itself as improper to it.”77
In knowing Himself as God and in knowing the nondivine as created, God knows
Himself as the creator, as the orderer, as the final end of creatures. God thus knows His proper
relation to creatures. This is the foundation for the divine intellect with regard to its arranging of
the finite in order that it will embody its proper relation to the divine. We will now turn to this
particular aspect of the divine intellect.

2.2 God’s Practical Knowledge
2.2.1 Divine Wisdom
Above, we explored the divine intellect in its theoretical aspect. But there is a practical
side to the divine knowing as well, in that it is also concerned with ordering extradivine being to
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its end, namely, to God Himself. This aspect of the divine intellect Staudenmaier refers to as the
‘divine wisdom’: “The divine wisdom relates everywhere to the goal and the destiny of
extradivine being; and thus we can take the divine wisdom as the teleological directing, or the
side of the divine intelligence with a view to the goal and end of finite things.”78 Thus, the divine
intellect implements a vision of how creaturely essences ought to be, as well as implementing
how creaturely essence can fulfill this vision. “For the eyes of the Godhead,” Staudenmaier says,
“the world is, from eternity, not only that which it is according to its essential layout and
according to its idea as divine concept, but for the eyes of the Godhead the world is also eternally
what it will be according to the determination already contained in the idea.”79
Here, the theoretical and the practical aspects of the divine intellect relate. The theoretical
aspect, the divine idea, encompasses creaturely essences as they ought to be, and the practical
aspect encompasses how creaturely aspects can reach this goal. As Staudenmaier puts it, God
“regards the idea of the creature with consideration of its fulfillment, namely as it ought to
actualize itself in its inner truth in time, the idea, therefore, as what ought to be, or rather the
essence as what ought to be according to its truth, which truth is just the idea.”80 Although we
can distinguish these two aspects of the divine intellect, they are nonetheless united in God’s
intellectual relation to creation: “The divine intelligence is, in its Ur-thinking of the world, also
already an ordering of the world with consideration to the general world goal.”81
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To this point, we have considered how Staudenmaier understands the intellectual relation
of the divine to the nondivine. But for Staudenmaier, a merely intellectual relation between the
divine and the nondivine is insufficient to account for the existence of the nondivine: “The
eternal knowledge of extradivine being, which has merely possible existence, is not itself the sole
cause of finite being, but to this cause belongs above all the divine will, which decides in a free
way that merely possible being becomes a real being.”82 It is the will of God, in cooperation
with His intellect, which bring the nondivine into existence. Our next task, therefore, is to
examine the divine will.

3. The Divine Will
3.1 Introduction
As we saw above, the divine will is that ability of God to determine Himself and others.
But before we investigate the specifics of what God might will, we must step back and consider a
much larger issue. We have seen that, for Staudenmaier, God not only can distinguish between
Himself and the created order, but that God knows the proper relation between Himself and
creatures. And we have seen that, as a result of God’s knowledge of the proper relation between
Himself and creatures, God knows how to order them to Himself.
Although an agent may know his proper relation to others, this is not sufficient to
guarantee that the agent will act properly towards others. Thus, the question we must pursue is
this: what is it that demands that God will in accordance with His proper relation to creatures?
Why ought God respect this ‘proper’ relation between Himself and the created order? That the
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agent will act properly towards others requires that the agent possess the requisite moral quality.
This quality Staudenmaier refers to as the ‘divine truthfulness’ (die göttliche Wahrhaftigkeit).

3.2 Divine Manifestation as Truthful
In CD II §73, Staudenmaier treats the topic of divine truthfulness. “By truthfulness,”
Staudenmaier says, “ we understand not only that a being corresponds with its concept, but we
understand by it chiefly this, that the spirit corresponds most exactly to the concept or the
representation of itself which it has developed and has stirred up in others through self-revelation
of its inwardness.”83 Truthfulness, then, is the agreement between a moral being and the way it is
manifest to that which is other than itself.
The truthfulness of God, therefore, is “the absolute accordance of His spiritual being and
working with His idea which, as the idea known by man, is the result of the self-revelation of
God to man. God, as the truthful God, is thus that which He reveals Himself as; and: God, as the
truthful God, works and accomplishes that which He has promised to work and accomplish.”84
Here, the ‘idea’ is God’s self-manifestation to rational creatures in the act of revelation. Thus, the
truthfulness of God is the agreement between the divine essence and its self-manifestation to
creatures.
It may seem odd that there is even a question of the agreement between the divine
essence and its self-manifestation to creatures. It will be helpful, then, to imagine briefly what
would have to be the case if agreement between essence and its self-manifestation was not even a
question.
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‘Agreement’ or ‘correspondence’ entails that there are two aspects (in this case the
essence and its manifestation) involved in a relation. The notion of manifestation is something
beyond mere being, and thus it entails a relation to that being. Yet manifestation cannot occur
without that which is being manifest. If, then, the notion of an agreement or correspondence
between divine essence and divine manifestation were eliminated, then the relation between the
two would disappear. Since, however, manifestation cannot occur without that which is being
manifest, a dissolution of the relation entails a dissolution of manifestation. To eliminate the
notion of a correspondence between essence and manifestation is thereby to eliminate the
possibility that there be a manifestation of the divine to any essence which is not the divine
essence.
If there is no relation of correspondence between essence and manifestation a second
possibility suggests itself. We saw that the elimination of a correspondence between divine
essence and divine manifestation eliminates the notion of manifestation altogether, thus
eliminating divine revelation to nondivine essences. A second possibility, then, is that God does
not communicate an idea of His essence to the creature, but simply communicates the divine
essence itself to the creature. In other words, instead of manifesting or showing the creature who
He is, God actually makes the creature who He is – and so what would possess a created essence
instead would possesses the divine essence. (The paradigm instances of the divine
communicating its very essence to another are, of course, the generation of God the Son from
God the Father and the spiration of God the Spirit from the Father and the Son). Under this
possibility, the creature would no longer be a creature at all.
To eliminate the notion of an agreement between the divine essence and its selfmanifestation entails either that the communication between God and creature would be
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eliminated altogether, or that the difference between God and creature would be eliminated
altogether. This why, therefore, Staudenmaier speaks of God communicating His ‘idea’ to
creatures: it preserves the difference between the divine and creaturely (which, as we have seen,
Staudenmaier is very concerned with) while still allowing for the divine to reveal itself to the
creaturely.
Staudenmaier links the truthfulness of God to truth, holiness, and justice as divine
attributes: “The truthfulness is therefore an attribute blended from truth and holiness, but also
justice, because justice is just the revelation of the inner holiness [of God] which is expressed
outwardly.”85 “The truthfulness of God,” Staudenmaier says, “is both the appearing
(Sichtbarwerden) of the inner truth of the divine nature as well as the self-proving
(Sichbewähren) of the inner truth of the divine nature. While the contrary of the first would make
the inner truth of the divine nature a lie, the contrary of the other would make the divine essence
appear as unholy.”86 What does he mean here?
Staudenmaier seems to be saying that a lack of agreement between the divine essence and
its self-manifestation to creatures is a violation of both divine truth and divine holiness. A selfmanifestation which was the contrary of truth – the contrary of the inner truth of the divine
nature – would result in a lie: God would not be communicating the truth about Himself to
others. Second, the divine nature is always holy; it is the highest good there is. A selfmanifestation of the divine which is contrary to the divine nature is a self-manifestation which is
contrary to such holiness. Thus, a lack of correspondence between the divine essence and its selfmanifestation is thus a manifestation of unholiness.
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3.3 The Relation of the Divine Will to the Divine Essence
Here, we ought to pause and dwell for a moment on the last point made above. As we
have seen, God beholds Himself – He possesses self-knowledge. Thus, because God has selfknowledge, God has a concept of Himself. And further, in having a concept of Himself, God
knows the truth about Himself. The divine intellect, therefore, is that through which God
apprehends the truth about Himself.
What is important here is that the truth which God apprehends about Himself imposes
certain constraints upon the divine will. Staudenmaier’s construal of God’s personal subjectivity,
therefore, includes a normative component over the exercise of the will (viz., the divine essence).
Indeed, this normative character is brought out in Staudenmaier’s description of the divine
essence as that of a ‘law’: “The self-concept of the divine nature according to its entire truth, or
the complete truth of the divine nature, is the law (Gesetzt) of the divine life. The self-concept of
God, however, is the idea of God – namely, the idea which God has of Himself, i.e., the idea
which God has of His essence.”87 Indeed, Staudenmaier argues that if God did not will in
accordance with His own essence, it would be tantamount to a defect in the divine: “If it is,
however, the divine essence which wills, or if the divine essence is a willing essence, then we
would posit an imperfection in this essence if we assumed that God does not will as it lies in His
essence to will; we would put a contradiction and conflict in the divine life when we would
present to ourselves God willing against His nature, against His essence.”88
Therefore, the divine will does not conflict with the divine essence but, on the contrary, is
bound always to obey the normative constraints of the divine essence. If we were to construe the
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divine will as acting out of accord with the divine essence, then “we would cancel (aufheben) the
concept of eternity in the being (Wesen) of God, we would give ourselves over to the view that at
one moment God wills according to His nature and the next moment God wills against His
nature.”89 As Staudenmaier puts it in another place, “The divine will, as a substantial will, is in
all its movements eternally only the affirmation of the divine essence, the affirmation of the idea
of divinity. Denial [of the divine idea, of the divine essence] would be cancellation (Aufhebung)
of the divine essence.”90 Indeed, no divine attribute whatsoever can be in conflict within the
divine: “Since, however, the Godhead (divinitas) itself underlies all divine attributes, so also can
there be no attribute in God which contradicts the Godhead.”91
Although pursuing the matter in detail would take us too far afield, it should be registered
how Staudenmaier seems to be following Hegel with respect to divine freedom. Within a
Hegelian framework, that God is obliged to will in accordance with His essence is not
understood so much as a limitation of freedom as it is a limitation upon arbitrariness. Within
such a Hegelian framework, true freedom is found not in unconstrained exercise of the will but
in seeing oneself at home in otherness. True freedom, therefore, is achieved precisely in
constraining one’s will such that what is other no longer appears alien. True divine freedom,
then, is achieved in God constraining the exercise of His will such that the divine essence is not
alien to it.92
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Yet Staudenmaier is not completely Hegelian in terms of how he construes the divine
will. Although Staudenmaier stipulates that God must will in accordance with His essence, this
does not mean that, because God has willed creation, creation is therefore required by the divine
essence. Insofar as God wills something, that something must accord with the divine essence;
however, there is nothing other than Himself which God must necessarily will. Thus, it seems
that Staudenmaier would affirm that God could have willed otherwise than He has, so long as
whatever would have otherwise been willed was still in accordance with the divine essence.
The essence of the divine is to exist, to be what it is. For God to deny the divine essence
would be keep it, and so Himself, from existing. In the same way that it is a contradiction for the
divine essence not to exist, so also it is a contradiction for God to will contrary to this essence.
As the divine will manifests God to the created order, according to Staudenmaier, then, it is the
very nature of the divine essence to manifest itself as it truly is.
This final point is important for the nature of God’s interpersonal interaction with the
created order (and we will have opportunity to explore this in the next chapter). If God always
wills in accordance with the divine essence, then God always manifests Himself to the created
order as God, and nothing else: “Although God relates Himself to the world freely, although He
is free in His thinking, willing, and creating of the world, He can always only relate to the world
as God, and therefore can neither think, will, nor bring forth the world in a non-divine way
(ungöttlich). That God acts with freedom lies in His absolutely free essence; that He is unable to
act in an ungodly way towards the world lies in His own idea and in His own essence.”93 Given,
then, that God can act only as God toward the created order, the created order itself thereby
reflects the divine: “God, therefore, when He thinks, wills, and creates the world, will think, will,
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and create it as God. And therefore the world will be a living reflection of the Godhead.
Precisely herein, and in nothing else, consists the likeness [of the world to God].”94

Conclusion
We have examined Staudenmaier’s understanding of the divine intellect and will in order
to understand better how Staudenmaier sees God to be a personal subject. We have observed
that, for Staudenmaier, God’s personal subjectivity is such that the divine intellectually grasps
itself as well as what is other than itself, grasps how it relates to what is other than itself, and its
volition is normed by the content of its understanding. Having established that God possesses the
requisite characteristics for free action, our next task is to examine how the personal subjectivity
– the ‘personality’ – of the divine is manifest in engaging the nondivine. This is the task of the
next chapter.
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Chapter 2
STAUDENMAIER ON DIVINE PERSONALITY AND ITS RELATION TO THE
NONDIVINE

Introduction
In the previous chapter, we examined those characteristics which must obtain, according
to Staudenmaier, in order for an agent to be a personal subject, and thereby to be the subject of
free acts. There we saw that those characteristics of personality are being-for-self, intelligence,
and free will. We also saw how Staudenmaier understands those characteristics to apply to the
divine: God is an irreducible individual (being-for-self), who possesses the mental capacity to
accurately render reality (intelligence), as well as the capacity to determine reality in accordance
with the content of the subject’s intelligence (will). In virtue of these characteristics, God is a
personal subject and therefore has the ability to act freely in relation to the nondivine.
The previous chapter was concerned with how Staudenmaier understands the constitution
of a personal subject per se, but did not treat how personal subjectivity is manifest in
interpersonal encounter. In this chapter, therefore, we will examine how Staudenmaier
understands the free, interpersonal interaction of the divine personality with the nondivine. That
is, we will examine how the components of the divine personality are featured in God’s free
interaction with the nondivine.
In section 1, we will examine how the divine being-for-self – the irreducible subjectivity
of the divine – factors into God’s interaction with the nondivine. After brief explanations
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regarding the necessity of difference for interpersonal encounter and the singularity of the divine
essence (sections 1.1 and 1.2), we will see how Staudenmaier grounds the divine being-for-self
in God’s aseity (1.3). Then, in 1.4, we will examine how Staudenmaier utilizes divine aseity to
support the necessary existence of the divine (which further establishes the divine being-forself). Divine aseity, we will see, is responsible for the infinitude of God, which is responsible for
God’s transcendence over the finite (1.5). Thus, divine transcendence is constitutive of the
interpersonal encounter between the divine and the nondivine, as it is the manifestation of the
divine being-for-self (1.6).
In section 2, we will examine the divine intelligence vis-à-vis the nondivine. Section 2.2
examines the divine intelligence as the theoretical and creative component of nondivine
essences. Section 2.3 explores the divine intellect as practical knowledge or ‘divine wisdom,’ i.e.
the role of the divine intellect in enabling nondivine essences to reach God as their ultimate end.
In section 3 we will examine how the divine will factors into the interpersonal encounter
between God and creatures. In 3.2 we will see that the divine necessarily wills the good, and thus
that the divine requires the manifestation of this goodness in the created order. In 3.3, we will see
how the divine will is thereby manifest in the holiness of creatures.
Our study on Staudenmaier has its focus on interpersonal encounter. Interpersonal
interaction, though, requires some sort of presence between the subjects of encounter. Thus, in
section 4, we will examine how the aspects of the divine personality – being-for-self,
intelligence, and will – are manifest in God’s presence to the nondivine. Section 4.1 details the
mode of being which by which God is present to the nondivine, namely omnipresence. Section
4.2 examines how the elements of divine personality are exhibited in God’s omnipresence to the
nondivine.
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We conclude the chapter by showing how, for Staudenmaier, the finite is not necessary
for the existence of divine personality (section 5). This will set us up for chapter three, where it
will be argued that Staudenmaier sees the Trinity as the ground of possibility for God’s
interpersonal encounter with the nondivine. Thus, the components of the divine personality
which are featured in God’s interaction with the nondivine – the subject of this chapter – are
simply the external expression of the interpersonal components of the divine Trinity.

1. Divine Being-for-Self
1.1 Interpersonal Encounter, Difference, and Being-for-Self
As we saw in the previous chapter, being-for-self indicates a thing’s irreducible
individuality, or its irreducibility to another. The very notion of an interpersonal encounter
entails that there be an irreducible difference between personal subjects, for pure sameness
would occlude an interaction with something other than oneself. Thus, the very notion of an
interpersonal encounter entails that each subject within the encounter be different from the other,
and so possess its own being-for-self. In other words, there must be a numerical difference
between personal subjects, for encounter is not possible with only a single subject. (Note that the
previous assertion is not to be taken to mean that encounter is impossible where there is a single
essence, for a numerically singular ‘essence’ could include multiple subjects, as in the case of the
Trinity.)
Insofar as we are speaking of encounter between personal subjects in a generic sense, the
being-for-self of each subject is sufficient to establish numerical difference between subjects,
and thus is sufficient for the occurrence of an encounter. However, the difference between the
divine and nondivine spans more than numerical difference, and this difference we must take
account of. According to Staudenmaier, God is, by definition, absolute with respect to all that is
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not God. Thus, while there is a numerical difference between the divine and the nondivine, there
is an ontological difference as well. An interpersonal encounter between the two will therefore
be characterized by this ontological difference as much as by the numerical difference. It is
important, then, that we explore this absolute-relative relation that subsists between the divine
and the nondivine so as to understand the specifics of their interpersonal encounter.

1.2 The Singularity of the Divine
‘God’ is a designation for ‘the divine essence.’ Here, ‘essence’ is a generic designation
and thus ‘divine essence’ designates whatever kind of thing ‘God’ is. Staudenmaier takes up the
standard Christian view that God’s essence demands that God can be only one (or more
precisely, the divine essence demands that it be numerically singular), and thus that there can be
only one God: “When we say that God is only one according to His essence, there is really
expressed in this the fact that, in an ontological sense, to the concept of Godhead, θειοτης (Rom.
1:20), there corresponds only oneness, but not manyness of essence. God is therefore already one
according to His essence; manyness of essence is against the concept of Godhead.”95 Although it
is possible that there be manifold created essences, there can be only one divine essence.
Because there can be only one divine essence, an engagement with otherness by the
divine can only be an engagement with what is not the divine essence. That is, because there can
be only one divine essence, an engagement with the divine essence by something which is not
identical with, or a bearer of, the numerical sameness of this essence cannot itself be a divine
essence. There cannot be an encounter between two things identified with the divine essence if
those two things are not, according to their essence, numerically singular. (Here, the
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specification of being numerically singular according to their essence is important because, in
the case of the Trinity, we need to be able to say that there is an encounter between multiple
things identified with the divine essence which are not numerically singular, but this lack of
numerical singularity is in virtue of their personhood and not in virtue of their essence. The
divine persons are numerically distinct as persons but numerically singular according to their
essence.)
When the divine essence is compared to other sorts of essences (i.e., essences of a
nondivine sort), it is designated by Staudenmaier as ‘absolute.’ ‘Absolute’ designates the status
of God, or the divine essence, relative to what is not God and so what is not the divine essence.
What sort of relationship obtains between the Absolute (the divine essence) and the nonabsolute?
Staudenmaier grounds God’s absoluteness vis-à-vis the non-absolute in God’s aseity. He
says, “According to the category of aseity, God is absolute life from and through Himself.”96
God does not receive His existence from something other than Himself – He does not receive His
existence from a non-divine essence – but derives it from Himself. Aseity, as God’s deriving His
being or existence from Himself, ensures that God is dependent upon no other for His existence.
Below, we will explore what Staudenmaier sees as the implications of divine aseity and what
bearing they have on the interpersonal encounter between God and the created.

1.3 Divine Aseity as Ground of Divine Being-for-Self
According to Staudenmaier, because God has His existence from Himself and not from
another, He is the cause of the existence of everything which is other than Himself.
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Staudenmaier says, “For if there is an essence which exists absolutely from – and through –
itself, then it is necessary that this essence is at the same time the cause of all other reality.”97
And again: “The absolute being (Sein) of God from Himself is the reason why a being (Sein) of
things is possible through God.”98
Staudenmaier’s argument seems to be something like the following: Multiple essences
exist; as we saw, however, there can be only one divine essence. The divine essence has its
existence from or through itself. Therefore, those essences which exist and yet are nondivine
cannot receive their existence from themselves. This entails, then, that nondivine essences must
receive their existence from another, viz. that essence which has its existence from or through
itself (God).
The reasoning behind this conviction is that being is not something which spontaneously
occurs.99 On this point, Staudenmaier contrasts the Christian view that God possesses being
eternally with what he refers to as those ‘negative’ systems – in particular that of Hegel’s Logic –
which “begin either with nothing, or with a being (Sein) which as pure being is empty, without
content and determination.”100 Staudenmaier holds that being simply cannot arise out of nothing.
Thus, he says, “A being (Sein) which is the same as nothing and is nothing, in which nothing can
be beheld and nothing can be thought, is absolutely unable either to be a true positing of itself or
to posit another out of itself. Therefore a being (Sein) which in its primal origin is in itself and
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intrinsically the negation of being (Sein) will never raise itself to actual being (Sein).”101 If being
does not arise spontaneously out of nothing, then nondivine being, if it does not receive its being
from or through itself, must receive it from another (viz., that which possesses being).
For Staudenmaier, it follows from divine aseity, then, that God is completely independent
from the nondivine. As he puts it, “What exists from and through itself can, with respect to being
(Sein), in no way be thought as dependent upon another, and in fact everything outside of Him, if
it exists, must be dependent upon Him.”102 Such independence, Staudenmaier says, “is like that
of negative freedom, [and] consists in being conditioned and determined in being (Sein) and life
by nothing external.”103
Given that the divine has its existence from and through itself, the nondivine is
characterized by the fact that it receives its existence from outside of itself. As Staudenmaier puts
it, “To have life in oneself means having life from and through oneself. By contrast everything
which is not the Godhead itself, but is finite, neither has life in itself, nor is it given to it to have
life in itself, but life must be given to it in the first place. Finite life therefore, as opposed to the
absolute life of the Godhead, is a life which is bestowed, given, or better, a life which is carried
by and created through the absolute life.”104
As indicated above, interpersonal interaction requires difference between personal
subjects in order for interaction to occur. Further, as we have seen, being-for-self indicates the
irreducibility of some thing to otherness. Interpersonal interaction between the divine and the
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created therefore requires an irreducible difference between the two, i.e., some aspect which is
constitutive of each and yet different for each. It is through divine aseity, then, that there exists
an indissoluble difference between the divine and the nondivine: the one gives existence to the
other; the one receives its existence from the other. The acts of giving and receiving presuppose
distinction. In receiving existence from no other, God is absolute; in receiving existence from
another, creation is relative. Thus, it is precisely in possessing aseity that the divine retains its
irreducible difference from the one it encounters.

1.4 The Necessary Existence of the Divine
The irreducibility of the divine to the nondivine (and vice versa) is also expressed by
Staudenmaier with respect to the necessity of the divine essence. Through divine aseity, the
divine essence exists necessarily:
If God is absolutely independent from everything external, whether this be a thing,
person, or concept, then the necessity of the divine essence cannot consist in being at all
dependent or being subject, but the necessity which is ascribed to it is related to the type
and mode of the inner divine being and life. And here we say: what exists from itself in
an absolute way cannot be such that it would also be possible for it not to be, but in the
concept of absolute being lies also the concept of necessary being; in other words, the
absolute exists in such a way that it cannot not be.105
It is because the divine exists necessarily that it can grant existence to contingent realities.
Staudenmaier says, “The ground of giving the determination to the merely possible being either
to be, or not to be, can only lie in that which itself not only exists already, but exists
necessarily.”106
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The created order, because it does not exist from itself, does not exist necessarily, but
only contingently. “If, however, the absolute being of God is that which, as necessary [being],
cannot not be, therefore that for which it is possible to be or not to be, but which must be, then
conversely it lies in the concept of creaturely being, as the non-absolute, to be only possible [for
it to be].”107 The nondivine is constituted by the fact that it presupposes the divine: “What,
however, is not necessary is itself only possible being, consequently it is that which presupposes
an external being in order to be able to be.”108 Here, then, the divine possesses being-for-self in
that such being is necessary, in opposition to contingent being.
Thus, the irreducibility of the divine and the nondivine to one another is constituted by
the sort of modality characteristic of each: the divine exists necessarily while the nondivine
exists only contingently. Necessary existence, which follows from aseity, further grounds the
divine being-for-self, thereby further grounding the conditions for interpersonal interaction
between God and creatures.

1.5 The Infinity of God
Because God’s existence is from or through Himself rather than from another, and
because this existence is necessary rather than contingent, the divine is not limited by anything
outside itself. Given this lack of limitation, the divine can be regarded as infinite: “While God, as
the absolute positing of Himself, neither has originated out of another nor can be contained in
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another, and still less can be limited by something existing outside of Him, infinity (infinitas)
befits Him and in this is His greatness.”109
The notion of infinity is usually thought of numerically, as a never-ending amount of
something. For Staudenmaier, however, the concept of infinity is better understood in terms of
quality:
The category of limitation is, like most others, a category which concerns finite things,
whose qualities are definable according to this category and are modifiable by the
influence of foreign qualities. The concept of infinity is therefore not one which relates
merely to quantity, so that the definition of this attribute would be nothing other than
having no end, being endless. Rather the concept also relates to quality, and testifies to
being determinable and modifiable by no finite thing. Being infinite is therefore not
merely having no end, but also absolutely not being like the finite, not subsisting
alongside the finite and being determined by the finite.110
Things which are of the same quality subsist alongside each other, thereby limiting each other
(“modifiable by the influence of foreign qualities,” as he puts it in the passage above). If the
divine is infinite, and so not modifiable by the influence of foreign qualities, then the divine must
qualitatively transcend any other sort of quality.
Given the infinitude of the divine, God transcends both space and time, features which
are constitutive of the finite. “The infinity (Unendlichkeit) of God regarded with a view to space
gives the concept of the immeasurability (immensitas) of God.”111 “The infinity (Unendlichkeit)
of the divine life with respect to time gives the concept of the eternity of God. Actual eternity is
distinct from the so-called eternal time – aevum –, which is that time in which the development
of the finite spirit occurs for eternity.”112 Given the infinity of God with respect to space and
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time, and given that space and time constitute the finite, the interpersonal encounter between the
divine and the nondivine is characterized by divine transcendence.

1.6 Divine Being-for-self as Manifest in the Finite: Transcendence
According to Staudenmaier, given the infinitude of God – rooted in divine aseity – the
divine thereby transcends created categories. Staudenmaier says, “Through divine aseity God is
the super-essential, but as this [is] outside all categories and raised above every finite
contrast.”113 As super-essential, however, this does not mean that the divine has no essence.
Rather, the super-essentiality of the divine essence signifies its qualitative difference from
creaturely essences: “With this attribute, however, the Godhead is not denied essence, but it is
only said that its essence is an essence absolutely separate from the finite and is an essence
which infinitely lies above the finite.”114
The manifestation of the divine being-for-self in the finite, therefore, is constituted by
divine transcendence over the finite. God, Staudenmaier says, is present to the nondivine “such
that He, although existing in space and time, nonetheless in His own right is spaceless and
timeless, and is not moved in space and time. He is everywhere, but He is in no place. The divine
immanence, therefore, is never without transcendence. As God no doubt fills the world through
His omnipresence, so He is also over and above the world; He stands over it, untouched by it.”115
Because God is characterized by His transcendence over space and time – because God
transcends the finite – God can never be reduced to the finite. Therefore, this indissoluble

113

CD II §53 heading (p. 257).

114

Ibid., §53 (p. 258).

115

Ibid., §56.6 (p. 278).

63

integrity of the divine essence – the divine being-for-self – ensures there will always be
difference between the divine and the creaturely, thus ensuring the possibility of encounter
between the two. In encounter with God, therefore, God’s being-for-self – God’s irreducible
difference from the one whom He encounters – is necessarily manifest, for without the divine
being-for-self, there would be no God ‘there’ to encounter.
We will return to the issue of the divine transcendence, for this is an important aspect for
Staudenmaier’s assertion (which we treat below, in section 5) that the divine personality is not
constituted by God’s interpersonal relation to the nondivine. At the moment, though, we must
address an important question. Interpersonal encounter, it seems, requires an interaction between
the members of the encounter. Put differently, interpersonal encounter seems to require a form of
presence of the two parties to one another (and in section 4, we will examine the way in which
the divine is present to the nondivine in their interpersonal encounter.) The transcendence of God
over the finite which we have just explored, however, raises a question: if God is transcendent
over the finite, how can there possibly be an interpersonal encounter between God and the finite?
If God transcends the finite, how could God possibly be present to and in the finite?
This question can be resolved if we keep in mind that God’s transcendence over the finite
is, as Staudenmaier puts it above, a qualitative difference from creaturely essences. Creaturely
essences are by nature finite – limited to space and time. God’s qualitative difference from finite
essences – and so God’s transcendence over the finite – means that God is not limited to space
and time. Or better: the divine transcendence means that, unlike finite essences, the divine
essence is not situated in the dichotomies of (1) space as opposed to (2) spacelessness, and (1)
time as opposed to (2) timelessness.
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In other words, the divine transcendence over the finite means that God is not limited by
the finite. The finitude of the created order does not preclude God from interacting with it. God’s
transcendence over the finite, therefore, allows for an interpersonal interaction between the two,
but an interaction where the former is not reduced to the limitations of the latter. Having
addressed this question, we will now treat the next element of the divine personality, the divine
intelligence.

2. Divine Intelligence
2.1 Introduction
We saw in the previous chapter that Staudenmaier divides the divine intelligence into
three areas: God’s theoretical intelligence regarding Himself, His theoretical intelligence
regarding the nondivine, and His practical intelligence regarding the nondivine. Because we are
focusing on the encounter between the divine and the nondivine in this chapter, we will
concentrate on the latter two.
As we saw above, it is only that essence which exists from and through itself that can
give existence to what is other than itself. Thus, it is only God who can create. Anything that
exists, of course, has some sort of determinate being. Thus, as an existing thing, a being
possesses certain aspects or features that make it whatever kind of thing it is. We saw in the
previous chapter that the free acts of a personal subject (for both God and creatures) involve both
the intelligence and the will, in that the intelligence is responsible for comprehending the truth of
being whereas the will is responsible for determining being in accordance with the intelligence.
The work of the intelligence as comprehending the truth of being is constitutive of free acts
precisely because a subject must know what it is they are doing in order to freely assent to
performing the action under consideration.
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Therefore, in order for God to be absolutely free vis-à-vis the nondivine – whether in acts
of creating, sustaining, or governing the nondivine to its end – the divine intelligence must have
a full comprehension of the nondivine. For God to act freely towards the nondivine, therefore,
God must know what sort of essences He is creating, sustaining, and governing towards their
end. Insofar as Staudenmaier divides these two areas, the divine intelligence as theoretical
concerns the divine knowledge of nondivine essences as such, and the divine intelligence as
practical concerns how such essences will reach their various ends.

2.2 Divine Intelligence as Theoretical and Creative
Because the divine essence is that which bestows existence upon the nondivine, because
the divine creates the nondivine freely, and because the intelligence is constitutive for free
actions, the divine intellect functions creatively: “The creature is what God eternally thinks and
knows it to be; nature is as it exists in the divine intelligence; spirit is, what it is in and for the
divine thinking; and finally, humanity is what God has before Himself in His knowledge.”116
We saw in the previous chapter that the intelligence works to establish an accordance
between being and thought. Given that the divine intelligence comprehends the nondivine, and
given that the divine intelligence functions creatively vis-à-vis the nondivine, the accordance
between being and thought is absolute for the divine intelligence. As Staudenmaier puts it, “The
thought through which God thinks the creature, therefore, not only accords, as we like to say,
most accurately with the essence of the creature, but accords absolutely with it, because the
divine thought thinks the essence of the things themselves.”117
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God’s thought of the world is what Staudenmaier refers to as the divine ‘idea’ (Idee) of
the world.118 Because the divine intelligence functions creatively and so is concerned with the
essences of creatures, in this regard it is not to be taken as a knowledge of creatures insofar as
they fall short of the divine idea, but as a knowledge of creatures as instantiations of the divine
idea. As Staudenmaier puts it,
[T]he representation God has of the world, insofar as it is both the truth and the idea of
the world, is not to be confused with that representation God has of the world insofar as it
is afflicted with deficiency and ruin (which is certainly also object of divine knowing).
Rather, the world which corresponds to the idea, or the world in truth, is the pure,
immaculate world without deficiency, as it is thought by God from eternity as the way it
ought to be, and as it was also created in this perfect character in the beginning of time.119
Further, because the divine intellect functions creatively vis-à-vis extradivine being, the truth of
extradivine being is not something which comes to God as mediated, but rather is perceived by
God immediately. Or to put the matter more forcefully, Staudenmaier notes that the divine
thought of the nondivine just is the truth of the nondivine: “The divine thought of the world is the
truth of the world. This is all the more the case, since the world is not an object of divine
knowledge which is first found by God, as it presents itself as object of our knowing.”120

2.3 Divine Intellect as Practical/Divine Wisdom
We saw in the previous chapter that there is a practical side to the divine knowing,
concerned with ordering nondivine being to its end, namely, to God Himself. Since here we are
examining the nature of interpersonal encounter between God and creatures, we can now turn to
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the issue of how creatures reach God as their end. Or, from the perspective of the divine, we can
now inquire into the means that God implements in the created order for creatures to be able to
reach Him as their end.
According to Staudenmaier, human beings reach the divine by means of religion: “The
general goal of things is…God, or being and life in God Himself. Divine wisdom is therefore
that intelligence in God through whose living thinking and acting the being with God of the
extradivine is mediated, through which mediation extradivine being enters into the true divine
life-order, which is the determination and the goal of general and particular life. For the free
spirit, this goal is expressed as religion.”121 The end of extradivine being is that very same being
and life which is in God Himself, and God’s own being and life is mediated to the creature
through religion.
According to Staudenmaier, “Religion – as actual and true unity – is the conscious, free,
and living communion of man with God.”122 The descriptions of the communion of man with
God as ‘conscious, free, and living’ are not accidental, for they denote just those properties of a
personal subject – ‘conscious’ denotes the intellect, ‘free’ denotes the will, and ‘living’ denotes
the unity of intellect and will. Religion, therefore, describes a communion between two personal
subjects: it is the means by which the created personal subject appropriates the divine idea which
has been communicated to her from the divine personal subject.
Consciousness is necessary for the mental act of knowing, and the act of knowing is
directed at the truth of being. “Religious knowledge, into which divine revelation introduces us,
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is a knowledge in the truth”123 In religious knowledge, the truth which is sought is that truth
which enables union with God. The truth sought in religious knowledge, therefore, is that which
God imparts to creatures about Himself: “The objective truth is the content of divine revelation,
in which the world takes part”124
However, the conscious element is not the only element necessary for union with God:
Staudenmaier says, “As necessary, however, as communion with God is a conscious
communion, its character is not exhausted in the essence of the pure consciousness. Rather,
another moment shows itself to be just as important, that of freedom.”125 How is free will related
to truth? Staudenmaier says this: “Truth in its complete realization is truth as it posits itself in life
and appears as life. And precisely in this same completion of its being through life truth also
aims at religion, so that religion is itself only real where truth has become life.”126
Truth, at its core, is not abstract, but has determinate content: the truth of created being is
that it is meant for God, that it be in ethical communion with God. Ethical communion, though,
requires exercise of the will. Thus, the exercise of free acts of the will is how the truth becomes a
reality or, as Staudenmaier puts it, how the truth is brought to ‘life’: “The ability on the side of
man to bring truth to life is freedom, or the free will.”127 As he also puts it, “If divine truth
(revelation) is a divine principle of human life, then freedom – the ethical principle of the human
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spirit – has combined itself with it in order to shape in union with it that life which is the
expressed goal of man himself.”128
Religion is conscious, free, and living because reaching God as one’s end requires both
intellectual knowledge of, and an ethical-volitional assent to, the divine. Religion, then, is the
mode of human appropriation of divine wisdom, the appropriation of the divine truth as it
pertains to reaching God as one’s end. Thus, it is precisely in the empirical fact that such a thing
as religion exists in the created order – in the fact that there is a means to reach the divine – that
divine wisdom is manifest in creation.
We recall from the previous chapter that the divine will is constrained by the divine
essence to communicate the truth about Himself to the nondivine. Truthful self-communication,
therefore, is constitutive of divine interpersonal encounter with the nondivine. Religion, then, is
just the other side of that interpersonal encounter: it is the mode of human appropriation of God’s
truthful self-communication.
More broadly, the impartation of divine wisdom – as that element of interpersonal
encounter which leads another to God Himself – is characteristic of God’s interpersonal
encounter. Interpersonal encounter, however, is not something which begins de novo. Rather,
because a personal agent needs others by which she can actualize her subjectivity, an
interpersonal encounter simply manifests those elements by which the personal subject is
constituted as a personal subject.
The upshot is that God’s interpersonal encounter with the nondivine manifests those
elements by which God is constituted as a personal subject. And as we will examine in the next
chapter, it is within the inner life of the Trinity that God is constituted as a personal subject.
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God’s interpersonal encounter with the nondivine is thereby just the manifestation of God’s
immanent personal subjectivity, i.e. the inner life of the Trinity.

3. Divine Will
3.1 Introduction
Divine intelligence, however, is not enough to bring extradivine being into reality; will
also is necessary: “The eternal knowing of the extradivine or merely possible being is of itself
not the only cause of finite being, but above all this belongs to the divine will, which decides in a
free way that merely possible being shall become actual being.”129 Indeed, the divine will is
necessary for the realization of every aspect of the nondivine: “From the divine willing
everything finite has its origin, through the divine willing everything is determined and ordered,
and the divine will is the law according to which everything finite is directed”130 It is through the
divine will, then, that created essences exist as the sorts of things they are and are moved to reach
the end which is appropriate to the sorts of things they are.
In short, the divine will works to manifest the divine essence in and to the nondivine. As
we saw in the previous chapter, Staudenmaier maintains that there is an irreducible difference
between God and the created order. Therefore, Staudenmaier does not intend the selfmanifestation of the divine in creation in any pantheistic way, but rather in line with the standard
Catholic view that the divine is mediated in the created order. Below, we will examine why the
divine will acts to manifest the divine essence within the created order (3.2) and then how the
divine is manifest within the created order (3.3).

129

CD II §64.9 (p. 325).

130

Ibid., §67.1 (p. 360).

71

3.2 Divine Willing of the Good: Holiness and Righteousness
The manifestation of the divine in the nondivine characterizes the interpersonal encounter
between the two. Before we can explore this further, though, we must ask what it is that
motivates the divine will to manifest the divine in the nondivine. Why not, for example, bring a
created order into existence that will not manifest the divine?
In the previous chapter, we saw that God beholds His own essence and wills only in
accordance with that essence. Indeed, we saw that God would not be ‘God’ unless He acted in
accordance with His essence. If the divine will works to manifest the divine in the nondivine, and
if the divine will wills only in accordance with the divine essence, then in order to understand
why the divine will manifests itself in the divine, we must understand what it is about the divine
essence that demands that it be manifest in the nondivine.
As noted in chapter one (section 3.3), Staudenmaier believes that the self-manifestation
of the divine in the nondivine is not a requirement of the divine essence in the sense that the
divine essence necessitates that God create so that the divine essence can manifest itself in the
nondivine. Rather, Staudenmaier wants to maintain that the divine act of creation is a free act –
and so not necessitated by the divine essence – but that if God has created, then this created order
will exist in accordance with certain laws prescribed by the divine essence (and in that sense will
necessarily manifest the divine essence).
The nature of the divine self- manifestation in the finite has its root in the fact that the
divine essence is the good. According to revelation, Staudenmaier says, “God is good and holy
or is the good and the holy. This appertains to the following passage: ‘There is only one good –
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God’ (Mt. 19:17). God is, according to this expression, not only the good, but it is included in
Him still further that He is in Himself the good alone.”131
Staudenmaier argues further that, by definition, goodness entails that it should be. “The
good is that which ought to be, consequently, the ought-being (Seinsollende).”132 Staudenmaier
notes that the notion of ‘ought-to-be’ entails [1] that it can be, for if something ought be done
then this implies that it can be done, and [2] that it must be. As he puts it, “In the concept of the
ought-to-be lies both the concept of the could-be (Seinkönnens) through freedom and the concept
of the must-be (Seinmüssens) through necessity.”133 Therefore, God is obligated to will the good
(since the good must be willed).
It is not the case, however, that God is merely obligated to realize the good. Rather, God
freely wills this good. Indeed, Staudenmaier notes that God wants to realize the good: “God
wants to realize the idea of the good just as much as He must realize it. Or: the idea which God
must realize God also wills eternally to realize.”134
Thus, in the divine will, freedom and necessity are united. The unity of freedom and
necessity in willing the good Staudenmaier refers to as the divine holiness: “The unity of
freedom and necessity, or the unity in willing and obligation in God is, however, the divine
holiness.”135 God’s external expression of holiness is God’s righteousness: “The divine
righteousness is the divine holiness which works and appears outwardly. Righteousness can
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therefore be defined as divine holiness in its application. Both are related to one another as
disposition and activity: holiness is the disposition, righteousness is the activity.”136
The divine, therefore, cannot tolerate unholiness. “Above all it is now clear how God,
through His inward essence as an absolute holy essence, is deterred already from either himself
positing an action, or allowing an action to be posited with necessity through a finite essence,
which is evil and sinful.”137 Because God both always freely wills the good and is obligated to
will the good, God’s ordering of creation can only be in line with this good: “But also the plan
and the order which ought to be developed out of the divine idea can only be a plan of the holy
and an order of the good.”138
Because it is in willing the good (which, again, is identical with just His own essence)
that God possesses holiness and righteousness, and because the divine plan and order vis-à-vis
the nondivine can only be in line with this good, God’s acts ad extra (because God’s acts involve
His will) must necessarily manifest the divine holiness and righteousness in the created order.
Below, we will explore precisely how God’s holiness and righteousness – indeed how God
Himself – becomes manifest in and to the nondivine.

3.3 Creaturely Righteousness as Manifesting the Divine Will
As we saw above, righteousness is just the external expression of holiness. Holiness
consists in the willingness to realize the idea of the good. Divine righteousness, therefore,
consists in God’s willingness to realize the idea of the good externally, i.e. to realize the idea of
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the good in the created order. Thus, Staudenmaier says, “The righteousness which exists in God
becomes, through the divine willing, an imperative for the human will, and consequently the law
for human life: it [righteousness] is what ought to be.”139
We saw above that God Himself is the good. If divine righteousness is the external
manifestation of the willingness to realize the idea of the good (or better, the actual realization of
the good), and if the good just is God Himself, then righteousness is the realization of God in
creation. But what does it mean for God to be ‘realized’ in creation?
Staudenmaier has emphasized that the created order and the divine are not to be identified
with one another. Thus, the realizing of God in the created order is not a conversion of created
essences into the divine essence. Rather, God “steers and leads the development of the divine
reign as ethical through omnipresent activity.”140 Because, as we saw above, God can will only
the holy and the good, “that which according to the holy plan of the Godhead should come to be
through development can itself only be holy and good, holiness at the same time becomes a
divine imperative for the human spirit.”141 “Just in this imperative, or through this imperative,”
Staudenmaier continues, “the holiness of God becomes the eternal prototype of man”142
The divine will is ‘realized’ in creation, therefore, because God himself is the prototype
of love for the good – of love for God –which creatures are to copy. In obeying the divine
imperative to love the good, which is just to love God, the creature renders to God what is due to
Him. Therefore, the divine righteousness is manifest in creation by the creature rendering to God
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what is due to Him, and the imperative that justice be rendered to God – that creation manifest
righteousness – is itself just the manifestation of the divine will in the created order.
That there is an imperative in the created order which demands obedience to the highest
good (and thus love for the highest good) – in short, that there is ethical law in the created order
– is a manifestation of the personal characteristic of the will, since a law demands obedience of
the will. As we will see in chapter three, this notion of rendering what is due to God – namely,
righteousness – is a feature of the triune life itself, i.e. of the interpersonal relations between the
divine persons.

4. The Presence of the Divine to the Nondivine: Omnipresence
4.1 Introduction
In sections 1.2 through 1.6, we saw that Staudenmaier characterizes the divine with the
qualities of singularity, aseity, necessary existence, infinity, and transcendence, and such
qualities establish God’s being-for-self – and so irreducibility – to the nondivine. These qualities
manifest fundamental differences between God and creatures, differences which are necessary
for an encounter between the two to occur. Although encounter between things requires some
level of difference between them, difference – and only difference – occludes the possibility of
encounter as much as pure sameness. An encounter between personal subjects therefore requires
something that is shared between the two. That is, an encounter between subjects requires that
they be present to one another in some way.
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The presence of the divine to the nondivine is a long-standing topic of Christian
theological reflection.143 Due to the absoluteness of the divine vis-à-vis the nondivine,
mainstream theological reflection has spoken of this divine presence to the creaturely as that of
omnipresence. Staudenmaier is here no different: “The divine causality, regarded as extending
itself in living efficacy in the universe, gives the concept of the omnipresence of God. In it lie the
principles of divine revelation and of the government toward their goal of the divine ideas which
develop themselves in space and time.”144
For Staudenmaier, the encounter between the divine and the nondivine through
omnipresence has two aspects. The first aspect consists in the divine presence in the nondivine.
He says, “If God, according to the category of aseity, affirms Himself eternally in His essence
which exists from and through Himself, then now, according to the category of causality, He
affirms Himself in, for, and through the creature, and this divine self-affirmation is the revelation
of God. God affirms Himself, however, by positing Himself in the creature…as that who, as its
cause, so also is its goal and end.”145
However, divine omnipresence not only consists in God’s self-positing in things, “but
also [in] His appearing in things; indeed, His working is in particular a working of His
appearance. As manifold as natural divine revelation is, just as manifold is this appearing
through omnipresence.”146 Thus, the second aspect of divine encounter through omnipresence
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consists in the divine presence to the nondivine: God ‘appears’ – reveals Himself – to the
nondivine.

4.2 Omnipresence and the Characteristics of Divine Personality
How is omnipresence related to the divine intelligence? Staudenmaier links the two this
way: “If above, we have called divine omnipresence the absolute causality of God which
continues itself in and continually influences the world, then – in order to use the right scientific
expression – we would be obligated to call divine omniscience the intellectual omnipresence of
God in the world.”147 Omniscience, then, is not utterly different from omnipresence. Rather, it is
just the divine omnipresence in its intellectual aspect.
Omniscience is the intellectual presence of God with regard to all aspects of the creature:
internal, external, and the span of its relations. As Staudenmaier puts it, “the divine intelligence
as absolute knowledge of extradivine being is related to the latter in the first place as the worldcreature, or as the creature in its entirety. In this relation, however, it is the present beholding of
the entire creature both according to its inner essence, as well as its external manifestation, and
finally, according to all relationships and all sides of the creature. Therefore, divine knowing is
the absolute science of everything – omniscience.”148
While Staudenmaier makes the connection between the divine intelligence and
omnipresence fairly obvious, the relation between being-for-self on the one hand, and will and
omnipresence on the other, is not as obvious. Thus, we need to do a bit of exegetical work to
show how he sees the relation between these two aspects of personality and omnipresence.
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We have seen that the divine being-for-self is constituted by God’s aseity, which ensures
the irreducibility of God and creature to one another. Staudenmaier then roots God’s causal
efficacy with respect to the nondivine in aseity: “In divine aseity, as the absolute power (Macht)
to be from and through itself, lies, at the same time, the absolute power (Macht) to cause merely
possible being [actually to be]. This gives the concept of the absolute causality of God which, as
a [thing] which fulfills itself in reality through causal power (Macht), is the Ur-essence.”149
Because God has the ability to exist from and through Himself, God thereby has the ability to act
causally vis-à-vis that reality which does not have to exist.
God’s causality ad extra, Staudenmaier notes, has two aspects: ability and will. He says,
“The concept of absolute causality is therefore such a concept as consists of two elements, that of
ability and that of willingness, which already in the concept are not one. For it is one thing to be
able to create the world, and another to be willing to create the world.”150 This ability to cause
the existence of the nondivine is the divine ‘almightiness’:
In the concept of causality above, we have found a twofoldness, and have distinguished
from one another an ability (ein Können) and a willingness (ein Wollen). If we now
extract the divine ability (Können) as an element existing for itself, then the concept [of
this ability] is the concept of the divine almightiness. This the absolute power (Macht)
and strength of the Godhead to posit life outside of itself, in general, to create and to
effect everything which it wills.151
Thus, because God’s ability to act causally towards the nondivine (His almightiness) is rooted in
His aseity, and because His aseity ensures His irreducibility to the nondivine (and vice versa),
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God’s ability to act causally ad extra – His almightiness – is just the presence of the divine
being-for-self within the nondivine.
As the passage above indicates (and as we saw in the section on the divine will [3.1]), the
actual existence of the nondivine also depends upon the divine will. Thus, God’s causal relation
to the nondivine involves almightiness and will:
If, however, the divine omnipresence is only the causality of God extended [into the nondivine], then omnipresence is constituted simply as causality which is abidingly
continued through the very elements we have detected above as elements of causality. As
elements of causality we have discovered absolute ability (Können) as almightiness, and
the willing of the Godhead which determines and calls forth everything with absolute
freedom. Almightiness and will, or absolute ability (Können) and absolutely free
willingness (Wollen) are therefore also the constitutive elements of divine
omnipresence.152
The characteristics of personality, therefore, each function within God’s presence to creation.
The divine omnipresence to the nondivine involves almightiness, will, and omniscience,
corresponding to the personal characteristics of being-for-self, will, and intelligence,
respectively.
We have seen that all three aspects of God’s personal subjectivity are present to the
nondivine in the interpersonal encounter between the two: the divine intelligence is present to the
nondivine in terms of its theoretical aspect (viz., creatively in imagining the various nondivine
essences), as well as its practical aspect (viz., in ordering these created essences to their
appropriate ends); the divine being-for-self is present to the nondivine through the divine ability
to bring the nondivine into existence as well as uphold it in existence; the divine will is present to
the nondivine in that it is only through God’s willingness to perform the above acts that these
acts actually occur. We saw above that Staudenmaier conceives two aspects of divine
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omnipresence: divine presence in creation and divine presence to creation. The very existence
and determination of the finite order thus manifests the presence of the divine in creation.

5. Divine Absoluteness and Divine Personality
We have seen how the elements of the divine personality – being-for-self, intelligence,
and will – are manifest in the encounter between the divine and the nondivine. Here we will see
how God’s being is related to the divine personality, specifically how the eternity of God’s being
has implications for understanding the nature of the divine personality. Understanding how the
eternity of God’s being relates to the divine personality will set us up for seeing exactly why the
Trinity is necessary for personality as being an immanent feature of the divine.
Since God is constituted by and through Himself, God is thereby not constituted by the
created order. As Staudenmaier puts it, “Because God has neither the ground of His being (Sein)
nor the goal of His life outside of Himself in another, rather His absolute self-affirmation is also
the affirmation of His being (Sein) as eternally grounded in itself and eternally complete in itself.
Thus in Him no movement is thinkable through which He could strive to fulfill Himself in a
ground and goal which lay outside of Him.”153 And in a text which we have already had
opportunity to examine in chapter one, he says, “As the one who for Himself, or as a personal
being-for-self, God is also the one of whom it can be said neither that the world is an essential
and necessary element of Him, nor is He Himself an essential and necessary element of the
world, and finally just as little can it be said that He would not be God without the world, which
definitions, as is known, are the philosophy of modern pantheism.”154
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Because God’s being is not constituted by the created order, God’s personality is also not
constituted by the created order. Rather, Staudenmaier insists, God is eternally personal: “there
was no moment for Him in which He was not personal.”155 Indeed, Staudenmaier argues that the
divine personality is as eternal as the divine being. Thus, he says, “Indeed in God the personal is
not added to being (Sein) in order to combine with being (Sein), but God is, as eternal being
(Sein), also eternally personal being (Sein) and life, so that with the concept of divine being
(Sein) is already combined within itself the concept of personal life.”156
In fact, Staudenmaier argues, it is only because God is already personal – personal apart
from the nondivine – that there can be nondivine persons at all: “Consequently it already lies in
the concept of God as the absolutely perfect that He is personal, and not only that He is personal,
but also that He is already absolutely personal insofar as He is the causal principle of all other
personality which is extradivine. In God, therefore, is the essence (Wesen) already beforehand
necessarily and eternally a personal essence (Wesen). Therefore, personality is no addition, or
something nascent which might arise later through an unfolding.”157 Personality, therefore, is an
eternal feature of the divine.
Given the fact that personality is an eternal feature of the divine, personality is thereby an
immanent feature of the divine. For Staudenmaier, then, the characteristics of intelligence, will,
and being-for-self are characteristics which belong to God eternally – i.e., apart from the created
order. These personal characteristics – manifest in God’s interpersonal interaction with the
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created order – do not have their genesis in God’s interpersonal interaction with the created
order, but are revelations of what is eternally true of God.

Conclusion
We have seen that personality is constituted by otherness, by other personalities. But in
the case of the divine, however, we see that personality is an eternal feature of God, and so that
personality is not constituted by the otherness of the created order. If personality is constituted by
otherness, and yet if the divine personality is not constituted by the otherness of the nondivine,
then this raises the question as to how God can be a personal subject without the presence of the
otherness of the nondivine.
The only solution to this question is that there must be a presence of otherness that is
within the divine itself, a presence of otherness which is eternal and thus an immanent feature of
the divine. God’s being-for-self – God’s irreducibility to the created order – blocks the created
order from providing the otherness that is constitutive of divine personal subjectivity, and
therefore forces the locus of such otherness to be within the divine itself. That the divine
personality requires otherness and yet is not constituted by its relation to the nondivine will form
the crux of why, for Staudenmaier, the Trinity is necessary for ensuring the presence of otherness
necessary for personality. To that issue we now turn.
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Chapter 3
THE TRINITY AS THE ACTUALIZATION OF DIVINE SUBJECTIVITY

Introduction
We left the previous chapter faced with a question. On the one hand, subjectivity –
comprised of the elements of personality – requires something beyond the individual person for
its actualization, i.e. something beyond that individual locus of divine being-for-self,
intelligence, and will. As we saw, Staudenmaier sharply distinguishes between God and the
created order. Thus, the created order cannot be identified with the locus of divine being-for-self,
intelligence, and will. It would seem, then, that the created order would prove a likely candidate
for that which could actualize divine subjectivity.
On the other hand, we have seen that Staudenmaier makes much of divine aseity as
facilitating divine transcendence. Because God possesses aseity, He not only cannot be identified
with the created order, but He also requires nothing from it in order to possess the full perfection
of His divinity. Therefore, this rules out the possibility that divine subjectivity could be
actualized through the created order, because if the created order cannot be identified with God,
then actualization through the created order entails that God does not possess the perfection of
His divinity immanently.
The problem before us, therefore, is this: one the one hand, how does Staudenmaier
understand the divine subjectivity to be actualized immanently, while on the other hand
including the aspect of otherness requisite for such actualization? This chapter offers an answer
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to this question. Here, I argue that Staudenmaier solves this problem through the Christian
understanding of God as a Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, three irreducibly distinct
persons sharing a numerical sameness of essence.
A trinitarian constitution of the divine resolves the dilemma in the following way.
Because the Christian doctrine of the Trinity consists in the claim that God is immanently both
one divine essence as well as three distinct persons, the presence of personal otherness –
necessary for the actualization of personal subjectivity – is a feature of the divine apart from the
created order. And it is precisely because the components for such actualization belong to the
divine apart from the created order that the personal subjectivity of the divine can be actualized
immanently.
In section 1, I make an exegetical case that Staudenmaier actually sees connections
between the Trinity, divine transcendence, and personal subjectivity. We will see that
Staudenmaier associates the notion of the Trinity with the notion of divine transcendence (1.2),
and that he sees the Trinity as the condition by which divine subjectivity is possible (1.3). Thus,
the Trinity operates in Staudenmaier’s theology as the solution to a problem about how God can
be a personal subject, and is thereby the necessary solution to this problem such that the Trinity
must be rationally demonstrated if one is to believe that God is a personal subject at all.
The task of section 2 is to examine how the Trinity is that by which divine subjectivity is
actualized, i.e. what it is about the Trinity which occludes God’s engagement with the finite as a
means of His own self-development. 2.1 treats Staudenmaier’s correlation of the Trinity and
divine transcendence with what he refers to as the ‘concrete unity’ of the divine. In 2.2, I give a
brief overview of Hegelian dialectic in order to explicate precisely what ‘concreteness’ consists
in.
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Having examined what ‘concreteness’ consists in, the task of section 3 is explore how the
notion of ‘concreteness’ ought to be applied in the case of the Trinity. 3.1 explores how
Staudenmaier conceives the Trinity as a dialectic, and thus how the concreteness of the divine
life is achieved dialectically. 3.2 examines what dialectical movement consists in when the
category in question is that of persons. In 3.2.1, I offer an apologetic for once again utilizing
Hegel as a guide. 3.2.2 presents Hegel’s dialectic of personal subjectivity, which provides a
model by which Staudenmaier’s trinitarian dialectic can be understood. In 3.3, Staudenmaier’s
trinitarian dialectic is then interpreted along Hegelian lines. In 3.3.2, it is argued that
Staudenmaier’s understanding of the Trinity parallels the Hegelian notion of “mutual
recognition,” an important aspect of Hegel’s understanding of personal intersubjectivity. Then, in
3.3.3, it is shown how the interpersonal encounters of the divine persons of the Trinity result in
the formation of a community.
Finally, in section 4, we will consider the implications of the actualization of divine
personality via the Trinity. There I will demonstrate that Staudenmaier sees the Trinity as that
through which divine subjectivity is actualized immanently, and so as that which prevents God
from having to actualize His subjectivity by means of the finite. I will also demonstrate that, for
Staudenmaier, because the Trinity is the locus of interpersonal encounter by which divine
subjectivity is actualized, the Trinity also serves as the model for interpersonal encounter
between the divine and the non-divine.

1. Trinity, Transcendence, and Subjectivity
1.1 Introduction
Our thesis is that for Staudenmaier personal otherness is requisite for the actualization of
personal subjectivity, and because the presence of personal otherness is an immanent feature of
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the divine (resulting in the divine Trinity), the divine Trinity is that in virtue of which divine
subjectivity is actualized and actualized immanently. Our first step in showing that Staudenmaier
believes this to be the case is to demonstrate that he associates the concepts of divine Trinity,
divine transcendence, and divine subjectivity. More precisely, our first step is to demonstrate that
he associates the notion of the Trinity with the notion of divine transcendence, and to
demonstrate that it is the Trinity with which Staudenmaier associates the actualization of divine
subjectivity.

1.2 Trinity and Divine Transcendence
How is it that God is able to transcend the created order? In a few key places in CD II,
Staudenmaier associates the Trinity with God’s transcendence over creation, and particularly
God not needing the created order. He speaks of the Trinity as forming a ‘world’ unto itself, and
thus as forming a self-enclosed milieu. He says, “For precisely because there are not one, but
three divine persons, is the divine life a world for itself (eine Welt für sich), a whole and
complete world (eine ganze und volle Welt), which precisely in this way stands by itself (durch
sich selber) over the finite world, as it does not require the latter for itself.”158 Staudenmaier
clearly maintains here that, in virtue of God being three divine persons, God does not require the
created order for His development or perfection.
A few sentences later, Staudenmaier posits the counterfactual – that if God was not a
Trinity of persons, then God would require the finite for His self-development. He puts the
matter this way: “If God ceases to live as divine person in the divine person, through the divine
person, and for the divine person, to know Himself and to be in the divine person, then the
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consequence is necessary, namely that God knows Himself in the finite, develops Himself by the
finite, loves Himself through the finite and in the finite, and lives in the finite. With the
annulment (Aufhebung) of the divine tripersonality, pantheism is introduced.”159
Staudenmaier’s descriptions of a divine person living and knowing Himself “in a divine
person, through the divine person, and for the divine person” are, as we will see later, a way of
referencing the divine as trinitarian. We will see that Staudenmaier thinks of the Trinity as a
‘concrete unity,’ and this requires what he thinks is a more intimate relation between the persons
than sharing one and the same essence, namely a union in which they relate as ethical subjects.

1.3 Trinity and Divine Subjectivity
In section 1.2 above, we saw that Staudenmaier associates the divine Trinity with God’s
transcendence over the finite milieu. Further, I have suggested that it is in virtue of a fullydeveloped subjectivity that God possesses transcendence over the finite (since God would
thereby not need the finite to actualize His subjectivity). But how do we know that it is divine
subjectivity which would be actualized by the finite if God were not Trinity?
Here we must admit that Staudenmaier is not as straightforward as we might hope in
correlating divine triunity with the actualization of divine subjectivity, making subjectivity the
cause – or explanation – of the Trinity. Indeed, in the hundreds of pages of Die christliche
Dogmatik, he nowhere puts the link between divine Trinity and subjectivity as baldly as I have.
However, his lack of explicitness on the matter need not mean that we reject our thesis out of
hand. What his lack of explicitness does mean is that we will have to look for suggestive links
between the Trinity and divine subjectivity by which we can build a cumulative case.
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Save for one instance (which we will examine momentarily), although Staudenmaier does
not explicitly state that divine triunity is a necessary condition of the actualization of divine
subjectivity, in several places he associates the Trinity with those personal aspects of intelligence
and will. As he puts it in the heading of CD II §93, “The trinitarian life of the Godhead consists
in the mutual being in-, through-, and for-one-another of the three divine persons, indeed 1. in
the immanent movement of knowing, through which Father, Son, and Spirit reciprocally know
themselves in the absolute identity of their essence; 2. in the immanent movement of willing,
through which they, in eternal accordance with their essence, mutually will themselves.”160
As the text above demonstrates, Staudenmaier sees the acts of personal subjectivity –
knowing and willing – as constitutive of the divine life, and thereby constitutive of the Trinity.
The reason that knowing and willing are constitutive of the Trinity is because the divine life is
characterized by an ethical unity between the divine persons, and such unity is achieved through
the exercise of knowledge and will. As he puts it a bit later, “the three divine persons, since they
are bound indissolubly to unity through the one divine essence, present the same unity as a
living-personal [unity] by the three persons being mutually in-one-another, through-one-another,
and for-one-another, by them mutually sounding themselves through their properties, and
forming an absolute spiritual unity in knowledge, will, and love.”161
We see this same association between the trinitarian life and the acts of knowledge and
will again at the end of §93. “Through love,” Staudenmaier says, “the divine persons mutually
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posit themselves in one another through knowing and willing, through love they pour themselves
out into one another, through love they mutually give and receive their being and life, wholly and
without reservation. Through love, finally, the trinitarian life forms itself as a united [life], a life
in which unity pervades all abilities of knowing and willing, and thereby creates a single life.”162
Admittedly, one can argue from the above quotations that although they demonstrate a
correlation between divine subjectivity and Trinity, where the divine persons utilize their
abilities of intelligence and will, their utilization of such abilities within the triune life does not
mean that the triune life is the means by which they are actualized. Indeed, one could argue that
the above quotations do not rule out the possibility that divine subjectivity may be actualized
independently of the triune life, and the triune life is merely the locus of their expression.
If the above quotations merely correlate divine subjectivity with the Trinity, there is one
instance where Staudenmaier suggests an even stronger relationship between the two, indeed a
causal relationship. He says, “If, therefore, God is certainly a personal God, i.e. if personality
certainly belongs to God, then He is necessarily (notwendig) a tripersonal [God], because
without tripersonality in the life of the Godhead the properly personal elements are not able to
occur (vorkommen) and are not able to satisfy (befriedigen) themselves.”163
Here, Staudenmaier indicates that there is a primal element of divine subjectivity – the
divine personality – which demands to come to fruition. The personality can come to fruition
only if there are multiple loci by which it is instantiated, that is, only if there are multiple divine
persons. Here, then, the existence of multiple of divine persons is explained by their being
vehicles for the fruition of personality. Given that there is a causal relation between the divine
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personality and the Trinity, this suggests that the quotations previous to the one above ought to
be read such that intelligence and will are not merely epiphenomenal to the Trinity, but in fact
are constitutive of it. As Staudenmaier puts it, “The one divine essence presents itself as
concretely personal in a threefold personality, or: the one absolute essence of the Godhead is
eternally actual and truly personal only in three divine persons.”164 We can say, therefore, that
for Staudenmaier, that divine subjectivity naturally unfolds itself as Trinity.
Given that Staudenmaier believes divine subjectivity necessarily takes the form of a
Trinity of divine persons, our next task is to examine how the Trinity is that by which divine
subjectivity is actualized. We have seen that it is in virtue of God being a Trinity of persons that
He does not need the created, finite milieu in order to develop or perfect His divinity. We must
now figure out what it is about the Trinity which occludes God’s engagement with the finite as a
means of His own self-development.

2. The Trinity as Concrete Unity
2.1 The Correlation of Transcendence, Trinity, and Concrete Unity
We have seen that Staudenmaier correlates the Trinity with God’s transcendence, and
that such correlation is due to the Trinity being the locus of the actualization of divine
subjectivity. This correlation, however, sheds little light on precisely how the Trinity actualizes
divine subjectivity. In order to get a better understanding on the matter, we must examine a
further correlation made by Staudenmaier, namely his correlation of the Trinity and divine
transcendence with what he refers to as the ‘concrete unity’ of the divine.
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“The unity (Einheit) of God,” Staudenmaier notes, “is consequently no abstract, but a
concrete, unity, and this concreteness consists not only in each of the divine persons being one
with the divine essence, but also and chiefly in the fact that the one essence of God emerges in a
threefold personality and is spiritually living.”165 Here we encounter the terms ‘abstract’ and
‘concrete,’ terms which are not novel with Staudenmaier, although the sense in which he uses
them may be (and certainly are not traditional in the history of Christian trinitarian theology). In
this passage, we see that although ‘concrete unity’ describes the divine persons ‘being one with
the divine essence,’ it chiefly describes the essence of God emerging in a ‘threefold personality.’
And here it is ‘unity’ which bears the description ‘concrete.’
As we can see in the passage above, this concreteness which describes the divine unity is
at least in part on account of the ‘threefold personality’ which emerges from the divine essence,
viz. the three divine persons. Thus, there is something about the divine being a threefold
personality which has a bearing on the divine unity so as to make it ‘concrete.’
Further, we saw above that Staudenmaier describes the Trinity as “a world for itself (eine
Welt für sich), a whole and complete world (eine ganze und volle Welt), which stands by itself
(durch sich selber) over the finite world, as it does not require the latter for itself.” Staudenmaier
further describes this ‘world’ as characterized by ‘concrete unity.’ He says, “This complete
world (vollkommene Welt) which God is in Himself is just the divine unity (Einheit) as a
concrete [unity], i.e. the tripersonality of the one God.”166
If concrete unity is a property immanent to the divine, then “the Godhead does not need
to mix itself with the world out of hunger for life and concreteness, so to speak, to posit and to
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love itself as a world, thereby at the same time to make itself dependent on the finite, and to
grasp this dependence as an essential and necessary element of the divine nature itself , like
Hegel, who confesses without embarrassment that he can conceive no God who could be God
without the world.”167
We see from these passages, therefore, that Staudenmaier correlates the divine as a
‘complete world’ with the divine as a ‘concrete’ unity, and that he correlates this ‘concrete’ unity
with the divine as ‘the tripersonality of the one God.’ This suggests that the Trinity is
characterized by a particular form of unity (viz., ‘concrete’ unity), and it is precisely this sort of
unity which engenders divine transcendence. Specifically, because concreteness is immanent to
the divine, God does not need to obtain concreteness for Himself by means of the finite order.

2.2 The Nature of Concreteness
The term ‘concrete’ – and its opposite, ‘abstract’ – are not traditional semantic terms in
Christian theology of the Trinity. Further, although Staudenmaier describes the divine as a
concrete unity in several places, he nowhere defines what ‘concreteness’ is as such. Interestingly,
the utilization of this term that is most proximate to Staudenmaier is that of Hegel. This is
interesting given Staudenmaier’s fierce criticisms of Hegel.168 Thus, it might seem that to utilize
Hegel hermeneutically for understanding Staudenmaier is wrongheaded from the outset.
However, as critical of Hegel as Staudenmaier was, one cannot ignore Staudenmaier’s use of
such language.
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In examining Hegel’s utilization of the term ‘concrete,’ we can speak only in very
general terms.169 This is because for Hegel, the categories of logic develop immanently, and
therefore relate to one another in different ways, depending upon the specific category in
question. It is difficult, therefore, to say much regarding the criteria for what constitutes a
category’s abstractness and concreteness without taking into account the specific category in
question. Thus, here I can give only basic criteria for abstractness and concreteness.
Generally speaking, the term ‘concrete’ was utilized by Hegel to describe a particular
concept or category insofar as it was viewed in relation to other concepts or categories. (Thus, its
opposite, ‘abstract,’ describes a particular concept or category that is viewed in isolation.) What
makes a concept ‘concrete,’ however, is not a relation to any other concepts whatsoever, but its
relation to a concept which is seemingly its opposite. This opposition is then mediated by a
subsequent concept, where such mediation shows how the (seemingly) oppositional concepts are
in fact intimately related, for each is comprehensible only in the light of its opposite.
On the one hand, this mediation does not dissolve the (seemingly) contradictory concepts,
for then there would be nothing to mediate between, and there would be no dialectical
progression, but a collapse back into indeterminate, abstract sameness. On the other hand, the
mediating concept that emerges from the opposition is a subsequent stage of the dialectic, which
provides a fuller, truer picture of Being than its less determinate stages. This is due to its
incorporation into a more comprehensive framework of the truths of its preceding concepts,
precisely because it is able to resolve the contradictions between its preceding concepts.
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It should be noted, though, that the movement from the initial concept to its opposite, and
then to their mediating concept, does not occur arbitrarily (as if the thinker begins with some
concept and then consciously tries to come up with what its opposite would be). Rather, when
thought entertains a concept, it simply perceives an instability, and this instability naturally leads
thought to the subsequent concepts of the initial thought’s opposite and their mediation. Thus,
the movement from concept to concept is not due to choice, but rather to thought’s following its
own immanent logic (which is, in the end, the same thing as being following its own immanent
logic).
Hegel’s dialectical logic, therefore, forms a chain of concepts that develop immanently,
where each subsequent concept incorporates the truths of previous concepts into an increasingly
comprehensive framework. The logical-dialectical process ends at the concept which
incorporates the truths of all previous concepts and which there are no further stages. This final
stage is ‘absolute’ because the framework as a whole is comprehensive, in that it has
incorporated the truths of all its preceding concepts and mediated their opposition, and there is
no further mediation possible.
We can see a paradigm example of this logical-dialectical opposition and mediation at the
beginning of Hegel’s Logic in his discussion of being, nothing, and becoming. We will briefly
examine this dialectical movement so as to get a picture of what this logical-dialectical
progression looks like.
The first, most indeterminate thought which one can still think is the thought of ‘being.’
When we think of ‘being’ in this indeterminate state, we have nothing at all in mind (e.g., we do
not have the thought of being insofar as it exists in a determination like ‘plant’ or ‘dog’ or ‘red’).
Rather, we simply have ‘being’ in mind.
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Yet note that, when we think simply of ‘being’ – and thus have nothing at all in mind –
we literally have the thought of ‘nothing’ now in our mind. In thinking the thought of ‘being,’
our thought automatically slips into the thought of ‘nothing.’ However, consider the thought of
‘nothing’: it is just the thought that there is nothing that is determinate before our mental gaze,
i.e. that whatever is before our mental gaze is content-less. But note that, when thinking the
thought of ‘nothing,’ we are actually now thinking of ‘nothing’ in terms of being: that whatever
is before our mental gaze is content-less (thus what is before out mental gaze is ‘being’ that is
without content)
Thus, the thought of ‘nothing’ automatically slips into the thought of ‘being.’ In thinking
of ‘being,’ then, thought moves from ‘being’ to ‘nothing,’ and then from ‘nothing’ to ‘being.’
Therefore, in thinking of being, thought thinks of the transition from the one to the other. Thus,
the indeterminacy of being – in its movement back and forth between itself and nothing, where
‘being’ becomes ‘nothing’ and ‘nothing’ becomes ‘being’ – just is the thought of ‘becoming.’
Being, therefore, has now moved from indeterminate to something more determinate (viz.,
‘becoming’).
Recall that, when thinking the thought of ‘nothing,’ we thought of ‘nothing’ in terms of
being: that whatever is before our mental gaze is content-less (and so the ‘nothing’ that is before
our mental gaze is ‘being’ that is without content). Further, recall that, when thinking the thought
‘being,’ we thought of ‘being’ in terms of nothing: in thinking of ‘being,’ we had nothing at all in
mind. Thus, when we think of either one of these two thoughts, we can only think of the one in
terms of the other: in order to successfully think the thought of ‘being,’ we must think the
thought of having nothing in mind, and in order to successfully think the thought of ‘nothing,’
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we must think the thought of having something in mind that is content-less, and so must think the
thought of ‘being.’
The upshot of this is that the successful thinking of either of these thoughts requires
mediation by its opposite thought. Ordinary thought (what Hegel refers to as ‘the understanding’)
simply regards the difference between ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ as automatic. More precisely, their
difference seems to be ‘immediate.’ But we saw that, in fact, the successful thought of the one
requires the other to be latent ‘in the background’ so to speak. So, the explicit thought of ‘being’
is mediated to us by the latent presence of the category ‘nothing,’ and the explicit thought of
‘nothing’ is mediated to us by the latent presence of the category ‘being.’ If, then, the thought of
one is mediated by the thought of the other, then the determination of one requires mediation by
the other. Determination, in Hegel’s view, is just something becoming explicitly what it is
implicitly. Therefore, for a thing to become explicitly what it is implicitly requires difference,
otherness.
Finally, though, note that the explicit thought of ‘being’ requires the mediation of the
latent thought of ‘nothing’ (and vice versa), and so displays both difference and unity or identity.
The thought of one is mediated by a different thought, and so the thought of one is united to
something (viz. its opposite), yet what it is united to is nonetheless other than it (in this case, its
opposite) and so is different than it. Thus, what we see here is what Hegel referred to as an
‘identity of identity and difference.’
Having proceeded through this dialectic, each of these categories – being, nothing, and
becoming – are now concrete, in that they are viewed in their relations to one another. And the
category of becoming mediates between the categories of being and nothing, and in so doing
incorporates being and nothing into a more comprehensive framework. Becoming, therefore, is
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the truth of being and nothing. Each of these concepts, therefore, become concrete because the
thought of each is mediated by the thought of the other two.
If concreteness consists in mediation, and if the Trinity is characterized by ‘concrete’
unity, then the sort of unity which obtains in the Trinity must be a unity that occurs through
mediation of distinct aspects of the Trinity. Further, apparently it is this sort of unity – concrete,
or mediated, unity – which engenders divine transcendence vis-à-vis the created order. There is,
therefore, something about the mediation of distinct aspects of the Trinity which precipitates
divine transcendence. Our next task, then, is to investigate how concreteness might apply to the
Trinity.

3. The Trinitarian Divine as Forming a Concrete Unity
3.1 The Trinity as Dialectic
Now that we have an understanding of abstractness and concreteness, we are in a better
position to explore how the divine, conceived as tripersonal, might form a ‘concrete unity.’
However, it is not yet obvious how the notion of concreteness ought to be applied to the Trinity.
We saw that the movement toward concreteness begins with a particular concept or category,
proceeds to its seeming opposite, and continues to the mediation of the two. And although we
have seen that Staudenmaier utilizes the Hegelian language of ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete,’ we have
yet to show that he sees such concreteness as following the logic which we have described
above. In other words, we must show that Staudenmaier sees the Trinity as manifesting
concreteness via a movement, a movement that issues in otherness and then resolves through a
movement of mediation. In short, we have to show that Staudenmaier sees the Trinity as
manifesting the movement of dialectic.
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Fortunately, Staudenmaier gives textual evidence that he conceives the Trinity
dialectically. He says that “in the trinitarian life of the Godhead there is indeed a living dialectic
(Dialektik).170 He begins the ‘speculative’ part of the doctrine of the Trinity (CD II §§91-93) –
whose first section is entitled “The Dialectic (Dialektik) of the Essential Moments of the
Trinitarian Being of the Godhead” – with “the express remark that a dialectic (Dialektik) of those
determinations which belong essentially to this dogma [viz., the Trinity] is no subjective, but is
an absolutely objective dialectic (objective Dialektik).”171 (It should be noted, though, that
Staudenmaier explicitly contrasts this objective, trinitarian dialectic with “sheer dialectic,” with
what “in modern times, in total misjudgment of the divine being (Wesen), the being (Sein) and
acts of God have been determined by philosophy as a mere dialectical process, indeed better, as a
process of the logical idea.”)172
What, then, is the dialectic that pertains to the Trinity? Staudenmaier says: “In the
objective dialectic (objectiven Dialektik) of the trinitarian life of God there is a movement which,
beginning with the principle passes from oneness (Einheit) over to twoness (Zweiheit), and the
movement itself comes to its rest only in threeness (Dreiheit).”173 Staudenmaier uses the term
‘movement’ (Bewegung) to describe the motion of life in the divine, that is, the movement of the
divine essence from the Father, to the Son, and from them both to the Spirit. “[W]ith the Father,
who has life in Himself,” Staudenmaier notes, “the entire movement of life (Lebensbewegung)
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begins.”174 Again invoking Gregory Nazianzus, he says, “[T]he immanent process of the
trinitarian life as it is posited through the equally immanent relations…is at the same time that
inner movement (Bewegung) through which ‘from the oneness (Einheit) of the principle moves
to twoness (Zweiheit) and goes forth into threeness (Dreiheit).’”175 The dialectical movement
that leads to the concrete unity of the divine is therefore just that movement of the divine essence
in the procession of the Son from the Father and the procession of the Spirit from the Father and
the Son.
We saw that dialectical movement begins with an initial concept or category and
naturally issues in otherness. Thus, that dialectical movement (in this case, the Father’s
generation of the Son) yields otherness: “Certainly through personal contrast (Gegensatz)
consists an otherness (Anderheit).”176 We also saw that this issuance which yields otherness
creates an opposition which must be overcome. Just as in the Hegelian dialectic, where the
concept of being automatically leads thought to the concept of nothing, and so there is an
opposition which must be overcome, so also here we have an opposition between the Father and
the Son (created by the Father’s generation of the Son).
Unfortunately, Staudenmaier does not go into much detail regarding the nature of this
opposition. (For example, he never indicates that there is a conceptual instability regarding the
Father that automatically leads to the thought of the Son.) What seems to drive the trinitarian
dialectic is that there is a truth in threeness that is not present in twoness. Of a system of twoness
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he says, “Because, however, dualism is no true and complete system, the Godhead overcomes
twoness and goes over to threeness.”177 Later, he notes, “Twoness (Zweiheit) is not yet complete;
it therefore strives for reconciliation in a third, in which it becomes true.”178 Regarding a system
that goes beyond threeness, Staudenmaier says, “First, threeness is the true system… Were it to
go beyond threeness, then it would fall into boundlessness (Maaßlose), into indeterminate
manyness, and therefore fall into polytheism.”179
What Staudenmaier seems to be getting at here is that threeness manifests the truth of
otherness. As he puts it, “This otherness consummates itself not in twoness but in threeness.”180
True otherness does not consist in total otherness, but in otherness which nonetheless contains
familiarity (and we will explore this particular point in detail in 3.2.2 below). On the one hand,
twoness alone is just bare otherness (where what is other appears as alien), rather than an
otherness in which one person can nonetheless see themselves in the other (and so does not
appear as alien). On the other hand, anything beyond threeness dissolves the truth of otherness
because it simply issues in indeterminacy, and so one is no longer faced with otherness.
If we follow the logic of dialectic, this would indicate that the Holy Spirit is the one in
whom the truth of the otherness between the Father and Son becomes manifest. This seems to be
precisely how Staudenmaier frames the matter: “For this reason the Spirit is often called the
Spirit of the Father and the Son in Holy Scripture. The person of the Spirit is everywhere the
confirming person, so-to-speak, the affirming person, the consummating person, the person who
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concludes or resolves the entire life-organism (Lebensorganismus) of the sublime Godhead.”181
The preceding paragraphs have presented enough textual evidence to demonstrate that
Staudenmaier conceives the Trinity as a dialectic, and thus that the concreteness of the divine life
is achieved dialectically. However, our investigation thus far has yielded only the formal features
of the concrete unity of the tripersonal divine life, in that we have simply considered dialectical
movement without any specific categories or concepts in mind. Thus, we still do not know
exactly how the dialectical movement which emerges from the Father, to the Son, and from them
both to the Spirit actually precipitates a concrete unity. In short, we do not know what dialectical
movement looks like when the category in question is that of persons. To that task we now turn.

3.2 Dialectic of Persons
3.2.1 Introduction: Justification of Utilizing Hegel as a Guide
We have utilized the basic pattern of Hegelian dialectic to guide our reading of
Staudenmaier’s trinitarian dialectic. We have seen that, for Staudenmaier, the dialectical
movement in the Trinity is a movement from person to person. In order to understand the
dialectical movement from person to person in Staudenmaier’s Trinity, we will utilize a Hegelian
dialectic that is also concerned with persons. This model comes from Hegel’s Phenomenology of
Spirit, although it reaches its fullest extent in his Philosophy of Spirit (the third part of his
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences) and Philosophy of Right.
One concern must be addressed at the outset. Above, our utilization of Hegelian dialectic
as a hermeneutical lens for interpreting Staudenmaier was very formal and so very basic. But
here we will be utilizing Hegelian dialectic not merely formally, but also materially. The more
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content we appropriate from Hegel for our hermeneutical lens, the greater risk we take in
distorting Staudenmaier. This is all the more a possibility given Staudenmaier’s trenchant
criticisms of Hegel. What, then, justifies our material use of Hegel for interpreting
Staudenmaier?
My answer twofold. First, such justification comes through certain parallels that arise
between Staudenmaier’s language of the divine persons and Hegel’s language in the
Phenomenology, as well as through various thematic parallels. In my view, although
Staudenmaier criticized Hegel, such parallels between the two cannot be written off. Indeed,
relations between thinkers are complicated, much more often exhibiting a both/and quality of
appropriation and rejection rather than an either/or quality.
Second, my material use of Hegel is still quite modest. I am not arguing that
Staudenmaier was a Hegelian in any robust sense. Hegelianism was no doubt ‘in the air’ and
notions of intersubjectivity were certainly not confined only to Hegel. Thus, my utilization of
Hegel here is more properly viewed as utilizing one example of a model of subjectivity that was
common within the larger philosophical climate. With this preliminary behind us, we can now
examine Hegel’s dialectic of intersubjectivity.
3.2.2 Presentation of Hegel’s Dialectic of Intersubjectivity
In the Phenomenology, Hegel seeks to demonstrate that the identity of thought and being is the
truth of consciousness on consciousness’ own, immanent terms.182 Thus, he begins from
everyday self-consciousness. In everyday self-consciousness, one has a consciousness of oneself,
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but also a consciousness of what is not oneself. Indeed, consciousness of self is possible only in
relation to what is other than the self.
This introduces a paradox: self-consciousness can be what it is only in relation to what is
other than itself. Self-consciousness sees this as a contradiction and tries to resolve this
contradiction by turning away from otherness back onto itself. It can do this because, although it
certainly views its object as real, it nevertheless views it as subordinate to itself, as existing for
self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, in other words, can be what it is – aware of itself – only
in relation to what is other, but it views this other object merely as the instrument by which it is
what it is, the instrument by which it is aware of itself.
Thus, self-consciousness affirms, or satisfies, itself by turning away from its object (by
‘negating’ it) and thereby becoming aware of itself alone. But such satisfaction can occur only
through negating the other. Thus, self-consciousness must continually negate other objects in
order to satisfy or affirm itself. Self-consciousness, in other words, can be conscious of itself
only through negating what is other than itself.
Since self-consciousness can satisfy itself only through this continual negation of
otherness, it comes to realize that otherness has a degree of independence. Self-consciousness
must therefore relate to otherness in a new way: otherness can still be negated, but it is
something independent that can be negated. More precisely, self-consciousness can be conscious
of itself through its negation of an other, but through negation of an other which has a degree of
independence from it.
This, however, precipitates another contradiction. Self-consciousness is satisfied by being
what it is, by being conscious of itself alone. Yet awareness of oneself alone must occur through
something which is independent of itself. It can be alone only through another. This
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contradiction can be resolved if the independent other is capable of self-negation: this allows for
the negation of otherness (leaving self-consciousness aware of itself alone), yet without selfconsciousness having to engage with otherness (which is what precipitates the contradiction).
The only thing that is capable of self-negation, however, is another self-consciousness.
Thus, the desire of the first self-consciousness can be provided only by another selfconsciousness. As Hegel puts it, “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another
self-consciousness.”183 In negating itself for the sake of the other, the second self-consciousness
thereby enables the first self-consciousness to have awareness of itself with minimal engagement
with the second. The second self-consciousness is merely a mirror for the first, for the first sees
only itself in the second. The second self-consciousness recognizes the first, but the first does not
recognize the second.
In seeing itself in the other, however, the first self-consciousness feels alienated from
itself because its identity is located outside of itself. To remedy this, the first self-consciousness
reclaims its identity from the second. This leaves the second self-consciousness no longer a mere
mirror for the first – the first self-consciousness recognizes the full independence of the second.
Self-consciousness is therefore achieved through another self-consciousness, but precisely
through recognition of that other as a free and equal self-consciousness. Thus, each selfconsciousness is mediated by the other self-consciousness. As Hegel puts it, each selfconsciousness
is aware that it at once is, and is not, another consciousness, and equally that this other is
for itself only when it supersedes itself as being for itself, and is for itself only in the
being-for-self of the other. Each is for the other the middle term, through which each
mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an
183
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immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this
mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.184
The dialectical movement above began with sameness, moved to difference, and then this
sameness and difference were mediated. At first, the consciousness took what was before it not
as independent, but rather as an instrument for itself. Subsequently, the consciousness came to
see the other as independent, but such independence was viewed as alien to itself. Finally, each
consciousness realized that its very self was mediated by otherness, that otherness is constitutive
of itself (and this is why it can see itself in the other).
It is in this third phase that a concrete unity emerges, for there comes to be (as Hegel
often put the matter) an identity of identity and difference. Mere sameness without any
difference whatsoever would be static and indeterminate, and total difference would preclude
any unity. In concrete unity, however, difference is mediated by sameness (and vice versa).

3.3 The Trinity as a Dialectic of Concrete Unity
3.3.1 Introduction
Now that we have a model before us of interpersonal dialectical movement, we can
examine Staudenmaier’s trinitarian dialectic. We have seen already that his trinitarian dialectic
begins with mere sameness (the Father), which issues in otherness (the generation of the Son
from the Father), and this otherness is subsequently mediated (the spiration of the Holy Spirit
from both the Father and the Son). The task now before us is to examine how Staudenmaier’s
understanding of the triune life of God manifests those features of interpersonal dialectic
examined above. This will enable us to consider how the Trinity forms a concrete unity and how
such a unity funds divine transcendence over the created order.
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Interpersonal concrete unity, as we have seen, consists in a unity amongst difference. As
Hegel put it, there is an identity of identity and non-identity. As such, Staudenmaier’s notion of
the interpersonal concrete unity of the Trinity is what I call an ethical unity: a unity (= identity)
between different individuals (= difference) who share one and the same universal (= identity). I
refer to this type of unity as “ethical” because it involves the use of what Staudenmaier refers to
as the “ethical” attributes of intelligence and will. Through intelligence, the individuals come to
possess knowledge of their common universality, and through will the individuals yield their
own individualities for the sake of the greater whole.
In Hegel’s dialectic, this ethical unity amongst persons occurs through “recognition” by
different individuals of their common universality.185 Admittedly, Staudenmaier does not use the
term “recognition” (Anerkennung) in his trinitarian dialectic. Nonetheless, he does speak in
similar terms (as we will see below), most often using the verb erkennen (to know), but
occasionally using the verbs begreifen (to grasp) and schauen (to behold).

3.3.2 Mutual Recognition
Concrete unity, as an identity of identity and difference, involves identity in two different
senses. One sense of identity, which we have already seen, is what I have called a ‘common
universality’ amongst the individuals. In Staudenmaier’s trinitarian dialectic, this sense of
identity is the one common essence that is shared by the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
The concrete unity of the triune life of God, however, is more than a unity of essence:
“The unity (Einheit) of God is consequently no abstract, but a concrete, unity, and this
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concreteness consists not only in each of the divine persons being one with the divine essence,
but also and chiefly in the fact that the one essence of God emerges in a threefold personality
and is spiritually living.”186 “What mediates the being-in-one-another and the living-in-oneanother of the three divine persons, alongside the unity of substance is, in addition, love, which
posits personally, i.e. for intelligence and will, what is already posited eternally through the
eternal nature.”187
Concrete unity indicates a unity of the trinitarian persons not simply in terms of their
sharing of a common essence but, in addition, a unity in terms of personal subjectivity (achieved
through the capacities of intelligence and will). We saw in our examination of Hegel’s
interpersonal dialectic that the ethical unity of persons is grounded in a mutual recognition
between the persons of their common universality. Such recognition, we saw, consists in each
person seeing herself ‘in’ the other person, in the sense that she recognizes that the other person
is a human just as she is. And it is in virtue of seeing herself in the other that she suspends her
will as merely her own and yields her will to the greater whole of which they are all a part.
In Staudenmaier’s trinitarian dialectic, we see an interesting parallel with Hegel’s notion
of mutual recognition, where Staudenmaier speaks of the divine persons as knowing or
discerning the commonality between themselves. Indeed, Staudenmaier speaks of the divine
persons discerning themselves in the other persons: “The Father knows (erkennt) Himself not
only in the Son and the Son in the Father, they are not only known (erkannt) mutually by one
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another, but both of them know (erkennen) themselves and are known (erkannt) in the identity of
their essence in a third like person.”188
Staudenmaier utilizes this language in other places as well:
Knowing (erkennend) Himself, each person knows (erkennt) Himself in the essence
which is one and the same for all the persons; grasping (begreifend) Himself each person
grasps (begreift) Himself in the other: no one knows the Father except the Son, and no
one knows the Son except the Father. If the Father turns His vision in upon Himself, and
His spiritual essence reflects itself, it replicates itself, so to speak, in this vision. Then this
reflection is not itself a mere reflection, but by recognizing (erkennt) Himself, He
recognizes (erkennt) the Son, and by recognizing (erkennt) the Son, He recognizes
(erkennt) Himself. The essence, which He knows as His own, He knows also as the
essence of the Son, when he knows the essence of the Son as His own.189
And again:
In absolute vision he Father, from whom emerges the movement in the trinitarian life,
places His essence in the Son, recognizes (erkennt) Himself in the Son, and is recognized
(erkannt wird) by the Son in turn in the identity of essence, and…these two behold
(schauen) their identical essence in a third person, and are recognized (erkannt werden)
again by this third person and are ratified through this recognition (Erkenntniß), through
which the self-knowledge of the Godhead completes itself.190
As we saw in our examination of Hegelian interpersonal dialectic, mutual recognition
between persons results in each opening herself up to the others, where each no longer wills
merely for herself, but each directs her will to ends that are mutually beneficial. Or more
positively, through a free individual’s mediation that occurs via its relation to other free beings,
certain ways of acting become closed-off, yet new ones are opened.
In Staudenmaier’s trinitarian dialectic we see a similar notion, where the will of one
becomes the will of another and vice-versa. As Staudenmaier puts it, “Each person wills Himself
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as an independent essence; however, the person wills Himself just as much in the other persons,
and finally He is willed by the other persons as He wills Himself in them. Thus there is a mutual
willing and being willed, and indeed this willing in the divine persons is a willing from, through,
in, and for one another, just as it is with knowing.”191 And again: “The Father wills Himself in
the Son and Spirit, and is willed by the Son and Spirit; the Son wills Himself in the Father and
the Spirit, and is willed by the Father and the Spirit; the Spirit wills Himself in the Father and the
Son, and is willed by the Father and the Son.”192
The unity is clear when Staudenmaier says, “The divine persons always will the same
thing, and they will it in the same way. In fact, this will is here exactly the same in the intention
of being and willing oneself in another.”193 As we will see in the next section, these acts of
mutual knowing and willing result in the formation of a social structure which is more than the
sum of individuals – the acts of mutual knowing and willing result in the formation of a
community.

3.3.3 Trinity as Community and the Actualization of Personal Subjectivity
What we saw in Hegel’s interpersonal dialectic is that there is a socially-guiding
principle, a principle which transcends the individuals as such. This principle pushes the
individuals to abrogate their individualities as such and form a socially cohesive structure which
transcends their individualities. In short, the Hegelian interpersonal dialectic results in the
formation of community. Each individual is not meant to be an isolated individual but, instead, is
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meant to be mediated to herself through her relations with other persons, relations constituted by
mutual respect. This is precisely why in Hegel’s dialectic, for example, self-consciousness can
only properly be self-consciousness if it is mediated through its relation with another selfconsciousness.
Staudenmaier himself uses language that is reminiscent of this dialectic when speaking of
the triune life: “Through this mutuality (Gegenseitigkeit) and reciprocity (Wechselseitigkeit) [of
the divine persons], the rigidity of being-for-self (Fürsichseins) as posited in the mere I dissolves
itself and personality stands in its place.”194 According to Staudenmaier, therefore, the
individuality of each divine person is dialectically transformed into an openness toward the other
persons. Here we see that the divine person abrogates His individuality as such so as to form a
socially cohesive structure.
The name for this opening of self to others is love. Love draws the divine persons out of
their rigid individualities and opens them to one another:
If the particular essence of good and love consists in the going out of one person over to
another, as well as in the incorporation of the life of the other person into one’s own, then
the divine person can fully be love only if with it is a second person, and with and beside
the second a third person, in which the tripersonal life completes itself as an absolutely
perfect life. The multiplicity of persons is demanded by the essence of love itself. As the
divine person is able to love completely only its like, and is able to be truly loved again
by another like [thing]…so can the divine person only again be love toward a divine
person. The perfection, truth, purity, integrity, holiness, and eternity of the divine love
demands, therefore, tripersonality, and indeed this eternally.195
As Staudenmaier puts it elsewhere, “What posits, and therefore mediates, the being and living in, from-, through-, and for-one-another of the three divine persons, considered inwardly, is
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love.”196 It is through love, Staudenmaier insists, that unity occurs: “Love is itself unity, and it is
at the same time the law of unity, namely the law according to which life forms and presents
itself as a unity.”197
Because concrete unity amongst personal subjects is the end by which is mediated by
love, and because love is just the exercise of the personal capacities of intelligence and will
toward concrete unity, Staudenmaier at times even speaks of love and unity as the teleological
explanation for the multiplicity of persons (recall the text we just examined where Staudenmaier
says that “[t]he multiplicity of persons is demanded by the essence of love itself.”)
Indeed, love is what drives personal subjects to seek other personal subjects: “The infinite
disposition (Gemüth) of the divine person can find its satisfaction (Befriedigung) only in the
equally infinite disposition of the other divine person.”198 Without a multiplicity of persons in the
Trinity, Staudenmaier notes, love would be abstract: “If the divine essence is mono-personal
(Einpersönlich), then the eternal love of the Godhead can relate only to itself. But the love which
relates purely to itself is abstract love, which is likened to self-seeking.”199 Therefore, the
subjectivities of the divine persons are actualized only insofar as they are engaged in relations
with one another characterized by love. Because the subjectivities of the divine persons are
actualized through mutual relations of love, their subjectivities can be actualized only if the
divine is comprised of multiple divine persons.
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We have seen that the subjectivity of an individual divine person is actualized only
insofar as the person is engaged in relations of love with the other divine persons. It is because
the divine consists of multiple divine persons that the subjectivities of each can be actualized and
a community can be formed. We will see below that this has important implications for how God
relates to the created order, our final topic of consideration.

4. Implications of the Actualization of Divine Personality
In the previous chapter, we saw that, for Staudenmaier, the divine engages the created
order as a personal subject (i.e., a subject who displays the features of being-for-self,
intelligence, and will). We have also seen Staudenmaier’s insistence that God does not develop
His personal subjectivity through or by means of the created order, and thus that the created
order does not actualize divine subjectivity. Rather, because the divine consists in a concrete
unity of personal subjects – and this as an immanent feature – there are important implications
for how God relates to the nondivine.
Indeed, because God is Trinity – and so because divine subjectivity is actualized
immanently – God does not need to actualize His own subjectivity through the created order. As
Staudenmaier puts it, “Because only thereby, that God as triune forms for Himself a ‘complete’
world (eine vollkommene Welt) can He, without Himself becoming the world, posit a creation
outside of Himself, and stand lofty and elevated over this creation as its Lord, leader, ruler, and
sanctifier.”200
It is precisely because divine subjectivity is actualized immanently – apart from the
created order – that God can engage the created order as a personal subject. This is because God
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cannot relate to the created order through His intellect and will if the created order is that
through which His intellect and will are developed. As a result, divine engagement with the
created order – particularly with created persons – can be an interpersonal engagement.
We saw above that each divine person recognizes Himself in the other divine persons,
and recognizes the other divine persons in Himself. As Staudenmaier puts it, each person ‘posits’
Himself in the other persons:
The Father, in an absolute way, posits (setzt) the Son through eternal generation, and with
the positing (Setzung) of the Son is combined the self-positing (Selbstsetzung) of the
Father, while He, generating the Son, posits (setzt), wills, and loves Himself in the Son.
Further, the Son posits (setzt) Himself in the Father, as He posits (setzt) the Father in
Himself, while He recognizes Himself as the Son. The Father and the Son posit (setzten)
particularly the Spirit, as they posit (setzen) themselves in Him and He posits (setz)
Himself in them.201
Staudenmaier relates this inter-trinitarian phenomena to God’s acts ad extra, noting that it is in
virtue of the positing of the divine persons within the Trinity that the divine is capable of
positing the extradivine. If the divine persons can posit themselves outside of themselves and in
each other, Staudenmaier notes, “then we have three eternal, absolute principles which exist
from, through, in, and for one another which, since they exist from, in, and through one another,
also possess the absolute power (Macht), in union with one another, to posit (setzen) the world
outside of themselves.”202 If the positing of something outside of God is possible only in virtue
of interdivine positing, and if interdivine positing is what accounts for fully-developed divine
subjectivity, then it is only in virtue of fully-developed divine subjectivity – and so only in virtue
of God being Trinity – that there can be a positing of something outside of God.
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If the encounter between God and the created order is interpersonal, and if the possibility
of God’s encounter with creation as interpersonal is dependent upon the immanent interpersonal
encounter within the Trinity, then the encounter between God and the created order – as
interpersonal – will be a reflection of the trinitarian interpersonal encounter. Thus, Staudenmaier
says, “The absolute self-positing (Selbstsetzung) in the trinitarian life which exists from and
through itself reflects itself in the positing (Setzung) of the world as the free creation of the
world.”203
What we see above is that God being triune is the condition for the possibility of God’s
ability to posit a world other than Himself. We also see, however, that God’s actions ad extra
reflect the characteristics of the inner life of the Trinity. In chapter one, we examined the
elements of personal subjectivity, viz., being-for-self, intelligence, and will. In chapter two, we
examined an element of interpersonal encounter (that of presence), and how the elements of
personal subjectivity and interpersonal encounter obtain in the case of God’s interaction with the
created order. Finally, here in chapter three, we have seen how the members of the Trinity
themselves possess the elements of personality, as well as how the interpersonal encounters
amongst them occur. Since the subjects of interpersonal encounter within the Trinity are just the
very same divine persons who act ad extra, the very same aspects of interpersonal encounter
within the Trinity are construed by Staudenmaier as manifest in God’s interpersonal encounter
with the nondivine.
We see Staudenmaier’s insistence on the correspondence between trinitarian
interpersonal encounter and the divine-creaturely interpersonal encounter in ways other than just
that of the positing mentioned above. In the previous chapter, we saw that the mode of God’s

203

CD II §93.15 (p. 607).

115

interpersonal presence to the created order is that of omnipresence. Interestingly, Staudenmaier
utilizes this same mode of presence as characteristic of the interpersonal encounter within the
Trinity: “If the divine persons reciprocally know themselves in one another, know and grasp
themselves each undividedly and entirely in the others, and the others equally in themselves,
each has opened itself entirely for the others…then this mutual personing, this reciprocal
sounding-through-self (Sichdurchtönen) and self-permeating (Sichdurchdringen), is the
omnipresence in the trinitarian life.”204 The omnipresence which characterizes the interpersonal
encounter between the trinitarian persons themselves, Staudenmaier continues, simply manifests
itself in God’s interpersonal encounter between Himself and creation: “This omnipresence [in the
trinitarian life] expands itself by coming into the world, which is the work of the triune God, and
which the triune God itself permeates (durchdringt), dwells though (durchwohnt), and sounds
through (durchtönt).”205
We saw in the previous chapter as well that the intellectual omnipresence of the divine to
the created order is the divine omniscience. Curiously, Staudenmaier will speak of divine
omniscience not only as God’s knowledge of the created order, but as characteristic of the
trinitarian interpersonal encounter. As Staudenmaier puts it,
As the three divine persons know (erkennen) themselves most deeply and completely in
and through one another according to their particularities, and with this knowledge
combine the equally complete knowledge of that which they think, will, and accomplish
concerning the world, this knowledge, which permeates the entire Godhead in its
complete scope and deepest ground and in the same way grasps the world through and
through, is the divine omniscience. . . . The divine omniscience extends therefore, as we
have seen earlier, not only to the world, but just as much and already previously, to the
Godhead itself, and this precisely as the triune Godhead.206
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Again, that the characteristics of the interpersonal encounter between God and creation are
described as characteristics of the interpersonal encounter between the divine persons of the
Trinity suggests that Staudenmaier regards the two sorts of encounter as merely two species of a
shared genus. Or perhaps more neutrally, Staudenmaier regards the Trinity as the model which is
exemplified in creation.
Of course, the interpersonal encounter between God and created personal subjects is not
an encounter between equals, but between the infinite and finite, between the Absolute and the
relative. As such, the creature’s relation to God is not a neutral relation because her creation,
existence, and destiny are ordered to the divine. The interpersonal encounter between God and
creature is such that the former is the telos of the latter.
We saw in the previous chapter that the interpersonal encounter between God and
creature, insofar as God is the telos of the creature, is characterized by God implementing the
means by which creatures can reach Him as their telos. God imparts wisdom – the truth about
Himself as their end and how they may reach Him as their end – which is subjectively
appropriated by creatures through religion. Interpersonal encounter with the divine, therefore, is
characterized by seeking God as one’s ultimate goal, by offering oneself to God so as to exist in,
through, and for Him.
Significantly, though, Staudenmaier speaks of the divine as telos not only for creatures,
but as telos for the divine itself. In other words, there is a telos which is within the divine that is
also for the divine. God realizes Himself as His own goal. As Staudenmaier puts it:
If wisdom is practical knowing, and consists not only in knowing the goal to which one
strives, but also in knowing the means which lead to this goal; and finally, if wisdom is
not only this just described knowing, but in addition the actual self-completion of that
which is known and aspired to befits it; then in God, knowing is eternally wisdom,
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because in God knowing is an eternally consummating and eternally completing
knowing, the goal is an eternally fulfilled and eternally achieved goal.207
Wisdom, therefore, does not describe only a presence of the divine in the created milieu, but also
describes the immanent life of God.
Wisdom, as we have seen, is that by which a telos is appropriated by a personal subject
just through those personal characteristics of intellect and will. Further, as we have seen, the
Father, Son, and Spirit are each personal subjects. Finally, as the text above shows, wisdom is a
characteristic of the immanent life of God. This sets up Staudenmaier for rendering the wisdom
of the immanent life of God in a trinitarian register. Thus, referring to that goal of which he
spoke in the above text, Staudenmaier continues by saying, “This eternally fulfilled and achieved
goal is no other than the trinitarian life of the Godhead itself in its unending unity, in the
harmonious being in-, through-, and for-one-another of the three divine persons, which being in-,
through-, and for-one-another we can name the absolute wisdom as the achieved in God: it is
wisdom as absolute complete life in which the idea of the Godhead is seen as eternally
achieved.”208
What Staudenmaier is saying, therefore, is that the interpersonal encounter within the
Trinity is characterized by wisdom – wisdom by which the divine persons are led to one another
as the telos of each. As a personal subject, each divine person seeks and reaches the other divine
persons through intellect and will. To be sure, Staudenmaier speaks of the wisdom within the
divine as eternally fulfilled and eternally achieved, and so distinguishes wisdom within the
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divine from wisdom within creation. Nonetheless, Staudenmaier is making a radical move by
describing the divine persons as telos for one another.
It is in this notion of wisdom that we can see again that Staudenmaier regards the
interpersonal encounter between the divine and creature as a reflection of the interpersonal
encounter between the divine persons. Thus, Staudenmaier says, “This same wisdom [viz., the
wisdom by which the divine persons are led to one another as the destination of each] turns
outwardly as the wisdom which leads the world to its destination, which destination is God
Himself.”209 Interestingly, here Staudenmaier notes that the wisdom “which leads the world to its
destination” is just the outwardly-turned wisdom of the inner divine life. The interpersonal
encounter between God and creature is therefore an outwardly-turned manifestation of the
interpersonal encounter of the divine Trinity.
In Staudenmaier’s theology, therefore, we see that the Trinity is of vital importance. As I
hope I have shown over the past three chapters, for Staudenmaier, the Trinity is not simply a
more proper way of describing the God of the Christian tradition; more than this, the Trinity
performs a function, in that it is the means by which divine subjectivity becomes actual and
thereby the means by which divine transcendence is preserved. Of course, whether or not the
performance of a function is indeed a good thing in understanding the Trinity is debatable, and
my take on this matter is given in the concluding chapter.

209

CD II §93.15 (p. 608).

119

Chapter 4
DORNER’S THEOLOGICAL PROJECT

Introduction
Over the next three chapters I will present Isaak August Dorner’s doctrine of God and, in
this chapter specifically, its attendant theological methodology. Dorner’s doctrine of God
culminates in his doctrine of the Trinity, the significance of which, I will demonstrate, lies in
how it functions as the ground for so many of his other theological claims. An important theme
that runs across the entire presentation is that of God as ‘love.’ According to Dorner, the
Evangelical (i.e. Protestant) experience of Christian faith demands that God must be
experienced, above all, as love.
Although such a description of God hardly seems novel (and, in fact, perhaps even
saccharine), for Dorner neither is the case. Although God has been described as ‘love’ since
biblical times, it is only since the emergence of Protestantism, and more proximately, only since
Schleiermacher, that this designation of God has begun to be taken seriously. Further, Dorner
understands ‘love’ as predicated of God not in a sentimental way, but in a quite robust,
philosophically-grounded sense, as a union of freedom and necessity.
Thus the Evangelical experience of faith, as Dorner understands it, demands that God be
experienced as love. More specifically, in the Evangelical experience, there is a union of
freedom and necessity in the human person: the human person freely (hence, the aspect of
freedom) wills to offer herself to the demands (hence, the aspect of necessity) of the gospel. Such
120

experience has its archetype in God: “Our aim must be that the Trinity legitimate itself to
believing apprehension as the objective foundation (Fundament) in God of the Christian
personality, and especially of that which is peculiarly evangelical.”210 In God Himself, therefore,
there must be some union of freedom and necessity if God is to be thought of as love and
therefore if the Evangelical experience is to be vindicated:
The proper evangelical union of these opposites [viz., freedom and necessity] must have
its eternal necessity in God Himself, nay, must have in Him its eternal archetype (Urbild)
and its supreme principle. And since the opposites, the union of which is perfected in the
Christian personality, are of an ethical kind, it must follow that the fundamental
Reformation knowledge of the Christian personality is to be placed theologically securely
and objectively in the ethical idea of God, seeing that the necessity of these opposites,
like their union, is shown in their absolute verification (Begründung), i.e. in God Himself
in His ethically thought triune being.211
That God Himself is love, however, entails certain metaphysical requirements. God
cannot be merely a lifeless substance, for example, but rather must possess a robust form of
agency, having properties like consciousness and will (which will be accounted for in the
following chapter). But beyond the possession of a robust form of agency, to be love, God must
be able to view Himself as His own object of love, God must be able to freely will the highest
good that He Himself is. And this is just the aspect of freedom and necessity which must
characterize God if the Evangelical experience of faith is to be vindicated.
As we will see, in Dorner’s theology, that God is able to freely will the highest good that
He Himself is – that God can possess this union of freedom and necessity within Himself –
requires the particularly Christian understanding of God: that God is the Trinity. The Trinity for
Dorner, therefore, operates as the subterranean foundation for his robust theological claims. In
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Dorner’s theology, without the Trinity, God cannot love Himself, and thus God cannot be the
archetype for the Evangelical experience of faith.
In the current chapter, we will explore how Dorner understands his own theological
enterprise. In section 1, we will examine three concepts that will be operative in the presentation
of Dorner’s theology over the next three chapters, namely the ‘physical,’ ‘logical,’ and ‘ethical’
aspects of being. In section 2, we will examine how Dorner understands these concepts to have
operated in the history of theology, specifically their arrangement in the theologies of Martin
Luther and Friedrich Schleiermacher. Dorner lauds these two Protestant thinkers because he sees
them as privileging the ethical aspect of God over the physical and logical aspects. It is in Luther
that an ethical conception of God begins to arise (2.1). Although theology begins to languish in
subsequent generations of Protestantism (see 2.2), the arrival of German Idealism and
Romanticism breathes new life into understanding the primacy of the ethical in God. Dorner
lauds Schleiermacher specifically (as we will see in 2.3.1) because his ethical conception of the
divine pertains not merely to the doctrine of justification, but is systematically worked out in his
doctrine of God. Therefore, some attention will be given to Schleiermacher’s doctrine of God
(2.3.2).
In section 3, we will examine Schleiermacher as a theological precedent to Dorner. This
will help us understand how Dorner conceives of God as love (3.1). We will see, though, that
Dorner finds unsatisfactory certain aspects of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of God (3.2) and
therefore he will seek to amend Schleiermacher on these points (3.3).
In exploring how Dorner understands the theological enterprises of Luther and
Schleiermacher as well as his own in relation to them, we will then be in a position to understand
Dorner’s doctrine of God proper, which is presented in the next two chapters. Although much
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terrain will be covered over the next three chapters, the goal is simple: to show how an ethical
understanding of God requires that God be Trinity.

1. Aspects of Being: Physical, Logical, and Ethical
As mentioned above, Dorner seeks to arrive at a conception of the Christian God –
reached through the Evangelical experience of faith – that is ‘ethical.’ But what, exactly, does he
mean by ‘ethical’? The term ‘ethical’ here is to be contrasted with ‘physical’ or ‘logical’ notions
of being.212 The ‘physical’ aspects of being involve those aspects which are constitutive of it as
the type of thing it is, i.e. given its nature. In the case of God, for example, this would include
properties like omnipotence. The ‘logical’ aspects of being include those aspects of being which
designate an intellectual component. In the case of God, this would designate properties like
consciousness, intellect, and knowledge. Finally, the ‘ethical’ aspects of being involve those
aspects which regard goodness.
As an agent, my physical aspects consist in the fact that I am a being with a particular
nature or particular capacities. If I consisted of merely, say, logical aspects, then I could only
think or will, but such thinking or willing could never terminate in actions. Similarly, if I
consisted of merely physical aspects, then I would possess certain capacities for acting, but
would have no ability to direct such capacities in logical ways.
As we will explore in greater depth in the next two chapters, Dorner believes that for an
agent to possess the fullness of ethical subjectivity requires a union of two elements: necessity
and freedom. Here I will treat them in that order. First, an agent’s ethical subjectivity requires
that there be a good which is present to the agent and to which the agent is to pursue as a good,
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something to which the agent has an obligation. As Dorner puts it, “Certainly nothing can be
shown to be moral which may not in some way be or become duty; the whole realm of morals
must be brought under the aspect of duty; and this is accordingly an essential side of the
matter.”213
However, there must be a particular relationship between the good and the agent’s will:
“The idea of duty indeed, although it itself represents that which is morally necessary,
presupposes freedom, self-determination…”214 However, there are certain actions I might
perform which may objectively be good (it is good that I breathe), but which I did not
deliberately choose to pursue. It would be odd to think of me as ethically good simply in virtue
of, say, breathing. Such oddness issues from the fact that, in the act of breathing, my will is not
involved at all. We think of a person as ethically good when they have performed willful, or
deliberate, actions which we recognize as good. We might describe a person as good if we know
that she saved a drowning person, for example. Such an act cannot be performed without the
involvement of the person’s will.
Of course, the involvement of the will is a necessary condition of ethical goodness, but it
is not sufficient. There are many actions that people perform which involve their will, yet such
actions may not be considered good. A person might deliberately murder another, for example,
but such an act would not be considered good. Thus, the involvement of the will covers the
subjective aspect of the ethically good, but an objective aspect must also be present. The
individual who saves a drowning person is deemed good not just because she utilized her will
213
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and deliberately acted to save another, but also because we recognize that helping others to stay
alive is objectively good. Thus, the person is thought of as good because she recognized the
objective good and pursued this good deliberately.
For me to be an ethically good agent, therefore, I cannot just decide that whichever acts I
perform or whichever goods I desire are good simply in virtue of my performing such acts or
desiring such goods. Rather, for me to be ethically good means there are objective goods which
are not immediately in my possession and which I must pursue in order to be good. (Thus, for
example, Dorner describes the subject of Christian ethics as “the morally good, or the absolutely
worthy, as existing for the human personal will, and as attaining reality through it, i.e., by means
of the self-determination of the will.”)215
To put the matter positively, for the agent to be considered ethically good requires that
she freely will this good; she must desire to make this goodness a part of its own being. (To use
the language of some ethical theories, she must endorse the act in question.) If I perform the acts
which I ought but did so unaware, or only because I was forced to by another, I cannot be said to
be an ethically good agent. As Dorner puts it, “The playing of a child upon whom the
consciousness of an ethical rule has not yet dawned, is not yet to be placed under the category of
the ethical, although will, self-determination, and consciousness need not be wanting in it…”216
Thus, freedom is involved in being an ethically good agent.
For the agent to be considered ethically good, then, requires a union of freedom and
necessity: on the one hand, there must be a good which is not identified with whatever the agent
happens to will, a good which is not up to the agent to decide, and this constitutes the element of
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necessity. On the other hand, this good must be freely chosen and willed by the agent, and this
constitutes the element of freedom.
Now that we have defined what the physical, logical, and ethical aspects of being entail,
we will examine how they relate. Conceptually, there is nothing about these three categories per
se which entails how they ought to be related to one another. Religiously, however, Dorner sees
the ordering of these categories as extremely important. Indeed, the way in which these three
categories are ordered within God determines whether or not one is speaking of, say, a pagan,
Jewish, or Christian understanding of God, and – amongst Christian understandings of God – of
a Catholic or Protestant understanding of God.
To be sure, each of these various conceptions of God include all three aspects, physical,
logical, and ethical. What distinguishes them, however, is which of these aspects is privileged.
To privilege the physical aspects of God would mean, for example, that the components which
are natural to God’s being would direct what God wills. Thus, for example, it is part of God’s
nature to have ability or fullness of strength, to have the capability of doing anything. If such
physical elements were privileged over, say, the ethical elements, then because God could do
anything, God would will to do those things. On the other hand, to privilege the ethical aspect
would mean that God’s willing is not dominated by the components which are natural to God’s
being. To privilege the ethical aspect of God, in other words, means that although God possesses
the capacity to do anything, God does not act blindly and can choose to direct this capacity. 217
Having sketched this conceptual map, we will now examine how Dorner utilizes it in his own
theological project.
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2. Physical, Logical, and Ethical Conceptions of God in the History of Theology
According to Dorner, a conception of God which privileges the ethical has not always
been operative in the Christian theological tradition. Indeed, in Dorner’s reading of the history of
theology, it is only in the emergence of Protestantism where such a conception begins to arise.
This is not to imply that Dorner believed a Roman Catholic conception of God to include no
ability of God to direct His physical aspects by His ethical aspects.218 But for Dorner, the
Catholic doctrine of God, generally speaking, allowed for too much privileging of the physical
aspects of God over the ethical.
To make these nuances clear, we will examine Dorner’s understanding of these
developments in the history of theology. To this end, there are two Protestant theologians in
particular which we will examine in order to get a sense of what Dorner is up to, namely Martin
Luther and Friedrich Schleiermacher. I have selected these two to look at because Dorner sees
them as important turning-points in the history of Christian theology with respect to a primarily
ethical understanding of God.

2.1 The Beginning of the Evangelical Principle of Faith: Martin Luther
Of Martin Luther, Dorner says, “The personality of Luther is one of those great historical
figures in which whole nations recognize their own type…in which the germ of a new moral and
religious perception is as it were embodied.”219 In the following section, we will explore how
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Dorner understands this ‘new moral and religious perception’ which becomes distinctive of
Protestantism, and which provides for thinking of God in a more ‘ethical’ manner compared to
Catholicism. This new conception of the relation between God and the human Dorner refers to
as the “Evangelical Principle of Faith” or the “Reformation Principle of Faith” (consisting of a
“material” side – viz., justification through faith alone – and of a “formal” side – viz., the sole
authority of scripture).
According to Dorner, what is distinctive about Luther is that he “seeks to see in Christ the
bringing of the divine and human into perfect union...”220 For Dorner, the union of the divine and
the human in Luther’s Christology is not simply a metaphysical doctrine of Christ’s two natures.
What is novel in Luther’s Christology, as Dorner sees it, is that the hypostatic union reveals an
inherent correlation of God and human beings. Here we quote Dorner at length:
For the unity of the person of Christ, in which God and man are united, [Luther] finds a
basis by remoulding the conception regarding God and man according to the standard of
the principle of faith. Under the old conception of God, the ‘old wisdom,’ wherein
majesty, might, and infinitude passed for the highest and innermost essence of God, it
must have appeared unbefitting that God should not only act upon a man, or accept and
bear a man, so to speak, as His revelation and figure, but should make humanity His own
and impute it to Himself as Himself to it. But, says Luther, God is not content with the
glory of being the Creator of all creatures... He seeks also to be known in what He is
inwardly. His glory is His love, which seeks the lowly and the poor. ‘This is the new
wisdom’ [Luthers Werke von Walch, vii 1826-43; x. 1372, 1402]. God’s good pleasure in
the incarnation consists in this, that therein He pours out His nature, reveals His heart. . . .
Not less, in ‘the old language,’ does creature signify something which is infinitely
separated from the highest divinity, so that the two are directly opposed to one another.
But in the new language or wisdom humanity signifies something different, unutterably
nearly connected with Divinity... The new wisdom accordingly gives first the true
conception of man, according to which he in himself, i.e. by nature, is not a complete
whole, at least does not correspond to the idea for which God destined him; but it belongs
to His idea, and insofar also to the truth of his nature, that he should enjoy participation in
God through the communion of God with him. It belongs, however, to the ‘old wisdom’
Bewegung: und im Zusammenhang mit dem religiösen, sittlichen und intellectuellen Leben (München: JG Cotta,
1867).
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to represent God and man, according to their relative conceptions, as mutually
exclusive.221
What exactly about this is novel? For Dorner, the ‘old conception’ of God took the primary (and
thus normative) divine attributes to be those such as God’s majesty, might, and infinitude. (Note
the difference between these attributes and the attribute that Dorner will proclaim as “the
supreme, the only adequate definition of the essence of God,” that of love.)222 The ‘old
conception’ of God, in other words, emphasized God’s distance from creatures and God’s
difference from creatures. In virtue of such difference, God and humanity are ‘directly opposed
to one another’ and ‘mutually exclusive.’
But the ‘new wisdom’ of the Reformation emphasized God’s meeting of humanity
despite such distance and difference from it. We see this in descriptions of God wherein He
‘seeks the lowly and the poor’ and ‘pours out His nature’ to humanity. We also see that the ‘true
conception of man’ is to ‘enjoy participation in God through the communion of God with him.’
We see this same way of characterizing God in the medieval period in another passage
from Dorner. God, according to the view of the middle ages,
is the Majestic One, the Unapproachable, the Sinner-consuming, the Holy One and the
Just. Christ Himself is, according to the view of the middle ages, the stern Judge; the
God-man is, as it were, lost in God. . . . With this majestic God, who is in His essence
unknown to mankind, communion is not possible; He is void of love in Himself, else He
would not require that love and pity should first be excited in Him from without by the
saints; He is in His exalted position only just and holy, but righteousness and goodness
come not in God to mutual interpenetration in holy love, and even the grace to which
God is moved by Mary has the appearance rather of caprice and partiality.223
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What makes this such an un-ethical or non-ethical conception of God is that there is no
correlation between the divine and the human. This lack of correlation between the two is
apparent in such descriptions of God as “the Unapproachable” and “majestic.” Correlation
between two entities is possible only if they can draw near one another.
Such a view of God, Dorner believes, is characterized above all by God’s righteousness
(thus the descriptions of God as “sinner-consuming,” “Holy One,” and “the Just”). Due to the
sinfulness of human beings, a God who is concerned above all with righteousness cannot be
correlated with humanity. Because this conception of God is concerned with righteousness, love
and pity must be ‘excited in Him from without by the saints.’
We also must draw attention to how Dorner characterizes Christ in this understanding of
God. On a Reformation view, Christ brings about for us what he himself is: the union of the
divine and the human. Thus, on a Reformation view, Christ is how God has revealed Himself to
humanity. The view of God in the Middle-Ages, by contrast, portrays Christ himself as ‘hidden,’
and thus our communion with God is hidden with him. Indeed, on this view, Christ is not the
meeting point between God and humanity, but is instead the ‘Judge.’
Here, we can point out two aspects of this characterization which will become thematic.
First, Dorner speaks of this God whose essence is ‘unknown’ to mankind. Second, Dorner notes
that this God is ‘void’ of love, in strong opposition to the Evangelical understanding of God, and
to his own position that the best characterization of the divine essence is love. As we will see in
subsequent chapters, one of Dorner’s worries is voluntarism, which is the mark of the divine
whose ‘physical’ aspects are primary. If, however, Christ is how God has revealed Himself to
humanity, and if Christ is the union of the divine and human, then God has revealed Himself to
humanity precisely as the divine seeking union with humanity. Thus, in Christ, God’s essence is
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known. Further, if God has revealed Himself as seeking union, then God has revealed Himself as
love.
Dorner’s summary of Luther’s doctrine of justification nicely articulates a view of God
that Dorner will embrace, where the attribute of love is not bound by the attribute of
righteousness:
This therefore is the sum of his doctrine. To the purity of the grace, which undertakes the
cause not of the righteous but of sinners, and thus seems to disregard the law, because it
is gracious to the unworthy, and gives bountifully to them, not simply in advance, [not] in
anticipation of future payment, but freely and for nothing – it is precisely to this
prevenient love that it is given to kindle in us also a love which deserves to be called so,
because it too loves freely, not for reward, not even for the reward of salvation.224
The human person fears when he is worried about his own justification. When he fears, he
cannot love God, he cannot do good works out of love, but only out of fear. When one performs
good works out of fear, one does them because he is supposed to do them in order to get a
reward. Thus, it is an external authority which imposes itself on man.
But if God has preveniently justified man, as Luther holds, he no longer has to fear or
worry about his own justification. If he is not worried about his justification – because it is
already a fact – then he does not do good works in order to receive a reward. And thus his good
works are not done not at the command of an external authority, but they are done
spontaneously. In other words, the nature of man is such that he will act out of love when he is
acting freely; or he will act naturally when he acts freely. Thus, if God grants prevenient
justification, God’s desire for good works from man will be congruent with man’s disposition to
do good works when not in fear regarding his salvation.
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In this passage we can see the normativity of the ethical attributes of God over the
physical and logical, precisely in the words “and thus seems to disregard the law”: if the law had
primacy over the ethical, then God could not “disregard” the law.225 But because, in a Protestant
understanding of God, the ethical attributes are primary, the law appears to be disregarded,
although in fact it is moved to the background: following the law (i.e. doing good works) does
not make one ‘good’ (justified), but being declared ‘good’ (justified) enables one to follow the
law (do good works).
Thus, Dorner sees the fruit of the Reformation as making manifest that the divine and the
human are not in fact heterogenous but homogenous, that there is a correlation between the two.
And this homogeneity of the divine and the human is global in scope: nature is correlated to
grace, reason is correlated to faith, the historical is correlated to the ideal. This notion of
correlation is precisely what makes a union possible between God and the human being. That
this correlation is possible is due to giving primacy to the ethical in God.

2.2 Protestant Thought between Luther and Idealism
In Dorner’s reading of Protestantism’s subsequent history, however, the insights of the
initial Reformers entered a sclerosis. According to Dorner, in seventeenth-century Protestantism,
“The subjective factor [viz., faith], which – as is expressed by the material principle of the
Reformation – essentially belongs to the character of evangelical piety and theology, was
abridged, and received but trifling cultivation.”226 In its stead, the ‘objective’ elements –
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scripture and Protestant doctrine – came to dominate. The result was that “Faith, formerly so free
and vigorous, occupied but a passive position with respect to [scripture and Protestant doctrine],
which yet are not God, but things given.”227
The eighteenth-century brought about a reaction to the era of objectivity which preceded
it. This era consists in thinkers such as Leibniz, Wolff, Klopstock, Hamann, Claudius, Lessing,
Herder, Kant, Fichte, and Jacobi. In this era of subjectivity, Dorner says, “Antiquated theology
went down to its grave, but the Christian faith remained, nay, was even now reviving with fresh
vigor, to bring forth in due time a new theology.”228
Although sharply critical of Christianity, this ‘subjective’ philosophy nevertheless aided
it. Dorner notes, “[P]hilosophy, even in its specially critical period, furnished its contribution. Its
attitude indeed was, during the above-mentioned period, for the most part alien, nay, antagonistic
to Christianity. Its labors nevertheless subserved a higher cause than its own, and formed a
regularly advancing process, which was not at all loss, but also profit, because it showed
beforehand how intrinsically akin were the factors of the human and the divine, of nature and
grace.”229
How, exactly, did this period of subjectivity show how ‘intrinsically akin’ the divine and
the human were to one another? Dorner says,
The whole process was inwardly connected with Protestantism and its intrinsic tendency,
especially with the material principle [viz., justification through faith alone]. For as the
material principle promises inward assurance and freedom in God, nay, makes these a
duty, so also the fundamental feature in this subjective process is, that whatever would
exercise authority over man, or claim his submission, must be homogenous with his
nature, feeling, perceptions, and will, and capable of being assimilated thereby, that so it
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may become his personal possession and his personal assurance. Even the essential
affinity between the human and the divine was brought to light by the efforts of that very
subjectivity... For the absolutely valuable predicates of knowledge of truth, desire of
good, and feeling for the infinite and the divine, being acknowledged not to transcend
human nature, but to be elements of the true nature of man, so many lines of
communication were thus drawn between the idea of the human and the Divine, in
opposition to their traditional separation. Hence the idea of their mutual exclusion and
alienation appeared no longer tenable.230
The accomplishment of subjective philosophy was to globalize what was merely a germ in
Luther: the correlation between the divine and the human. It lay in the next important era – that
of nineteenth-century German Idealism – to unify the objectivity and the subjectivity.

2.3 Friedrich Schleiermacher
2.3.1 Dorner’s Praise for Schleiermacher
Of the nineteenth-century, Dorner says, “A new era of German science in general was
inaugurated, first by Schelling and Hegel, and then by Schleiermacher. But it was the latter who
laid the foundation for a revival of theology by establishing principles which overcame the
twofold partiality of the preceding epoch, viz. the partiality of objectivism, which had prevailed
from 1600, and that of subjectivity, which had been dominant since 1750, and by raising to the
rank of a ruling idea the persuasion of the intrinsic connection between the objective and the
subjective.”231
Dorner has much praise particularly for Schleiermacher in terms of his contributions to
theology. Indeed, according to Dorner, Schleiermacher was the fulcrum to a renewal of
Protestantism which had languished during the period of subjective philosophy. He says, “His
heartfelt piety, nourished in the midst of the Moravian Brotherhood, together with his great
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talents, and the methodical power of his constructive genius, fitted him to form a point of
transition to a revived evangelical theology.”232
Schleiermacher’s contribution to theology, which forms an important precedent for
Dorner’s theology, is that the ethical aspects are not limited to the doctrine of justification but
extend into the doctrine of God itself. Dorner notes this: “The first stage of the new era [viz.,
German idealism] grasps the absolute with physical, the second with logical, the third with
ethical precision. The first result was brought about by Schelling as the founder of natural
philosophy, the second by Hegel, the third especially by Schleiermacher.”233
2.3.2 Schleiermacher’s Doctrine of God
Because Dorner lauds Schleiermacher’s ‘ethical precision’ in his doctrine of God, and
because this is the task Dorner sets for his own doctrine of God, we will take a brief look at
Schleiermacher’s understanding of God, as well as some of Dorner’s specific criticisms of it.
Such a step is necessary because it will shed light on how Dorner both appropriates and deviates
from Schleiermacher. Specifically, we will explore those issues which are most proximate to
Schleiermacher’s novel understanding of the divine attributes. This exploration is crucial, for
Schleiermacher’s elevation of the ethical attributes – culminating in his identification of God as
love – will be followed by Dorner.
Situated in the Romantic tradition, Schleiermacher’s elevation of the ethical aspect of
God is bound up with an understanding of human subjectivity which was common among
Romantic thinkers. It was a basic conviction of Romantic thought that human subjectivity
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requires that the human person be conscious of herself as capable of influencing and being
influenced by the world. Human subjectivity, therefore, involves the ability to think selfreferentially: a subject must be able to treat herself as an object of thought in order to be able to
act in the world. Thus, self-referential thought involves an agent’s ability to distinguish between
two aspects of itself, what we might call its ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ aspects. As
Schleiermacher puts it, “In self-consciousness there are only two elements: the one expresses the
existence of the subject for itself, the other its co-existence with an Other.”234
On the other hand, although a distinction between the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ aspects
of the self is necessary for subjectivity, there also is a need for the two aspects to be united in
some way. The human agent cannot direct herself unless she has an awareness that the one who
is being directed is in some sense identical with herself as the one directing.
But how does the human agent have an awareness of this identity? She cannot appeal to,
say, empirical observation of herself, for such an act already depends upon her directing herself
to observe herself, which itself depends upon a prior awareness of this identity. In other words,
an appeal to data regarding oneself which comes to the subject empirically through
consciousness has already been mediated by an awareness of the identity between the subjective
self and the objective self.
One of the fundamental tenets of Romanticism, of which Schleiermacher shared, was that
a person’s ability to identify her subjective self with her objective self cannot be the result of
mediated knowledge, but can only be immediate (non-mediated).

234

Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. MacKintosh and J. S. Stewart, First Paperback Edition
(London: T&T Clark, 1999), §4.1 (p. 13) (hereafter abbreviated as CF, followed by the section number and page
number).

136

To use a common example, I cannot deduce that the person in the mirror in front of
which I stand is me simply by appeal to empirical data.235 There is no way that I can move from
observation of this empirical data to the conclusion that its content is identical with the one who
is undergoing this conscious experience. My certainty that the person in the mirror is identical
with myself is grounded in an immediate way, and thus in a way in which I cannot inspect
without thereby mediating this unity.
On the one hand, then, reflexive, or mediated, thinking is necessary in order for the
subject to direct herself. On the other hand, the subject must assume a non-reflexive, nonmediated identity between her subjectivity and objectivity. Thus, there is a discrepancy between
the two aspects of the self: the non-mediated identity can only be rendered to the human person
in a mediated form.
As a result, the unity of the two aspects of the self, and so the very ability to be a subject at all,
cannot be grounded in the subject herself.
Schleiermacher notes, however, that the subject possesses an awareness of this fact. This
awareness of being grounded in a source which is outside of oneself Schleiermacher refers to as
the “feeling of absolute dependence”:
But the self-consciousness which accompanies all our activity, and therefore, since that is
never zero, accompanies our whole existence, and negatives absolute freedom, is itself
precisely a consciousness of absolute dependence; for it is the consciousness that the
whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source outside of us in just the same
sense in which anything towards which we should have a feeling of absolute freedom
must have proceeded entirely from ourselves.236
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For Schleiermacher, that source which is outside of the subject, that source which the
human person is dependent upon for the possibility of her subjectivity, is God: “The whence of
our receptive and active existence, as implied in this self-consciousness, is to be designated by
the word ‘God,’ and…this is for us the really original signification of that word.”237 This feeling
is ‘absolute’ because the human person exercises no degree of influence upon God vis-a-vis her
own subjectivity, for her own subjectivity – and thus the capacity to exercise freedom –
presupposes this dependence: “Any possibility of God being in any way given is entirely
excluded, because anything that is outwardly given must be given as an object exposed to our
counter-influence, however slight this may be.”238
In Schleiermacher’s theology, this relation of absolute dependence constitutes the human
subject’s perception of the divine, and thus how the divine attributes can be understood. Since
God is the correlate of the feeling of absolute dependence, and since such a feeling does not arise
through the human’s interaction with mundane objects (because the human person has a relative
freedom and a relative dependence vis-a-vis mundane objects), the divine causality cannot be
like the temporal or spatial causality of such objects. As Schleiermacher puts it, “...it is selfevident that the contrast between the feeling of absolute dependence and the feeling of either
partial dependence or partial freedom (both being equally spatial and temporal) includes in itself
the implication that the causality which evokes the former feeling cannot be temporal and
spatial.”239 Indeed, for Schleiermacher, the divine causality transcends the temporal and spatial
precisely by its being the very condition of the temporal and spatial. Such conditioning of the
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temporal is designated by God’s ‘eternity,’ and such conditioning of the spatial is designated by
God’s ‘omnipresence.’240
Although the divine causality is unlike finite causality, Schleiermacher also notes that the
divine causality is equal in compass to the finite:
We experience the feeling of absolute dependence as something which can fill a moment
both in association with a feeling of partial and conditional dependence and also in
association with a partial and conditioned feeling of freedom; for self-consciousness
always represents finite being as consisting in this mingling of conditioned dependence
and conditioned freedom or of partial spontaneity and partial passivity. But whenever
dependence or passivity is posited in a part of finite existence, then spontaneity and
causality is posited in another part [of finite existence] to which the former is related, and
this condition of mutual relation of differently distributed causality and passivity
constitutes the natural order. It necessarily follows that the ground of our feeling of
absolute dependence, i.e. the divine causality, extends as widely as the order of nature
and the finite causality contained in it; consequently the divine causality is posited as
equal in compass to finite causality.241
As we have seen, with respect to finite causality, the human person feels relative dependence and
relative freedom. Thus, as the feelings of relative dependence and freedom have their ground in
the feeling of absolute dependence, and the ‘whence’ of this feeling of absolute dependence is
God, so the causes of the feelings of relative dependence and freedom are those objects of finite
causality, which has its ground in the divine causality.
Since the feeling of absolute dependence is the ground of the feelings of relative freedom
and dependence, and since the feelings of relative freedom and dependence occur wherever there
is finite causality, the divine causality must occur wherever there is finite causality. And as we
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will examine below, Schleiermacher will claim, the divine causality must be ‘equal in compass’
to the finite causality.
The divine causality as equal in compass to finite causality is designated by God’s
‘omnipotence.’242 Omnipotence so understood is expressed in two sub-ideas: first, that finite
causality is founded upon divine causality; and second, that the divine causality is completely
presented in finite causality.243 We will examine these two ideas in turn.
The first statement – that finite causality is founded upon divine causality – means that
there is no finite causality which is not grounded in the divine causality. He says, “As now
everything that we can regard as a separate thing for itself within the totality of finite being must
be ‘cause’ as well as effect, there is never anything of any kind which can begin to be an object
of the divine causality, though previously – hence somehow independent of God and opposed to
Him – in existence. Rather on such a view...the foundation feeling of religion would thereby be
destroyed.”244
In other words, if there were some thing within the level of finite causality, which was
not originally an object of the divine causality, then this means that it would exert some level of
counter-influence upon the divine causality. If it exerted some level of counter-influence upon
the divine causality, it would not be absolutely dependent upon the divine causality (for it would
be exercising some level of partial freedom towards the divine causality). If anything within the
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level of finite causality exercised some level of partial freedom towards the divine causality
(however small), this would destroy the feeling of absolute dependence, for the idea of such a
feeling is based on the notion that everything finite exercises no freedom towards the divine
causality, and thus is absolutely dependent.
The second statement – that the divine causality is completely presented in finite
causality – means that all divine causality is expressed in the finite causality. In other words,
there is no aspect of God which is not involved in God’s causality vis-à-vis the finite. For
Schleiermacher, this has an important implication for how we understand God: in God, there can
be no distinction between the general and the specific (§54.2), between the actual and the
possible (§54.3), between absolute power and ordained power, between absolute will and
conditioned will, between freedom and necessity, and between the active and the inactive
(§54.4). In other words, the divine causality which is displayed in the created order simply
reveals God as He is all the way down.
For Schleiermacher, the divine attributes which were given above denote merely the
‘general relationship between God and the world.’ Thus, they are generic, derivable from any
religious consciousness whatsoever. While the above gives a rendering of the formal components
that shape our understanding of the divine attributes, it does not give a rendering of a
consciousness associated with a particular religious community.
According to Schleiermacher, what is distinctive about the Christian consciousness is its
Christocentricity. For the Christian consciousness, “all other things have existence only as they
are related to the efficacy of redemption – either as part of the organization in which the
reawakened God-consciousness finds expression, or as so much raw material which this
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organization is to elaborate.”245 For the Christian consciousness, then, the government of the
world is directed towards a particular end, namely redemption. And since redemption entails a
redeemer, the Christian consciousness sees the divine government of the world as ‘aimed’ at the
appearance of a redeemer: “The Christian faith that all things were created for the Redeemer
[Col. 1:16] implies …that by creation all things (whether as prepared for or as overruled) were
disposed with a view to the revelation of God in the flesh, and so as to secure the completest
possible impartation thereof to the whole of human nature, and thus to form the Kingdom of
God.”246
As we saw above, because there is no dualism between God’s underlying disposition and
the form in which the underlying disposition of God is given effect; and because the form in
which the underlying disposition of God is given effect is aimed at incarnation and redemption;
it follows that there is no dualism between the incarnation of and redemption through Christ, on
the one hand, and God’s underlying disposition, on the other hand. Thus, it is only the
consciousness that has been determined by the consciousness of redemption that can adequately
characterize the divine essence. It follows, then, that the characterization of incarnation and
redemption is just the characterization of the divine essence itself (and further, that there can be
no creation without redemption).
How, then, does Schleiermacher characterize the incarnation and redemption? They are
characterized, he maintains, by love. “Love,” says Schleiermacher, “...is the impulse to unite self
with neighbor and to will to be in neighbor; if then the pivot of the divine government is
redemption and the foundation of the Kingdom of God, involving the union of the divine essence
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with human nature, this means that the underlying disposition cannot be conceived otherwise
than as love.”247 Because love is what is manifest in the incarnation and redemption, and because
there is no ‘dualism’ between God’s underlying disposition and the form in which it is given
effect to, that love characterizes incarnation and redemption means that one can rightly predicate
it of the divine essence: “...we have the sense of divine love directly in the consciousness of
redemption, and as this [viz., the consciousness of redemption] is the basis on which all the rest
of our God-consciousness is built up, it of course represents to us the essence of God.”248 As will
be shown in chapter six, Schleiermacher’s assertion that love is the highest characterization of
the divine essence is appropriated wholeheartedly by Dorner.

3.1 Dorner’s Understanding of Love
We can get a sense of why Dorner finds Schleiermacher’s doctrine of God compelling by
briefly investigating Dorner’s understanding of the concept of love. Dorner conceives of love as
the unity of self-assertion and self-impartation (or, as he sometimes puts it, ‘self-preservation’
and ‘self-communication’).249 ‘Self-impartation’ is the giving of oneself to another. But it must
be noted that ‘self-assertion’ here does not mean selfishness. Rather, self-assertion is one’s
recognition of oneself as worthy of being loved. Thus, it is the recognition that in giving oneself
to another in love, one is not an instrument for that other. It is a recognition that a relation of love
requires an acknowledgment of the intrinsic worth of the other party, and thus a recognition that
– as one of the two parties – oneself must thereby possess an intrinsic worth. In recognizing that
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one is not an instrument, then, one recognizes that there are aspects of oneself which is not to be
annihilated, for intrinsic worth implies that those aspects have worth and thus ought not to be
annihilated. Love, therefore, involves the impartation of oneself to another, but without the
annihilation of oneself.
Dorner insists that, to communicate oneself to another as love – to love another – can
only occur between persons (hence such communication of God to humanity can occur only
through divine incarnation).250 Before the incarnation, what communicated the divine – the
medium of divine self-impartation – was the natural world and the Law. Put differently, what is
communicated by the natural world and the Law is are things like God’s omnipotence, God’s
holiness, etc. Thus, the natural world and the Law communicate merely physical aspects of God.
But the natural world and the Law, Dorner insists, are unable to communicate that love is a
property of the divine.251 God, then, can only communicate himself to another as love by
revealing Himself personally, that is, by becoming incarnate.
In identifying the incarnation as the medium by which love is identified as a property of
the divine, Schleiermacher has recognized the primacy of God’s ethical aspect: to conceive of
God as love apart from the incarnation is to conceive of love without self-impartation, and to
conceive of the incarnation apart from love is to conceive of love without self-preservation. This
is why Dorner believes that Schleiermacher gives ‘ethical precision’ to his doctrine of God.
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3.2 What Dorner finds unsatisfactory in Schleiermacher
In characterizing the divine essence as love, Schleiermacher has given primacy to God’s
ethical aspects over against God’s physical and logical aspects. Although Dorner will follow
Schleiermacher in this, he will nonetheless deviate from him in some important respects. We saw
that, for Schleiermacher, there can be no distinction in God between the general and the specific,
between the actual and the possible, between absolute power and ordained power, between
absolute will and conditioned will, between freedom and necessity, and between the active and
the inactive. Dorner will argue, however, that eliminating such distinctions leaves one with an
unsatisfactory doctrine of God.
Dorner gives an explicit treatment of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of God on this point in
his essay on the history of the doctrine of divine immutability.252 Because we have established
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Dorner’s appreciation for Schleiermacher in privileging God’s ethical aspects, here we will
simply focus on his criticisms of how Schleiermacher executed this task.
Dorner’s most devastating criticism of Schleiermacher on this point is that, if we
eliminate the distinctions which Schleiermacher wants to eliminate, the result is acosmism (i.e.
the only reality is God, and there is no creation). If there is no distinction to be made between
God’s potentiality and actuality, and if God is beyond time (since there is no then and now for
God), then what is actual (viz., creation) must itself not possess any temporal characteristics.
Since there obviously is a temporal world, Schleiermacher must be wrong.
Thus the experience of temporal succession that creatures have would be an illusion:
If one emphasizes the point that all that originates in a timeless way is not merely thought
and willed, but effected, that is, has become actual – as one must if there is no distinction
between God’s will and ability – then there remains nothing else but to regard temporal
succession as merely an illusion. This agrees with Schleiermacher’s point that God
strives after nothing that He does not already possess, because this would again introduce
distinctions into God, if not God’s blessedness. But this is equivalent to acosmism and
represents a flight to an ideal world apart from this world of temporal distinctions...253
This line of thought can be applied more broadly to any distinctions within the finite. If
everything finite is due to God (because there is no finite causality which is not grounded in or
independent of the divine causality), and if in finite causality there are distinctions, then such
distinctions must be grounded in the divine.
Therefore, if there is no finite causality which is not grounded in or independent of the
divine causality, then either there must be some sort of distinction within God (by which the
distinctions in creation are grounded) or the distinctions within creation are, in fact, illusory:
If nothing can be thought or willed in isolation from God, everything is what it is in
distinction from everything else, by virtue of being thought or willed by God. It would
then be the case that all real distinctions in the world...would have no basis in God and so
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would be merely illusions.”254 Thus Dorner says, “Schleiermacher’s doctrine is in this
respect unsatisfactory. It offers no basis for thinking of God as the cause of what is
empirically and historically actual, and thereby fails to secure the actual from the
suspicion of being a mere illusion for religious consciousness.255
Dorner therefore finishes his essay on the history of divine immutability by rejecting the
notion that God must be utterly devoid of distinction. He says, “Consequently Christian faith
neither must, nor may, remain content with assertions such as divine simplicity or quiescence, or,
what leads to the same result, assertions of an eternal and uniform vital causality that always and
everywhere produces the same effects.”256
Dorner’s task is, on the one hand, to construct a doctrine of God in which the ‘ethical’
aspects are primary. This allows him to incorporate into his doctrine of God what he sees as the
gain of the Protestant Reformation, namely, a correlation between the divine and the human. On
the other hand, his critique of Schleiermacher demonstrates that such a doctrine of God cannot
consist solely of those ethical aspects, but must also account for the physical and logical aspects
of the divine.

3.3 Dorner’s Amendments of Schleiermacher
The question is, therefore, how Dorner can maintain that God possesses physical, logical,
and ethical aspects, and nonetheless privilege some of these aspects over the others. To have
certain features of God as primary or normative over others entails some level of activity and
passivity amongst those attributes. In Dorner’s case, as we will see, the physical and logical
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attributes must be passive with respect to the ethical attributes because the physical and logical
attributes are to be governed by the ethical attributes.
Therefore, instead of the divine essence consisting of an undifferentiated unity of the
divine attributes, we have in Dorner’s doctrine of God an ordering of attributes, where the
physical and logical attributes serve the ethical attributes as means to end. As Dorner puts it,
“The non-ethical distinctions in the nature of God are related to the ethical as means to an end;
but the absolute end can lie only in morality, because it alone is of absolute worth. The ethical
principle is the ultimate reason for the fact that God eternally wills Himself, or is the ground of
Himself, in all His attributes.”257 In the next chapter, we will examine Dorner’s attempt to
construct a doctrine of God precisely along these lines.
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Chapter 5
DORNER ON THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

Introduction
In the previous chapter, we examined various background aspects which were pertinent
to Dorner’s doctrine of God. In this chapter, we will examine Dorner’s actual treatment of the
doctrine of God, particularly the divine attributes. A consideration of the divine attributes is
important, for they are the ingredients, so to speak, for Dorner’s construction of the three
trinitarian configurations (physical, logical, and ethical).
In order to avoid confusion, some comments need to be made at the outset. In chapter six,
we will see that Dorner speaks in terms of a principle in the divine which demands that the
divine actualize itself as an ethical subject. Ethical subjectivity, we will see, demands a
trinitarian structure. Thus, in demanding that it actualize itself as an ethical subject, the divine
demands that it be a Trinity. Thus, God is Trinity because God is to be an ethical subject.
Ontologically, then, this principle of ethical subjectivity precedes the divine persons (since they
are the means by which it is to be actualized), and the resultant ethical subject succeeds the
divine persons (insofar as it is their result).
In this chapter, however, we will examine how Dorner arrives at the Trinity by a complex
series of inferences based on various arguments. Through these arguments, Dorner constructs a
theology wherein God is an ethical subject comprised in terms which are seemingly opposites
(viz., that of ethical necessity and that of ethical freedom). The Trinity will allow Dorner to
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reconcile these opposites because it will allow both ethical components to be ascribed to God. In
this chapter, the divine attributes epistemically ground the claim that God is Trinity. As
mentioned above, however, the next chapter will show that the Trinity itself is ontologically
grounded in divine ethical subjectivity.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 gives a brief overview of Dorner’s
procedure in establishing the divine attributes. Here I will describe some of the basic differences
between the types of arguments he employs, and discuss how such arguments are for Dorner
more of a single, cumulative argument.
Section 2 examines how Dorner establishes divine aseity, the notion that God has His
existence from Himself and not from another. Here, we will see how he treats the ontological
proof for God’s existence (2.2), which establishes that God is necessarily existent, and so as the
original possibility of thought, being, volition, and knowledge, possesses the attributes of unity,
singularity, simplicity, and infinity. We will then examine his treatment of the cosmological
argument (2.3), where Dorner applies the concept of causation to the divine, establishing that
God must have His continual actuality, always realizing His inexhaustible potentiality, from
Himself. Through the ontological and cosmological arguments, therefore, Dorner establishes that
God possesses aseity.
Section 3 examines how Dorner establishes that God possesses intellect. Here, Dorner
treats the physico-teleological argument (viz., an appeal to the structure and purposiveness of
empirical phenomena as evidence that there is a conscious subject responsible for such design
and order) to establish that the divine is in possession of intelligence.
Section 4 examines how Dorner establishes God as an ethical agent. Here, we will look at
how he treats the juridical argument (4.2), which establishes that God acts justly towards
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Himself. Then we will look at his treatment of the moral argument (4.3) wherein he establishes
that God is the absolutely worthy end. Throughout this section, we will see how Dorner
establishes that the ethical in God be both a matter of the divine being as well as a matter of the
divine will. Therefore, this section in particular is critical for understanding the issue that
preoccupies Dorner regarding the Trinity: that both ethical freedom and ethical necessity must be
present in God. This will set us up for the next chapter where we will see how Dorner will solve
this problem by means of the Trinity.

1. Proofs for God’s Existence and the Divine Attributes
As mentioned, the present chapter is concerned with Dorner’s doctrine of God, giving
particular attention to the divine attributes. The divine attributes themselves are reached through
an examination of proofs for God’s existence (ontological, cosmological, physico-teleological,
juridical, and moral). These proofs can be divided into two types: a priori and a posteriori, that
is, conceptual and empirical, respectively. The a priori argument, which consists solely in the
ontological argument, begins with the concept of a most-perfect being, and from this concept
derives that such a being must necessarily exist. For Dorner, because the ontological argument is
the only argument that does not appeal to empirical data, it is the only argument that can
establish that God exists. A posteriori arguments, on the other hand, begin with empirical data,
and from such data supplement the concept of God obtained by the ontological argument. Thus,
the empirical arguments do not establish God’s existence, but instead only enrich the initial
definition of God established by the ontological argument.258
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which serves as the first premise from which God’s existence may be inferred. At the conclusion of his treatment of
the ontological proof, Dorner refers to the subsequent proofs by saying, “The remaining proofs for the divine
existence lend their aid in order to obtain from absolute and infinite Being more intimate definitions of God. So far
as these proofs proceed in a mere empirical manner, accept what is given from without, and thence infer God or
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From such arguments, Dorner derives various attributes to predicate of the divine. An
examination of these divine attributes is important for our understanding of Dorner’s trinitarian
theology, for each of them will be parsed in a trinitarian configuration: divine aseity is
configured as the physical Trinity, divine intellect is configured as the logical Trinity, and the
ethical attributes are configured as the ethical Trinity.

2. Establishing Divine Aseity
2.1 Introduction
Our goal in this section will be to examine how Dorner establishes the doctrine of divine
aseity. Such an examination is crucial, for aseity is the essential attribute that is the basis of the
personal properties of the divine persons as treated in the ‘physical Trinity.’ In his treatment of
the ontological argument, Dorner argues that the idea of God indicates that such a being
necessarily exists and that such an idea is necessary for any rational thought at all. In
subsequently utilizing the concept of causality (from the cosmological argument) and applying it
to the divine, Dorner then makes a case for how God’s necessary existence is an existence which
is received by no other than Himself.

certain predicates of God, they may indeed be too weak collectively to effect what they would. They cannot of
themselves answer for the being of the absolute Essence, but they simply afford us categories or predicates which
belong in the first place to the world, without being able to prove the being of God and the existence of those
predicates in God” (SCD §19.3, observation [ET: v. 1, p. 247]).
The two types of arguments, when considered together, form something analogous to what has been called
in 20th century analytic philosophy of religion a “cumulative case argument.” Historically, the cumulative case
argument has been associated with establishing only God’s existence. But to utilize this terminology for Dorner’s
context, the two types of arguments form a cumulative case not only for God’s existence, but for all the attributes
we can apply to God.
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2.2 The Ontological Argument
According to Dorner, the ontological proof shows us that God is the real original
possibility of thought, being, volition, knowledge, and is absolute.259 If one thinks about the
highest essence – that is, what the highest essence must be like – one must conclude that
existence must be included in what it means to be the highest essence. He says, “The highest
essence, when thought, is to be thought as unconditioned and independent of anything else,
independent also of our subjective thought, but as unconditioned or absolute, self-existing, and
consequently as existent.”260 The highest essence, in other words, cannot be conditioned by
anything, and so must have its existence from itself and not from another.
Dorner then moves from the notion that, since the highest essence must have its existence
from itself, it must exist. Here, he seems to assume the following: (1) things, or in his
terminology, ‘essences’ do exist, and (2) of those things or ‘essences’ which exist, they have
their existence either from themselves or from another. Since the highest essence must have its
existence from itself, and since there are essences, this highest essence must exist.
Given that the concept of God necessarily includes that God exists, Dorner concludes that
the concept of God is a necessary concept for thought. Dorner says, “Thus the only choice lies
between leaving the idea of God unthought, or thinking it, when thought, absolute and selfexisting.”261 Notice, here, the choice is not between thinking of God as existent or thinking of

“In the ontological proof we have found God to be the real original possibility of thought, being, and knowledge,
and to be absolute” (SCD I §20.4 [p. 256]). In this particular text he does not mention volition, but in other texts he
lists it. See section 1.1.3 below.
259

260

SCD I §18.2 (p. 226).

261

Ibid.

153

God as non-existent, but between thinking of God as existent or not having any thought of God
at all, whether as existent or as non-existent.

2.1.1 God as the Original Possibility for Thought
However, one cannot not have any thought of God at all, because the idea of the Absolute
is itself necessary for human thought. How is the idea of the Absolute necessary for human
thought? Dorner begins his account by stating, “It is not optional, but necessary, to think an
Absolute, which, in order to be thought, is to be thought as existent. It is necessary [to think an
Absolute], that is to say, for him who wishes to think rationally, and whose thought is thought
which would become knowledge…”262 The thought of an Absolute is necessary for rational
thinking because without it, “there is no longer anything infinite for men, and also an absence of
knowledge of the finite as such; for apart from opposition to the infinite, even the finite as such
cannot be known. Thus understanding at most might remain, but not reason.”263 The thought of
the Absolute is necessary for human thought, Dorner argues, because it provides a contrast
between itself and all that is not it, between the infinite and the finite. Unfortunately, Dorner
does not go into any further detail on this point. The assumption seems to be that a contrast is
needed for the possibility of human thought, wherein the infinite (the Absolute) functions as a
sort of horizon or background by which the finite can be present as foreground to the human.
A second argument for the thought of the Absolute as being necessary for human thought
deals with the Absolute as ‘unity.’ Dorner notes that, without the thought of the Absolute,
the point of unity is lost for all plurality of the existent and the possible. A consciousness
which has got rid of the thought of absolute Being would become a prey to an endless
atomicism and dissolution. The reason must by its nature seek unity, must maintain an
262
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ultimate point of unity of the ideal and real for thought and existence; otherwise there
would neither be rational thought nor volition. Without this principle of unity, thought
falls apart. Even the copula between subject and predicate, this last relic of the ultimate
principle of unity, would be consistently dissolved, and with it thought would also be
extinguished.264
Thinking is an act whereby distinct things are mentally related to one another (e.g., the thought
‘This blanket is green.’). Distinct things can be related to one another, however, only if there is a
bridge that allows for such relation. That a blanket can be a certain way (e.g., ‘green’) and that
greenness can be a certain way (e.g., belonging to a blanket) entails that there is a reality more
basic than either blankets or greenness – namely, being itself – which allows for the blanket and
greenness to be a certain way. Human thought, Dorner supposes, must presuppose the thought of
this basic reality in order to make mental relations between things. This basic reality just is the
Absolute.
Dorner argues, thirdly, that the thought of the Absolute is necessary for human thought
because the Absolute grounds the logic by which thought operates. “Thought is truly human,”
Dorner says, “i.e. not visionary or sportive thought, but thought which would become knowledge
– by the presupposition of an Absolute as the prototype of thought.”265 Dorner sees human
thought as operating under certain norms: “Thought is what it should be only by the laws of
thought, which form its regulative element and internal law, which thought has not first
produced, but which constitute the immovable foundation, the absolute fortress and a power
innate in the thinker.”266
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Unfortunately, here too Dorner does not give a thorough argument, and so one must
guess a bit at what he means. He seems, however, to be saying something like the following. The
laws by which thought operates are not arbitrary or subjective, for thought is governed by these
laws. Logic is authoritative over how we think, if we are to think rightly. Thus, because these
laws are normative over thought, they are not something which thought merely produces. Rather,
they are objective and independent of thought. Thus, there is a reality which transcends human
thought and is that by which human thought can operate. As Dorner puts it, “Thus the Absolute
as the logical power precedes all actual thought, and is not produced by thought; or, the Absolute
is the primary logical element, the original possibility of logical thought to be presupposed as
existent.”267 Since thought of the Absolute is demanded by thought as such, one must have an
idea of a highest essence. And since a highest essence must be the source of its own existence,
this highest essence – this Absolute – must exist.

2.1.2 God as the Original Possibility of Being
Not only is the Absolute necessary for thought, but also for the possibility of being at all.
The Absolute is “the original possibility of existence, of all realization according to form and
matter. If an actual being is to be (and the thinker is already an actual being), its possibility is
presupposed, whether that possibility is absolutely within itself or without. In the latter state it
cannot remain; it impels toward an existence which has its possibility within itself. But that being
which bears its possibility within itself, and which is thereby the possibility of all being, is called
the Absolute.”268
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Dorner’s argument runs as follows. One who thinks already exists, and thus the one who
thinks must presuppose that things actually exist. Given that things do actually exist, anything
which actually exists logically presupposes the possibility – the potentiality – of existing. Things
which cannot potentially exist could never actually exist, therefore things which do actually exist
presuppose a potentiality of existence.
The next step of the argument is less clear, but seems to be something like this:
everything which has a potentiality of existence has that potentiality either from themselves or
from something other than themselves. At least in this argument, Dorner assumes that there can
only be one thing which has its potentiality of existence from itself. That which has its
potentiality of existence from itself, and not from another, is ‘the Absolute.’ Since one who
thinks must presuppose the actual existence of things, and since the actual existence of things
entails that there be something which has its actual existence from itself (viz., the Absolute), the
act of thinking entails the thought of an actually existing Absolute.

2.1.3 God as the Original Possibility of Volition
Of the four claims Dorner makes regarding the Absolute as a necessary presupposition of,
the most obscure claim is that the Absolute is necessary for the possibility of volition, for he
merely asserts this is the case without actually making an argument. The text in which he is most
direct on this matter is still merely suggestive: “But if the existence of the Absolute is to be
thought as the original possibility of all being, the world of volition, which has to do with the
real, also presupposes the Absolute as its original possibility.”269
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Because he notes a similarity between the Absolute as the original possibility for volition
and as the original possibility of being, this suggests he is thinking something like the following:
God is the original possibility of being because one who thinks must presuppose the actual
existence of things, and since the actual existence of things entails that there be something which
has its actual existence from itself (viz., the Absolute), the act of thinking entails the thought of
an actually existing Absolute. Analogously, one who wills must presuppose the actual existence
of things (since to will something is to seek to make a change with respect to being), and since
the actual existence of things entails that there be something which has its actual existence from
itself (viz., the Absolute), the act of willing entails the thought of an actually existing Absolute.

2.1.4 God as the Original Possibility of Knowledge
The thought of the Absolute, fourth, is necessary for there to be knowledge. As Dorner
puts it, knowledge “is the unity (not the identity) of thought and being.”270 Knowledge occurs, in
other words, when some object (and thus some aspect of ‘being’) becomes an object of thought.
Things cannot be objects of thought (and therefore cannot lead to knowledge), however, if the
two are not correspond-able: the object must be cognizable to thought, and thought must have the
ability to cognize the object.
A correspondence, of course, entails some level of likeness between the two. In other
words, there must be something common between the potential object of knowledge and the
potential knower at a level even more fundamental than the one in which knowledge occurs.
Thus, there must be a basic unity between thought and being, a unity which accounts for the
possibility of their correspondence that leads to knowledge. As Dorner puts it, “Were, then, this
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unity and harmony of being and thought generally and originally nowhere given (therefore also
not once present) in a common primary basis of both, which is the real point of unity for the
cognoscens and the cognoscibile, this harmony of both could not gain a place in us.”271
Thus, a basic unity between thought and being entails a reality which transcends both.
This reality is the Absolute: “Therefore this absolute harmony must be originally given, and be
presupposed, as truth. The ideal and the real must be originally united in themselves somewhere
and somehow in order for the union of the two to exist in us, in our knowledge. If we call this
unity of thought and being to be presupposed the Absolute, the Absolute is therefore the original
possibility of all our knowledge, inasmuch as it is the self-existent unity in which they
harmonize, or inasmuch as it is original truth.”272
Thus far, Dorner acknowledges that we have only a bare concept of God: “But we have
certainly not treated strictly in our argument the full idea of that which we call God, but only the
Godhead as the absolute Being, which is to be thought as necessary and existent, if thought,
being, volition, and knowledge are to be."273 The next step will be to consider the entailments of
the ontological argument in order to enrich this concept of God.
Four attributes of God immediately follow from what we have established: unity,
singularity, simplicity, and infinity.274 The attribute of ‘unity’ – that the Absolute possesses a
coherence or agreement with itself – can be arrived at from what we have considered thus far.
We have seen that God is the possibility of all actual existence, and so God functions, therefore,
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as the single cause all of being: “That the absolute being is one follows immediately from the
fact that it is the primary real possibility of all everything. By that inference all dualism at the
ultimate sources is excluded.”275 Given that God is the single cause of all being, all being –
despite it diversity – is held together coherently by this single thing. Thus, God must possess the
attribute of ‘unity.’
The attribute of ‘singularity’ – that there can be only one Absolute – is arrived at as
follows. Dorner notes that ‘God,’ as the possibility of all actual existence and thus as the ‘unity’
of all actual existence, could simply refer to all that exists. Everything that exists, in other words,
could just be ‘God.’ The advantage of this would be that God’s absoluteness would never be
threatened: God cannot be made relative to something other than Himself since everything is
God.
Dorner notes, however, that because God is the possibility of all actual existence, this
distinguishes Him from all other things. If God were to create, that which is created would have
to have its existence from God, and thus from something other than itself. Since there will
always be this difference between God and everything else, even if God creates something other
than Himself, that which is created can never threaten God’s absoluteness.
God, therefore, will always have a qualitatively different status than anything else that
might exist: “The being of the Godhead as the Absolute is unique of its kind; the world therefore
is, in this respect, of a kind absolutely dissimilar [to God]. The world cannot lay claim to His
kind of Being, and thus He cannot be limited by the world. The world cannot, therefore, with the
being that it has, be any limitation that could contradict His absoluteness, because He is and
remains the primary possibility of everything. Generally, His being cannot be coordinated with
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another’s, for He must be the very possibility of that other’s existence.”276 Therefore, a second
attribute follows from God understood as ‘absolute Being’: there can only be one Absolute, and
so God possesses the attribute of ‘singularity.’
The last two attributes are much simpler to treat. As we saw above, God is the unity of all
being: there is the possibility of thought and knowledge because there is a primordial unity
which allows the ideal and the real to be correlated. If God Himself was diverse, there could be
no primordial unity by which the ideal and the real could be correlated. Thus, God understood as
‘absolute Being’ leads to the conclusion that God possesses the attribute of simplicity, that God
is not a composition of parts.
The final divine attribute that can be established from the ontological argument is
infinity. As we saw above when treating of God’s unity and singularity, God cannot be made
relative by the existence of another. The finite, therefore, cannot impose a limitation upon God as
the absolute Being. For Dorner, this lack of limitation vis-à-vis the finite is denoted by the
attribute of infinity.277 Therefore God, as necessarily existent, and so as the original possibility of
thought, being, and knowledge, possesses the attributes of unity, singularity, simplicity, and
infinity.

2.3 The Cosmological Argument
2.3.1 Introduction
The conception of God established above, because it is derived a priori, is the least
determinate conception of God that is possible while still being thinkable. Dorner, however,
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insists that human thought naturally seeks to move beyond such an indeterminate definition of
God to one that is more determinate: “At the idea of the absolute essence, which, though not
wholly indeterminate in contents, is yet poor and not particularly definite, thought cannot
stop.”278
Dorner, however, is cautious here. On the one hand, he is convinced that thought
necessarily moves to a more determinate concept of God than that provided by the cosmological
argument. On the other hand, in arriving at a more determinate concept of God, he wants to
proceed scientifically, and to do so requires that one proceed upon a principle of rational
necessity. He asks, “How then are we to proceed from universal and infinite being to richer
definitions, or from pure being to an onward movement, to a progress in knowledge and to
definitions indeed, not introduced from without, but necessarily thought in the being of God, so
that the concept of God may be further defined?”279
The ontological argument, recall, is the only a priori argument, and so the only argument
that proceeds by rational necessity. Thought demands a more determinate conception of God
than that provided by the ontological argument. The challenge, therefore, is to reach a richer
definition of God, and to do so scientifically, yet having already exhausted the resources of the
one a priori argument.
As we will see, Dorner’s solution is quite clever. Although he rejects the cosmological
argument in its customary form, he will extract a component from the argument (the category of
‘causality’), argue that this component may be applied validly to the divine, and so apply it to the
conception of God already obtained in order to reach a more determinate conception.
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The cosmological argument, in its classical form, appeals to empirical data and reasons
from this to God as first cause. But an appeal to empirical data assumes that there is a world to
appeal to in the first place. Further, any reliance on the empirical is an appeal to something
which is not the result of reason, i.e. it is an appeal to something which is not driven by logical
necessity. As Dorner puts it, the cosmological argument (in its customary form) “presupposes the
being of the world as a firm and certain being, in order to derive God as the cause of the world
from that presupposition. But the world is not something of itself and by itself, as indeed the
conclusion [of the cosmological argument] itself already acknowledges that the cause is found in
God of the world which is ‘contingent.’ If the world is contingent, it may possibly not exist.”280
The cosmological argument, in its customary form, uses the category of causation as a
bridge that links the contingent and the necessary, establishing the latter by means of the former.
Necessity, however, cannot be established by contingency, and so Dorner rejects utilizing the
category of causation to establish a link between the contingent (the empirical) and the necessary
(the divine). Note, though, that what Dorner rejects is the utilization of the category of causation
to establish the necessary from the contingent. However, Dorner sees it as legitimate to apply the
category of causation to the divine itself (i.e. as something within the realm of necessity, and not
between the realms of necessity and contingency).281 The concept of causation itself does not
imply the empirical, and so is applicable to the divine.
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2.3.2 Causation Applied to the Divine
Now that we have seen how Dorner secures the category of ‘causation’ for its application
to the divine, we can proceed to the material results that it supplies for the conception of God. In
basic terms, Dorner seems to think of causation as the reduction of potentiality into actuality.
Since God must be thought of as always actually existing (rather than merely potentially
existing),282 God can neither have an excess of potential existence over actual existence (for then
something is limiting God283), nor can God have an excess of actual existence over potential
existence (for then there would be a mere succession from one to the other, making God subject
to time284). If, then, God is actually and absolutely existing, then the absolute potentiality cannot
become extinct in God: the potentiality must be continual because actuality is realized
potentiality, and God’s actuality is continual.285
When this notion of a continual potentiality-actuality relation is applied to the notion that
God cannot receive existence from something other than Himself, it follows that God must have
His continual actuality, always realizing His inexhaustible potentiality, from Himself. In other

“But He cannot be thought as merely possibility of Himself, potentially existing, and not existing actu, just as
little as He can be thought as passing over into actus, or into existent reality successively; He is actually and
absolutely existent, He is absolutely in Himself realized potentiality (Potenz), actus purissimus” (SCD I §20.4 [p.
256]).
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words, God must possess aseity.286 Therefore, God is the ground of Himself: He provides
Himself with the infinite supply of potentiality to be actualized.287 And given that God is both
actuality and the source of this actuality, there is a distinction in God: the originator and that
which is originated.288
Here a problem immediately arises. We saw that, as absolute, God cannot have an other;
there can be only one absolute. Yet if there is a distinction in God, this would seem to imply that
there are, in fact, two absolutes (thereby negating both in their claim to be absolute). To avoid
this problem, God as originator and God as originated need to be seen as unified in some way.
Dorner unifies these two elements by positing a reciprocal relationship between them. In other
words, it is not that the effect is stagnant, but as effect relates itself back to its cause.289 This
circular, reciprocal action between God as originator and God is originated Dorner expresses by
the term ‘absolute life.’290 (In the next chapter, we will examine Dorner’s explicitly trinitarian

“God must be ab aliquo [from something]; that the law of causation requires; and, because not ab alio [from
another], necessarily a se [from Himself]. He has aseity” (SCD I §20.4 [p. 256]).
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absolute the progressus in infinitum comes to the stand, which is predicated in the relation of cause and effect, and
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texts which indicate that this action between God as originator and God as originated is just that
of the procession of God the Son from God the Father. We will also see that the reciprocity
between the two described above occurs in virtue of the Holy Spirit.)
The ontological argument, supplemented by aspects of the cosmological argument,
establishes that there is a highest being – an Absolute – which exists necessarily and has this
existence not from another but from itself: God is ‘absolute life.’ In the next chapter, we will see
how Dorner configures this conception of the divine in a trinitarian manner, viz. as the ‘physical
Trinity.’ Now, however, we will proceed to Dorner’s further elaboration of the divine attributes.

3. Establishing Divine Intellect
3.1 Introduction
Our task in this section will be to examine how Dorner establishes the doctrine of divine
intellect. An examination of such a property is vital, for it is the essential attribute that is the
basis of the personal properties of the divine persons as treated in the ‘logical Trinity.’ Dorner
establishes that God possesses consciousness through his treatment of the physico-teleological
argument. To that we now turn.

3.2 The Physico-Teleological Argument
3.2.1 Introduction
What Dorner calls the physico-teleological argument, in its customary form, is an
argument that appeals to the structure and purposiveness of empirical phenomena as evidence
that there is a conscious subject responsible for such design and order. Such an argument

originated, of being originated that is at the same time activity, to be expressed in the proposition that God is
absolute life. For God is absolute life in Himself, not by His being realized once for all, but by eternal selfrealization…” (SCD I §20.4 [pp. 257-58]).

166

assumes that the empirical unambiguously displays harmony and order, and that such harmony
and order is a direct expression of the mind that is responsible for it.
As we will see, Dorner modifies the customary form of the physico-teleological
argument, asserting that, in fact, the empirical world does not unambiguously display order and
purposiveness. What this means is that one cannot thereby move directly from nature to a mind
behind that world. Dorner’s modification of the customary form of the physico-teleological proof
is to assert that it is precisely the imperfection of the natural order which moves us to the thought
of a perfect order, this perfect order being the divine.
3.2.2 Application of Measure, Adaptation, Harmony, and Beauty to the idea of God291
“The world of nature,” Dorner says, “is full of wonderful contrivances, and relations of
disconnected things with one another, for the production of certain results, so that a theologia
naturalis may be projected with a collection of noteworthy instances of the designed and
harmonious correlations of natural things.”292 However, Dorner notes a problem: “Still, more
than one thing is lacking to the cogency of the physico-teleological proof of itself, both as
regards content and form.”293
The problem is that, although we sense much order and harmony in the empirical, we
also sense disorder and arbitrariness. “Adaptation or harmony is not everywhere represented to
us,” Dorner says. “[W]ith the means at our disposal the induction is not to be perfectly
established. Then in the statement of what is to be regarded as design, arbitrariness easily
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comingles. There is much seemingly purposeless working. What from one side appears to be
display of design, is neutralized again by other forces; for example, fruit or seed is the purpose of
plants; they are destroyed.”294 Nature, Dorner continues, “is rather a cycle of rising and setting.
Even man himself, if he regards himself as the end of nature, is devoured in turn by her, who is
his mother, and thus forms an instance against the physico-teleological argument built on finite
ends.”295
Dorner says: “This constitution of the world does not correspond with the idea of the
perfect organism, in which there can be nothing superfluous or casual, too little or too much; this
constitution [of the world] is contrary to such an idea.”296 Dorner therefore concludes that,
because of the imperfection displayed in the natural world, we cannot arrive at the notion of the
natural world as the finite effect of the infinite Absolute: “Consequently, even when the physicoteleological proof is applied, it cannot possibly lead to an absolute intelligence, to design, etc.,
via causalitatis. Finally, an absolute intelligence distinct from the world is not to be thus
reached.”297
However, the imperfection manifest in the world does not entirely preclude one from
reaching a perfect designer. Dorner presents a clever way of reaching an absolute from the
imperfection of the world: “The shortcoming, the imperfection of nature, shows us that we
cannot stop at the design and harmony appearing therein as at an absolute thing, and thus an
elevation above the world is needed to reach the Absolute and divine, which is free from
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contradiction, which nature must acknowledge it is not. But still the world, as the entry upon the
physico-teleological proof itself shows, may contain so much, that it urges to the conception of
an absolute end, or a perfect harmony and beauty.”298
What does Dorner mean by saying that the world “urges to the conception of an absolute
end, or a perfect harmony and beauty”? He seems to mean that the instances of imperfection in
nature force reason to think of a perfect instantiation of life: “Now the world, upon whose
suggestion of course these ideas [of order, measure, adaptation, beauty, and harmony] first come
into consciousness, only presents them in an imperfect manner; therefore thought cannot rest
content with the world, but only finds repose in the idea of the absolute and perfect design,
beauty, and harmony.”299
That thought can be satisfied only with a perfectly ordered living whole means that the
idea of such perfection is a necessary idea. Thus, since such an idea is necessary for thought, it
must be associated with that we have already seen as necessary for thought, and thus what is
necessarily existent. (Thus here, with the physico-teleological proof, Dorner builds upon what
has already been established by the ontological and cosmological proofs.) Since there can only
be one Absolute, this Absolute itself must be the perfect instantiation of life. (As Dorner puts it,
God must be the ‘absolutely harmonious life.’300)
Given that God is this perfect instantiation of order, measure, adaptation, beauty, and
harmony, the following can be said about God:
The absolute life…is absolutely and essentially full of purpose in the fullness of its
potentialities. It is not simply free from contradiction; the divine potencies of life are in
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harmonious equilibrium, the divine life is essentially retrogressive purpose, self-purpose.
The divine life, further, is essentially glorious, essentially forms a beautiful, eternal, and
harmonious rhythm; and this primary beauty typically presents measure, the eternal order
of the world, the perfect organism, and, if there is a world, the principle of all wellmeasured equipoises, of everything that displays design or use, of everything beautiful
and harmonious, in a word, of everything that is physically good in the world. The
primary forms of things, and the primary ideas of adaptation and beauty, must be in
God.301
What we have, then, is an empirical sphere where order, measure, adaptation, beauty, and
harmony are imperfectly realized, and yet lead to the rationally necessary idea of a perfect
realization of order, measure, adaptation, beauty, and harmony. The only way to make sense of
this imperfect realization is to relate it to a higher sphere, that of ‘spirit’: “So long as we remain
in the realm of natural design, or good, or beauty, and know nothing of an absolute purpose,
there remains something inadequate to the absolute life of God. Without spirituality the designed
and beautiful is necessarily merely finite in value and manifestation.”302
Dorner thinks that this notion of ‘spirit’ can be obtained by considering teleology further.
In the sphere of nature, we see teleology, and yet what is so vexing about teleology in this sphere
is that it is not just the means that perish (which we might expect), but also the ends. In other
words, everything in the sphere of nature – means and ends – seems to be transitory. “Now the
physico-teleological argument brings ends before us relative to the sphere of the useful, the
finitely good, and the beautiful, which are already of worth, but there is at the same time in these
valuable objects transience and decay.”303 Thus one asks: “Wherefore this mutation and change,
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however just it is in itself? Why are transience and change the only permanent things in
nature?”304
The only way to make sense of this is to posit an absolute end, an end which does not
undergo transience. As Dorner puts it, such an end “is only to be found, not in ends merely finite
in value and power, not in transitory ends, but in a higher or absolute end, which asserts itself
even in this change of the finite, and which, because it is absolutely and essentially worthy, is no
longer inadequately related to the absoluteness of the divine”305 “Rational thought only finds a
point of rest,” says Dorner, “by a non-arbitrary exaltation above the visible; that with which the
exaltation has to do is, therefore, first of all, immaterial and non-transitory being, and so far
already Spirit.”306
The sphere of spirit
is the solution of the riddle, which always confronts rational thought in the consideration
of natural life itself. Nature remains a contradiction to the reason which is in search of a
final cause, unless there is a higher sphere than the natural, unless nature is broken
through by the spiritual sphere, and by that means growth as well as decay, the
consumption of the finitely purposed as well as the progressive renewal under new forms
of what has been consumed, be justified and established. In that way, what was
previously an end, although a finite one, enters into a greater coherence, into relation with
a higher existence, with which it is incorporated as a medium.307
When we examined the sphere of nature, we were left with what seemed like an irrational
sphere. Although we can discern order, measure, adaptation, beauty, and harmony in nature,
these categories become questionable in light of the transience and decay that we also see in
nature.
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But if this sphere is related to an absolute end, then the order of nature becomes rational
to us. Relating the sphere of nature to an absolute end restores the categories of order, measure,
adaptation, beauty, and harmony. With an absolute end, such categories have a permanent seat:
“In this higher something, or in God as Spirit, the principles will be found of all those ideas of
which the world forms the mere finite manifestation or type, the principles of measure, design,
and order, of beauty and harmony.”308
If this higher, absolute order provides rationality, then this means that this higher order is
itself rational. Since rationality entails intelligence, the Absolute, therefore, must have the
property of intelligence: “These categories [of order, measure, adaptation, beauty, and harmony]
already presuppose a divine intelligence, an understanding, in which the eternal truths of logic,
mathematics, and aesthetics are present as essential powers, so to speak, pertaining to the divine
nature, already defined to be spiritual. Ends, whether finite or absolute, do not exist apart from
intelligence; nor does beauty or order.”309 Thus, with the physico-teleological argument, Dorner
has established that the Absolute possesses intellect.

4. Establishing God as an Ethical Agent
4.1 Introduction
With the juridical and moral arguments that are to be examined below, Dorner will
establish the divine attributes that constitute God as an ‘ethical’ agent, and thus the attributes that
concern the ‘ethical Trinity.’ Recall that for God to be ethically good, there must be some good
which He freely wills. The juridical and moral arguments demonstrate that God is such in the
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following way. In brief, the juridical argument establishes that God is just, i.e. that the rendering
of that which is due is itself a property of God, and the moral argument establishes that God is
the highest good, i.e. that God is an end only and not a means to some further end. In other
words, the two arguments establish that God is just toward the good, that God Himself is the
highest good, and therefore God is just toward Himself. God necessarily ensures that what is due
to Himself is rendered to Himself. Since God is just towards Himself, God is thereby ethically
good.

4.2 The Juridical Argument: God Acts Justly Towards Himself
In his treatment of the ontological argument, we saw Dorner link necessary ideas of
reason to the Absolute. Here, he does the same with the ideas of justice and right. The notions of
‘justice’ and ‘right’ are not based on contingency, but on the inherent quality of that which they
preserve. “The idea of right,” says Dorner, “is, in the first place, no mere subjective idea; it is
neither a matter of a human mode of view nor a mere work of human liking, agreement, or
convention, so that it is purely a matter of human choice to form right.”310 Although we may
encounter injustice in the world around us, we know it as such precisely because the concepts of
justice and right are necessary concepts.
Further, since the Absolute is the seat of the truths of reason, right and justice have their
perfect exemplification in the Absolute: “The idea of right, when once it has been conceived
upon positive or negative suggestion, cannot be again surrendered by the reason; it is a necessary
idea of the reason, which cannot fail of existence in the Absolute, and of absolutely perfect
existence therein. But the same absolute justice must also be acknowledged to be a good thing in
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itself, an essentially and absolutely worthy end in itself.”311 Dorner thus concludes, “But since,
now, right and justice are necessary ideas of the reason, and something absolutely worthy is
expressed thereby, they are also to be predicated of the divine essence.”312
Thus, because God Himself is the origin of the necessary ideas of reason, the notions of
justice and right have their origin in God. Yet it is not that the concepts of justice and right have
their origin in the divine and manifest themselves in the finite. Rather, justice and right have their
origin in God precisely because God Himself is right and justice – as Dorner puts it above, they
are ‘to be predicated of the divine essence.’
What does it mean to say that God Himself is right and justice, that they are to be
predicated of the divine essence? ‘Right’ denotes that certain things are due to a subject, that a
subject is deserving of things based on its status. ‘Justice’ is simply the protection of such rights;
the defense or guard that allows the subject enjoys its rights. For God Himself to be right and
justice therefore means that God Himself is just, that God Himself upholds that which is due to a
subject.
Here it is tempting to move to the notion that God, as right and justice, simply means that
God upholds that which is due to human beings. But Dorner, here, is not discussing the finite; he
is discussing the Absolute. Justice and right are predicated of the divine essence, and the divine
essence refers to God Himself. Right and justice, therefore, are predicated of God even apart
from creation. Indeed, that God could be just only if He is in relation to something other than
Himself is flatly rejected by Dorner:
But if in the just action of God there is not revealed an internal and immanent justice,
there would not be necessity in this just action: it would simply be arbitrary action,
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because it would not have its roots in the divine essence; and thus, again, the concept of
justice would become something subjective, it would be based in our mental
representation, which is pressed upon us, although contingently, and thus the idea of
objective right would vanish. But right belongs to the eternal truths as well as
mathematics and logic, and those truths are maintained by God Himself, indeed they are
united with His essence.313
Dorner rejects the idea that God could be just only if there is an other because this would mean
that, if there was an other to which God would relate, such relating would be based only on a
divine will which would not be beholden to any law at all, even a law which is based in God’s
very being. God could, potentially, act against His own essence. Dorner concludes, “We must
therefore endeavor to apprehend God as just in Himself, or in relation to Himself, and apart from
the idea of the world, or apart from the world.”314
Although Dorner rejects the idea that God would need an other in order to be just, he
does recognize that the concept of justice entails a relation between two distinct things. For
Dorner, God’s immanent justice is therefore possible only with a weak version of divine
simplicity. Positively put, immanent justice entails a distinction of some sort within God: “The
idea of justice at any rate presupposes a duality, and so, in order to be the original seat of justice,
God cannot be thought as abstract simplicity, but only as distinct in Himself. But God is not to be
abstractly simple; that point has already become clear to us by the divine self-origination.”315
The question is: Where in the divine is this distinction relevant, i.e. what is to be distinguished
from what when it comes to God’s immanent justice?
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That God is immanently just, and that justice entails a relation, means that God is just
with respect to Himself. If God simply allowed His physical attributes free reign – if, for
example, God simply asserted His will based on what He was absolutely capable of – then God
would not be beholden to any law, any necessity. If, on the other hand, God is beholden to a law,
then God must exercise His abilities and acts within the constraints of such a law.
If justice is an immanent attribute of God, and if justice entails a respect for law, then
immanent justice in God means that God must respect His own law. A self-constraint out of
respect for a law means that one subordinates their abilities and actions to the law, that they see
the law as normative over their actions. Thus, if this is the case in God, then this law in God is
normative over God’s abilities and actions. Thus, although God’s abilities and God’s law are
both included in God – are both aspects of God – nevertheless these two aspects are not to be
given equal weight. Rather, if justice is indeed to be predicated of God, then there must be
certain aspects of God which are subordinate to other aspects of God. In subordinating certain
aspects of Himself to others, God is simply giving those various aspects of Himself their due.
“God is just in Himself,” says Dorner, “seeing that He thinks and wills every single thing in
Himself according to its value; that He gives and maintains its right, just, and harmonious
position to each of the distinctions in Himself.”316
Mere ability is simply part of the ‘physical’ aspect of God, whereas a respect for a law or
norm entails something beyond and above God’s mere ‘physical’ aspect, namely the ‘spiritual’
aspect of God. God’s immanent justice, therefore, entails that God not be indifferent to the
relation between His ‘physical’ aspect and His ‘spiritual’ aspect. As Dorner puts it, “The opinion
that everything in God is of identical value, that nothing is superordinate and nothing
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subordinate, threatens the distinction between the physical, e.g. the divine power, and the
spiritual; or it proceeds as if the distinction between the physical and the spiritual or ethical were
merely subjective, and not given in the objective essence of God.”317 Thus, the ‘physical’ aspect
of God is to be subordinate to, and servant of, God’s ‘spiritual’ aspect: “Everything in God
accords with that justice which knows, wills, and preserves everything after its kind, and preeminently so His life, His nature, and His fullness of might, as the servants of the spiritual, [as
the servants of] the higher worth. There is thus also in God a subordination and a superordination
by virtue of His justice, which penetrates the whole divine life, and is unalterable.”318 The
distinction in God which justice preserves is therefore between the physical and the spiritual.
We have spoken of God’s immanent justice as a relation of God to Himself, and that such
justice gives each aspect of God its proper due. Specifically, we saw that Dorner is concerned to
show that the spiritual aspect of God is preserved and not subordinated to the physical. Thus, the
spiritual aspect of God has an absolute value since it can never be a means for a physical end
(lest God’s justice be violated). God, therefore, respects His own divine law. God, as Himself
right and justice, means that God upholds that which is due to Himself.
Because right and justice are attributes of the divine, and therefore are the reason why
God upholds that which is due to Himself, it is thereby necessary that God be just towards
Himself. But here it will be important to pause and anticipate where the discussion is going. In
the next section, we will see that God is just towards Himself not simply because He is God, but
because He is the highest good, the absolutely worthy end. As a result, God is necessarily just
towards Himself as the highest good.
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Toward the end of the next section, however, we will see Dorner bring in a consideration
which will directly challenge – indeed it will contradict – this line of thought he has been
developing. The line of thought he has been developing, as we have seen, is that God is
necessarily just towards Himself. But he will note that an important aspect of ethical goodness
consists in an agent freely choosing to will the good. To look ahead, Dorner wants to maintain
that both of these (contradictory) aspects of ethical goodness are present in the divine: God is
necessarily just towards Himself and He freely wills to be just towards Himself.

4.3 The Moral Argument: God as the Absolutely Worthy End
The juridical argument has yielded the conclusion that God upholds that which is due to
Himself. Yet this really has only given us a negative characterization of the spiritual. What, then,
is that which the divine justice protects? It is in SCD §26 where Dorner begins to offer a positive
account of the ‘spiritual’ nature of the divine, of what the divine justice protects. He says, “That
which is simply full of worth and purpose, and by means of which the just is just, and from
which the just has its inviolability, is the holy, which exists for the sake of the intelligence and
will, desires and attains in them positive realization, and thus becomes the ethically good”319
Thus, this spiritual reality is ‘full of worth and purpose,’ and this is why it is protected by the
divine justice.
Dorner characterizes this spiritual reality more robustly as follows:
The ultimate, holy, and positive idea of end, with which thought can and must be
satisfied, is positive moral good alone, to which justice occupies the relationship of
guardian, as the form which maintains that moral good as its essential contents. Or if we
place ourselves at the position of ethical idea, justice is itself the negative side of the
ethical, which, by virtue of its positive and unconditional worth and value, excludes and
negatives in the just manner already considered (§24) everything inimical. Its obligatory
force and strength, as has been shown, right derives, indeed, from the absolute worth of
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the positively good, as of the absolutely highest end, which as such is justly to be
absolutely defended by justice. And thus the positively good, or the ethical, is the more
deeply-lying ground or basis of all right which is unconditionally obligatory320
Thus, it is what Dorner calls the ‘positive moral good,’ or ‘the ethical,’ which is the positive
characterization of the spiritual.
Dorner confirms that it is ‘the ethical’ which is that which cannot be made into a means
by noting how nothing can surpass it:
In that idea [viz., ‘the ethical’], once thought, must the questioning cease as to the why,
the cui bono, because the answer is that in that idea itself the bonum lies, and therefore
the ultimate final cause, to transcend which is neither necessary nor possible. To
transcend that idea would be to negative it. For if we thought anything to be higher than
the ethical, the ethical would only be a means instead of the highest end. The ethical,
when thought, is thought as that which is the essentially good, as its own absolutely
worthy and positive end. In the idea of that absolute end and worth, thought can find its
absolute point of rest.321
We have seen that the divine justice guards the ethical, the absolutely worthy end. But
what, precisely, is the relationship between the divine and the ethical, between the divine and this
absolutely worthy end? Is the ethical an ideal which the divine justice guards, or is it the divine
itself? Dorner argues that it is the latter: “If the ethical idea occupies this unique and necessary
position, and if an absolute divine being is to be necessarily thought, the ethical, the thought of
which is rationally necessary, cannot originally be outside of the Absolute, otherwise a
something absolutely worthy would exist outside of the absolute being.”322 We have established
that the ethical is an absolute end (rather than a relative end). Further, we saw that the
ontological argument establishes an absolute being. If the ethical is something other than the
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absolute being, then there are competing absolutes (or, rather, two things competing for the title
of ‘absolute’). Thus, the ethical must be identical with the absolute being.
The ethical, in other words, cannot be something which is merely potential in God. It
cannot be something whose actuality is contingent upon, for example, the divine will. If this
were the case, there would always be the potential that the ethical would not be actual. For
Dorner, however, the status of the ethical entails its actuality: “But that the ethical should be
thought as merely potential, as a law in or on the absolute being, is inadequate to the idea of the
ethical as the absolutely highest idea. Potentiality as such is non-existence; if the ethical is
merely potential, it is non-existent.”323 Dorner therefore concludes that “there exists in the
absolute being and life the reality of the ethical.”324 The actuality of the ethical in God, therefore,
is part of God’s very being.
There is, however, an important consideration regarding the actuality of the ethical as
God’s being. Dorner captures this consideration nicely:
But what is naturally or immediately good is not the true realization of the good. If God
were only fatalistically and compulsorily determined in His being by the law of the
ethical, or were He immediately at one therewith without conscious will, He would
merely be a necessitated ethical substance, and not the God who is the prototype of
holiness, whose image we ought to be. Indeed, apart from consciousness and volition,
there could be no talk of the ethical, because good could not in that case be willed as
such.325
The objection to the ethical as merely identical with God’s being is that it would eliminate God’s
will from what it means to be ethically good. One cannot say that an agent is ethically good if her
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will is not involved, i.e. if there can be no sense in which this agent consciously and deliberately
pursues ethical goodness.
Does this mean, then, that the ethical in God must be a matter of divine will rather than of
divine being? Dorner rejects this option. He says,
If in the ultimate resort we built the ethical upon the divine will, without determining that
will by the eternal ethical being God desires to be, such a will, because undetermined by
the essence and being of God, would be ethically absolutely undetermined – that is to
say, it would be mere caprice and absolute power (supremum liberum arbitrium), and
would be quite as much of itself a merely physical category as that ethical natural
disposition which is immediately and, so to speak, fatalistically determined.326
If the ethical in God is due solely to the divine will, we have the same problem as before, just in
a different form. The ethical identified solely with the divine being or solely with the divine will
makes God only fatalistically related to the good: in the former case, nothing God wills is related
to the good, and in the latter case, no aspect of God’s nature is related to the good. As Dorner
puts it, “To think of God only as an actual and ethical will, and as only ethical substance or
ethical being, leads essentially to the same result, and takes us back from the ethical sphere to the
physical.”327
Dorner will conclude, then, that the ethical “exists in the deity in both ways, as eternally
perfected ethical being, and as living ethical actuality, or will.”328 The ethical, therefore, exists in
God both as part of God’s natural essence and as a product of divine volition. How these two
aspects of the ethical fit together forms the summit of Dorner’s trinitarian thought: the ethical
Trinity. It is to this topic that we now turn.
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Chapter 6
DORNER ON THE TRINITY

Introduction
In the previous chapter, we examined Dorner’s treatment of the physical, intellectual, and
ethical divine attributes. There we saw that, for Dorner, God must be both naturally good, and
yet an agent who freely wills the good. That God must be both, however, presents a problem, for
the two at least seem to be mutually exclusive. The problem, in other words, lies in how we can
predicate both of one and the same agent. The solution to this problem, Dorner thinks, can only
be found in a trinitarian divine subject. In this chapter, therefore, we will explore exactly how
Dorner tries to solve this problem (viz., in the ‘ethical Trinity’). As the solution to a problem, the
Trinity is therefore grounded in the notion that God must possess ethical subjectivity.
The structure of this chapter runs as follows. Section 1 examines Dorner’s notion of the
physical Trinity, the trinitarian configuration expressed by those physical attributes examined in
the previous chapter that established divine aseity. Section 2 examines Dorner’s notion of the
logical Trinity, the trinitarian configuration expressed by those logical attributes examined in the
previous chapter that established divine intellect.
Section 3 examines Dorner’s notion of the ethical Trinity, the trinitarian configuration
expressed by those ethical attributes examined in the previous chapter that established God as an
ethical agent. We saw in the previous chapter that Dorner was particularly concerned to maintain
ethical freedom and ethical necessity in the divine. We will see in 3.1 that the maintenance of
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both ethical components necessitates a distinction in the divine (which turns out to be the
personal distinctions of the Trinity). In 3.2, we will see how Dorner maps the components of
ethical subjectivity onto the Trinity. In 3.3, we will examine how the trinitarian persons function
as the means by which divine ethical subjectivity is actualized.
Section 4 examines how, in virtue of being a union of freedom and necessity (4.1), God
can be love. Section 4.2 then investigates how love is the primary attribute of the divine. Finally,
in section 4.3, we will see how, for Dorner, love makes possible the perfect union of divine selfcommunication and self-preservation vis-à-vis the created order – that is, how divine love
enables God to give Himself to the created order without losing Himself in the created order.

1. The Physical Trinity
In our examination of the divine attributes – specifically in our examination of the
ontological and cosmological elements – we saw the following: Because God must be thought of
as: [1] realized potentiality – that is, as actuality; [2] because such potentiality cannot be
exhausted; [3] because the concept of causation entails a ‘from’; and [4] because God cannot be
from something outside Himself; it follows that God must have His continual actuality, always
realizing His inexhaustible potentiality, from Himself. That is, God possesses aseity. Further, we
saw that Dorner unifies this inexhaustible potentiality with this continual actuality by positing a
reciprocal relationship between the two, what he called a ‘double-sided causality.’ This circular,
reciprocal action between God as originator and God as originated Dorner expresses by the term
‘absolute life.’
In his treatment of the ‘physical Trinity’ (SCD I §31B.I), Dorner seeks to demonstrate
how divine aseity and its attendant double-sided causality requires a trinitarian structure of the
divine. Thus, it is no coincidence that he begins his treatment of the physical Trinity by invoking
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his previous discussion of aseity: “That God is not a rigid but a living being, and is life in
Himself by the fact that He lives a se, has been previously stated. He has and is not merely life in
relation to what is distinct from Himself in which He loses Himself, but prior to everything He is
so in and relatively to Himself; He does not even need, as we do, something distinct from
Himself for His life, a material or a stimulus. By His own means He is the life, because He has
aseity in Himself.”329 We will see that it is because God is ‘absolute life,’ as Dorner puts it, that
God must be triune.
Since divine aseity is to be grounded in the triune structure of the divine, before
proceeding to the Trinity explicitly considered, Dorner first briefly treats divine self-origination.
Dorner notes that “if the divine self-origination is to be thought as real, a distinction, at least a
dyad, is thereby supposed in God; God is the producer absolutely, but what is produced is not
primarily the world, but is absolutely equivalent to the producer, an absolute effect which is itself
efficient in turn.”330 The notion of a ‘double-sided causality’ which is constitutive of absolute life
obviously implies a two-ness.
In appealing to the notion of a ‘distinction’ in God (viz., God the ‘producer’ and the
‘absolute effect’), and in noting that the effect is ‘absolutely equivalent’ to the cause, Dorner has
begun to prepare the way for thinking about the causality of absolute life in trinitarian terms.
God as ‘producer’ here alludes to the traditional trinitarian doctrine of God the Father generating
God the Son, and the ‘absolute effect’ alludes to God the Son Himself. Yet the more explicit
invocation of traditional trinitarian doctrine is Dorner’s assertion of the absolute effect being
‘absolutely equivalent to the producer,’ a reference to the Son as homoousios with the Father.
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To return to the issue of aseity for a moment, one of the most conspicuous aspects of his
treatment of the physical Trinity is Dorner’s construal of what I will call the ‘principle of life.’
Dorner thinks of the trinitarian life of the divine after the manner of an organism. An organism
consists of members and whole, wherein the whole logically precedes the members, and the
members act as the vehicles which realize the whole. What we will see is that, in the physical
Trinity, there is a principle of life which functions as the ‘whole’ – in that it drives the members
– and the divine persons function as the ‘members’ insofar as they realize this principle of life.
We will see, in other words, that there is a principle which necessitates that God be triune so that
this principle can actualize itself.
In speaking about this principle of life as it occurs in organisms on a generic level,
Dorner says, “In every living organism there is a reciprocal action without detriment to the
distinction of the members; but this is only possible by the fact that life is not comparable to a
straight line, upon which it is always producing something new and different, and is also not a
mere movement backwards and forwards between two points, but is a circle which returns into
itself.”331 We noted above that in an organism, on the one hand, the whole logically precedes the
members, and on the other hand, the members realize the whole. Thus, in an organism, there is a
reciprocity between the whole and the members. For the whole to be realized, the whole must be
present in those members which realize it. Thus the whole must be present in the action of goingforth, so that the going-forth is related to the purpose of the whole. The image of a circle in the
above passage suggests that the going-forth of life is not unrelated to the whole.
The whole, of course, does not materialize apart from the members. Thus, the
materialization of the whole must begin with one member of the organism (viz., God the Father),
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and it is through this materialization of the whole that the subsequent members of the organism
(viz., God the Son and God the Holy Spirit) are produced.
Dorner then applies this organic imagery to the divine. Just as is the case with mundane
organisms where the cause and effect are reciprocally related, such that the effect reaches back to
its cause, so also must this be the case with the divine: “this second efficient cause cannot in its
working continue to produce in a similar manner an endless series, a third which produces a
fourth, and so on in an interminable theogonic series; that would be the heathen
representation”332 Thus, he continues, the unity between God as cause and God as effect “is only
permanently assured, insofar as the living effect or the life effected eternally finds its way back
to the first efficient cause, and serves the end of eternally establishing God Himself as effect.
God, as αἰτιατόν, is referred to God as αἴτιον, so that the relation of causation passes over into
that of reciprocal action.”333
In other words, in the divine, God as effect must refer back to God as cause. Yet the
referring back of the effect to the cause is not a feature of the effect as effect. There must be
something beyond the mere going forth that relates the effect to the cause. How is it that in an
organism the cause and the effect are related, such that there is not an endless series? How is it
that an organism is not like a line that proceeds infinitely from a point, but rather like ‘a circle
which returns into itself,’ where there is a reciprocal relation between parts?
The reciprocal relation, Dorner says, occurs by means of a third member: “the relatively
independent and severed members are held together by a principle of unity which keeps the
centrifugal force in equilibrium with the centripetal, a principle which is not one of the two
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members, nor is it the whole, but which preserves and confirms the members in their distinction,
just as it unites them.”334 Such a principle of unity between God as cause (the Father) and God as
effect (the Son) is the third member of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit: “This principle of union in the
organism of the absolute Life we call the Holy Spirit, to whom even a physical importance
attaches. He constitutes this organism together with the other two, just as He is Himself
conditioned simultaneously with its members.”335
What is interesting here is that Dorner thinks of the act of life-origination in the divine,
and thus the generation of one divine person from another, as something which would
continually repeat itself were it not for the intervention of some principle which redirects it back
(viz., the Holy Spirit). Indeed, Dorner’s words give the sense that this principle of life would be
almost aimless were it not for the Holy Spirit: “To abide by a duality of principles would
not…attain the end of self-origination, because without a principle which reconducted to unity
either the second would produce a third, and the third a fourth, and so on ad infinitum, or God
would be unable to attain any causality at all, because when starting from Himself He would not
reach Himself again, and thus God would merely remain an absolutely simple, self-identical,
rigid substance.”336
As Dorner notes, not only would an absence of the Holy Spirit result in an endless
generation of divine persons, but further and paradoxically, an endless generation of divine
persons would indicate not divine vitality but divine impotence. Dorner does not expound on this
interesting point, but he implies the following. He has already noted that the Holy Spirit is the
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agent of unity vis-à-vis divine self-origination. As such, the Spirit brings about unity-indifference: unity between different divine persons (the Father and the Son).337
Divine causality, as we have seen, has both a component of duality (cause and effect) and
a component of organicity (there is a whole, a teleological principle, which drives the parts and
unites them). The Spirit, by uniting cause and effect – or more precisely, by relating the effect
back to the cause – unites the goal of the act of life-origination with its purpose. More precisely,
by relating the effect back to the cause, the Holy Spirit makes the act of divine life-origination a
teleological act.
More broadly, by uniting cause and effect, cause and effect can no longer be thought of
as discreet. The uniting of cause and effect allows for the discreet components to be predicated
of one and the same thing. Because aseity involves self-generation, the generator and the
generated must be predicable of one and the same self. Since cause and effect, considered merely
as such, are by their nature discreet, there must be a component that relates them in a nonarbitrary manner. This is similar to the idea that, where the motion of one’s foot and the
movement of a soccer ball are related by the person’s intention to kick the ball, because the
intention relates the effect (the motion of the ball) back to the cause (the motion of the foot) in a
teleological way, allowing one to say that the person kicked the ball.) The teleological aspect
allows for the Father, the Son, and the Spirit to be components of divine production, and thus
allowing for the act of aseity to be predicated to none of them entirely individually, but to all of
them collectively. For this reason, a trinitarian structure is needed for divine aseity.
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2. The Logical Trinity
We saw in the previous chapter that if God is to be ethical, He must possess knowledge:
We found earlier that God is not merely absolute thought, but also knowledge.
Consequently, we must continue, God is also knowledge not only of things different from
Himself, but of Himself primarily. The absolute energy of His knowledge must also
penetrate His own depths, and indeed in such a way that He does not merely think His
thought, but His being also, and His life, nay, that the whole fulness He has of real forces
of life, of beauty, and of harmony, is illuminated by His self-consciousness.338
Just as Dorner, regarding the physical Trinity, grounded the trinitarian structure of the
divine in the notion of divine aseity, it is in Dorner’s treatment of the ‘logical Trinity’ (SCD I
§31B.II) that he grounds the trinitarian structure of the divine in the notion of divine intelligence.
And just as we saw that it is in virtue of being triune that divine aseity is actualized, so we will
see here that it is in virtue of being triune that divine intelligence is actualized.
Before we can examine how the Trinity relates to divine self-knowledge, we must first
inquire not only into what is required for self-knowledge, but what is required for knowledge
simpliciter. Dorner notes, “Now to all knowledge there pertains an antithesis of subject and
object, of thinker and thought, and only by means of this duality and of their union does
knowledge arise. The same thing is true of that knowledge which is self-consciousness. In this
case the object is, it is true, no foreign object; but one and the same spirit, that it may become
self-conscious, contrasts itself with itself.”339
For knowledge, there must be a subject – the one who does the thinking – and an object –
that which is thought. Hence, for knowledge, there must be a distinction (an ‘antithesis,’ as
Dorner puts it) between subject and object. The same is true for self-knowledge, although the
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object of thought is identical with the one who does the thinking. Yet, for self-knowledge to be a
form of knowledge, there must be a distinction or ‘antithesis’ between the self as subject of
knowledge and the self as object of knowledge. The self must ‘contrast’ itself with itself.
How does the self contrast itself with itself? Because it is self-knowledge, and thus one
and the same agent making itself an object for itself, Dorner speaks of the agent ‘reduplicating’
itself: “In this objectivation, the spirit reduplicates itself, so to speak, within itself.”340 So, in
making itself an object of knowledge for itself, the self doubles itself. This reduplication, as an
act of objectification, creates something which is now distinct.
Thus, there is an important difference between knowledge of things other than the self
and knowledge of the self. In knowledge of things other than self, there is no reduplication. In
self-knowledge, however, the self, “does not primarily project something foreign to itself…but
[it] projects [its] own counterpart or image”341 In self-knowledge, therefore, that which is
projected (the object of thought), although necessarily distinct from the subject, has a certain
likeness to the subject, for it just is the subject’s own ‘counterpart’ or ‘image.’
Here, already, we can anticipate Dorner’s trinitarian articulation of divine selfknowledge. Such a view of self-knowledge maps onto traditional trinitarian thought in that there
is reduplication (which corresponds to the generation of the Son from the Father) and such
reduplication occurs within the agent itself (which ensures the homoousios of the divine
generator and the generated divine).
As we might guess, self-knowledge requires more than two components. Dorner says:
Human self-consciousness does not really take place because the essence of man…has,
amongst the objects of its consciousness and along with what is distinct and foreign,
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apprehended itself, has made an object of itself, a circumstance which can only happen
by self-objectivation or by diremption into subject and object. On the contrary, so long as
there rises before the consciousness of a man, or his intuition, himself indeed, but only as
one amongst other objects, so long he has not himself as yet, but speaks of himself as of a
third, in the third person, he is estranged from himself, for he has himself, it is true, as an
object amongst others, but does not know that he, the thinker himself, is one with the
thought, and conversely.342
Although the self-conscious agent makes himself an object of thought for himself, he nonetheless
grasps that object of thought as himself. The self as object of thought, in other words, is
understood by the self as subject to be not just another object amongst all the other objects of
consciousness.
Dorner’s point here is that the dual components above (the self as thinker and the self as
object of thought) are not sufficient of themselves for self-consciousness because there is no
component by which the self as thinker might recognize itself as one and the same with the self
as object of thought. There must be, therefore, a third component – distinct from the other two
components – which unites the self as thinker and the self as thought, facilitating selfrecognition. Without this distinct, third component, the thinker “has not looked upon the thinker
again as returned so to speak from the depths of the thought, and thus has not yet found himself.
And thus he is not yet self-conscious spirit, he is not yet I. The spirit of the man is primarily
related to itself as a natural object merely.”343
In self-knowledge, then, there is a component immanent in consciousness which relates
the self as thinker to the self as object of thought, facilitating this self-recognition: “But it thus
pertains to the essence of spirit as such that it is its own mediator, that it generates itself as actual
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spirit, and that apart from such mediation it is not actual spirit, but remains like a child at the
commencement of the natural life”344
Unfortunately, Dorner is vague on what this third component is in the case of human selfconsciousness – he offers descriptions of it but never names what it is. Here, he may simply be
drawing upon a discovery of Fichte that later became important for German Romanticism, where
in human consciousness, we recognize the self of our empirical experience as identical with a
transcendental aspect of ourselves, but the recognition of this identity cannot itself be empirical
(for to prove it empirically would itself already require an intuition of this identity). Thus, the
two aspects of the self must be united, but this unity can only be assumed and never proved.
We have already seen Dorner identify the subjective aspect of divine self-knowledge with
God the Father and identify the objective aspect of divine self-knowledge with God the Son. And
as we have seen, possession of self-knowledge requires a third component which unites the two.
This is no less the case in the divine, and Dorner identifies this third, uniting component in the
divine with the Holy Spirit: “Thus the absolute Spirit must also be this self-mediation or ideal
self-reproduction, only that He has His effect ever with Him as eternally happening, and is not to
be thought as first becoming in time.”345 In noting that the divine must be this mediation between
itself as thinker and itself as object of thought, Dorner implies the trinitarian tenet that the Holy
Spirit is homoousios with the Father and the Son.
In Dorner’s treatment of the logical Trinity, we see a similarity with his treatment of the
physical Trinity. There, we saw that there was a principle which was not itself identifiable with
any of the divine persons (viz., that of ‘life’), and which was actualized by means of the divine
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persons. Here we see a similarity in that, just as in the physical Trinity, ‘life’ was aimless were it
not for the third member, so also in the logical Trinity Dorner speaks of the divine consciousness
as if it were aimless were it not for the involvement of the third member. In the logical Trinity,
therefore, there seems to be a principle which is actualized by the divine persons. He says: “It
cannot suffice that God should simply be the Father’s consciousness of the Son, or vice versa,
and that in both modes of being God should know the second to Himself merely as a second, and
not know Himself in and through the second. In that case there would only be an infinite
reflection and re-reflection of the divine essence on opposite sides.”346 Here, Dorner notes that
without the mediation of the third member, the consciousness of God would infinitely bounce
back and forth, so to speak, between the Father and the Son, without either being able to
recognize Himself in the other.
We must pause to note that, with the above comments, Dorner has made a subtle shift in
his thoughts about divine self-knowledge. Earlier, Dorner spoke of a single conscious subject
(viz., ‘God’), and this subject’s self-knowledge was possible via three components (viz., [1] God
as thinker, [2] God as object of thought, and [3] God as mediator between the two. Thus, all three
components serve as conditions for the self-knowledge of a single subject. Each component, in
other words, is not of itself identical to the single conscious subject.
Dorner’s comments about an infinite reflection and re-reflection, however, imply that the
Father and the Son are themselves conscious subjects in their own right, rather than the
components by which self-knowledge might occur. Dorner speaks of the Father and the Son as
conscious subjects in their own right, but as conscious subjects who could not recognize
themselves in the other – the divine essence that is their own as also present in the other –
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without the mediation of a third. As he puts it, “The spiritual divine essence or the Godhead,
which actually exists therein in a twofold manner, would remain unrecognized as the common
essence of both.”347
It is by the mediation of the third member, therefore, that the Father recognizes His
common essence with the Son, and the Son recognizes His common essence with the Father:
“Only by the thinking and determining Godhead, who is in both [the Father and the Son],
knowing His own essence in what is different to Himself, in what is thought and determined, is
self-consciousness constituted in God. But for that end a third and equally real principle of union
is necessary in God, the Holy Spirit, to whom Paul ascribes exclusive dignity in the selfknowledge of God in His depths.”348
Here, again, we see the results of the shift that we flagged above. Before, the possessor of
self-knowledge simply saw a copy of himself in the object of knowledge. In other words, the
object of knowledge was a reflection of the subject of knowledge, and so the subject recognized
himself in the object (or the object as himself). Here, however, what is recognized by the subject
in the object is not simply himself, but another who shares his essence. The conclusion of the
logical Trinity is, therefore, that God is His own primary object of knowledge, and that this selfknowledge must be mediated in some way.
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3. The Ethical Trinity
3.1 The Necessity of Distinction within the Divine
We have now reached the pinnacle of Dorner’s trinitarian thought, that of the ‘ethical
Trinity.’ We saw in the previous chapter that for God to be ethically good, He must be both
aboriginally good – thereby possessing ethical necessity – and be one who wills the highest good
–thereby possessing ethical freedom. This presents a problem, for it appears contradictory that
God would somehow possess ethical goodness in both ways. It is here in his presentation of the
‘ethical Trinity’ where Dorner resolves this contradiction, where he establishes how goodness in
God can be both ethically necessary and ethically free – namely, by assigning the former to the
person of the Father, assigning the latter to the person of the Son, and assigning the means by
which they are united to the person of the Spirit.
Dorner begins by establishing that there is a particular sequence that obtains between
ethical freedom and ethical necessity. Of the two, the logically prior component must be ethical
necessity, for this ensures that goodness is realized:
For if, with Duns Scotus, we suppose the first thing in God to be absolutely free will,
without a necessity which logically precedes, without a conditioning and defining by
means of what is ethically necessary or goodness simply, we could never arrive at an
ethical realization or ethical freedom. For even if goodness were willed, or if something
were willed to be good, but in an arbitrary manner, goodness would not be realized. What
is good in itself, what is necessary, what is constituted without arbitrariness, must be
willed in no arbitrary, but in a free way; only by such means is the ethical realized.349
Here, Dorner speaks of ‘ethical freedom,’ that the agent freely choose to will the good. For the
good to be freely willed by the agent, the agent must be presented with the good so as to be able
to will it as such. Thus, there must be a goodness which exists prior to the agent’s act of will (as
opposed to, say, the good just being identified as whatever the agent wills). If the agent must
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recognize the good as such so that she may thereby freely choose it, then, logically, the existence
of good (viz., ethical necessity) must precede the recognition and willing of it by the agent (viz.,
ethical freedom). We must now examine how Dorner understands this sequence to obtain in God.
Since ethical necessity has logical priority over ethical freedom, the good as God’s being
has logical priority over the good as a product of God’s will. We can say, therefore, that God just
is ethical necessity: “If then we must begin with the ethically necessary,” says Dorner, “we must
teach first of all that the ethically necessary must have an existence, and that in God Himself, or
rather God must Himself be the ethically necessary or holy.”350 Again: “that which is morally
necessary cannot be superior to God, as a law, power, or fate which is above Him; but, since it is
in itself the highest truth, it falls within the circumference of the divine being. The ethically
necessary has its eternal being so very largely in God that He is Himself moral law and morally
necessary being.”351 God, therefore, must simply be goodness, for if God merely willed
goodness, goodness would be superior to Him.
However – and it is here that the contradiction begins to arise – we have seen that the
ethically necessary must be freely willed by God, that God not be compelled to choose the good.
The contradiction, therefore, is this: on the one hand, God must be identified with the good, for
otherwise He would be subordinate to the good; on the other hand, God cannot be necessitated to
will the good, for otherwise God would not be able to will the good freely. How, though, can
ethical freedom and ethical necessity be predicated of one and the same thing? Just as Dorner
asserted that, for divine aseity and divine self-knowledge, the divine substance could not be
rigidly simple, so now he asserts the same for the divine as ethical: “Both aspects [viz., necessity
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and freedom] are to be supposed in the religious and scientific interest, but both can only be
supposed at the same time, if the primary goodness, which is God, has no mere simple form of
being, whether as ethically necessary or as free, but a manifoldly diverse being, absolutely
correlated, however, and reciprocally conditioning itself.”352 Indeed, as Dorner puts it in the
observation of this section, “as a divine triad underlies (zu Grunde liegt) the divine aseity and the
divine self-consciousness, so would we also seek to apprehend the triad as the basis (Basis) for
the divine love.”353 That God is triune, therefore, is the condition of the possibility of the divine
as ethical. Or more precisely, the divine must actualize its ethical subjectivity, and to do this it
must be triune.

3.2 Identification of the Divine Persons as Components of the Ethical
Having established that, for Dorner, the Trinity makes possible the ethical life of God, we
must now inquire further into its trinitarian rendering. Specifically, we must query the
relationship between the various ethical components and their relationship to the divine persons.
Given the logical priority of the ethically necessary, a trinitarian configuration of the
ethical components correlates this principle to the divine person who has logical priority vis-àvis the Trinity: God the Father. Dorner says, “This first form of being in God as the ethical one
we call with the New Testament, and in accordance with ecclesiastical custom, the principle of
fatherhood in God. Through God as Father it is that what is true, necessary, and good in itself has
an existence, and that a knowledge of what is true and good in itself is possible.”354
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This second ethical principle, the principle of freedom, is therefore identified with God
the Son: “This second principle we call God the Son, the mode of the existence of the spiritual
God in the form of freedom, just as frequently in the New Testament and in ecclesiastical phrase
the Son is the divine principle of the kingdom of freedom, of historical progress – the principle
of movement without self-detriment, but of movement on the ground of a basis already existent,
so that arbitrariness may ever be remote.”355
These two ethical components are, of course, reciprocally related: “For, far removed from
a principle of freedom which must tear itself away from the first principle and constitute itself as
a totality, a whole of itself, what is free in God is referred back to the ethically necessary as the
logical first principle, just as the former is willed for the latter.”356 The principles of necessity
and freedom, as reciprocally related, entail a reciprocal relationship between God the Father (as
the principle of necessity) and God the Son (as the principle of freedom).
In speaking of the principle of necessity, and therefore of God the Father, Dorner says,
If we start from goodness as necessary holy being, which is absolute in dignity and
worth, its necessity cannot be blind ἀνάγκη, can by no means be ethically blind fate, but
the ethically necessary is also simultaneously that which is true, rational, and luminous in
itself. Because it (or God in it) maintains the ethically necessary, it is not mechanical
coercion, caprice, or τυραννίς in spite of its own power. It is not adverse to freedom, but
the ethically necessary desires its own idea, and much more its apparent opposite,
freedom, as the absolute form which is alone adequate or conformable to the ethically
necessary. The ethically necessary would have its realization by means of freedom and in
it; it is a lover of freedom; and the free thus blossoms out of its apparent opposite.357
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As the ethically necessary has its realization in freedom, this suggests that the Father has His
realization in the Son. And in speaking of the principle of freedom, and therefore of God the Son,
Dorner says,
But, secondly, as the ethically necessary rejoices in the free, for the sake of which it
desires to be, the free, the principle of freedom in God, also strives to get back to the
necessary, and desires to condition itself by the necessary. For in itself the free has, it is
true, the power to will what it likes. But if it renounces the ethically necessary, it cannot
maintain itself, because it comes into contradiction with what is true and good in itself,
which as such is at the same time what is rational and logical, and would thus become
sheer caprice. But this free principle, of which we are speaking, is divine, being
constituted the second mode of existence of the Godhead, and cannot fall outside of the
divine sphere, because in its foundation it coincides with the same divine being, who also
presents and is the ethically necessary.358
Since the free cannot renounce the necessary without falling into contradiction, this entails the
same about the Son in relation to the Father. As the free desires to unite with the necessary, so
the Son desires to unite with the Father.
As we turn to the third member of the divine Trinity, we will see that it is the Holy Spirit
by whom necessity and freedom, the Father and the Son, are united. We saw Dorner’s assertion
in chapter four that the Evangelical principle has its foundation in the divine being itself. In the
Evangelical principle, there is a correlation between the divine and the human, in that the human
person freely wills the ethical necessity of the divine. The human person comes to see the
ethically necessary not as something foreign to herself, but as that in which her humanity reaches
its fulfillment. On the divine side, God sees in the human person – in the ethically free – not as
something foreign to the divine, but as an expression of Himself. In the human person, the
coincidence of the necessary and the free is wrought by the Holy Spirit.
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Since the divine is the archetype of the Evangelical principle, just as in the human person
freedom and necessity are united by the Holy Spirit, so also is it the case in the divine: “As then
the absolute unity of the necessary and the free, by means of which man is raised according to
the standpoint of the Reformation above caprice and above the standpoint of mere legality, is
only completed by the agency of the Holy Spirit in the inward parts, so also in God this union is
only perfected by the agency of the third principle; one and the same principle, namely, the Holy
Spirit, originally and archetypically combines in God the ethically necessary and the ethically
free, and consummates the same union as a kind of copy in man, the image of God.”359
Thus, the Holy Spirit is that by which the Father, as the ethically necessary, and the Son,
as the ethically free, are united to one another. Dorner says: “It is the Holy Spirit who rules in the
deep things of God in an ethical manner as well as a cognitive (1 Cor. 2), and by whose agency
God as the Son beholds and finds in the essence, or in the depths of the ethically necessary of the
Father, the volition of the being of the free, therefore the free, i.e. Himself; and by whose agency,
conversely, God the Father in the free finds and beholds the ethically necessary as freely willed
contents, that is, finds and beholds Himself.”360

3.3 The Ethical Personality and the Divine Persons
We saw above that, with the physical Trinity, there was a principle which was not
identifiable with any of the three members of the Trinity, and it was through or by means of the
trinitarian persons that divine aseity was actualized. Similarly, we saw that, with the logical
Trinity, there was a principle which was not identifiable with any of the three members of the
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Trinity, and it was through or by means of the trinitarian persons that the divine intelligence was
actualized. Here, in the ethical Trinity, the same pattern emerges: there is a principle which is not
identifiable with any of the three members of the Trinity but which is actualized through or by
means of them, what Dorner refers to as the ‘absolute ethical personality.’
Dorner is sometimes discreet in characterizing the relation between the divine persons
and this ethical principle which is actualized by their means. Speaking of the Holy Spirit, he
says, “Love is the truth of the Spirit; formally, because it is the absolute unity of the divine
intelligence and the divine volition; and as regards contents, because the absolutely worthy,
goodness, is brought therein to eternally living realization (Wirklichkeit).”361 Referring to love as
the “truth” of the Holy Spirit has a Hegelian ring to it, in that it suggests that love is the ultimate
end to which the Holy Spirit acts as a vehicle for. This interpretation is strengthened by how
Dorner elaborates the point, noting that the Holy Spirit is the truth of love because the Holy
Spirit that by which goodness is realized. In describing the Holy Spirit as an agent by whom
something is realized, it suggests that there is a principle above and beyond the Holy Spirit as
such.
However, certain passages are more explicit in describing ethical actualization by means
of the divine persons. Dorner says that God
since He is spirit and since it contradicts Him to be merely naturally ethical and holy,
does not will to be an ethical being which exists simply and is immovably rigid, but He
wills to constitute Himself an ethical being in a living manner; He has therefore in
Himself eternally the principle of ethical movement out of Himself or, as opposed to
what is ethically necessary, the principle of freedom as the instrument (Werkzeuges) for
His ethical self-production (Selbsthervorbringung) or self-realization
(Selbstverwirklichung) so as to ensure His absolute ethical personality and His living
love…”362
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Here, Dorner mentions that it contradicts God to be solely ethical necessity. This suggests that
there is a principle in the divine stipulating how the divine be ethically actualized
(and thus a principle operating in God above and beyond the actual means by which the divine is
ethically actualized). That there is such a principle above and beyond the actual instantiation of
ethical freedom in God is further textually supported a few lines down, where Dorner speaks of
the principle of freedom as the instrument (Werkzeuges) for the ethical self-production or selfrealization of the divine. The language of the principle of ethical freedom as an instrument
indicates its role as a means by which a higher principle is actualized.
These notions of ethical actualization and means of actualization obviously signal
something other than, say, the divine persons as merely instantiating the divine essence. Rather,
Dorner uses terminology such as “process” and “result” to characterize the ethical life of the
divine: “The ontology or metaphysics of love thus depicted forms the conclusion of the process
(Proceß) by which God is eternally absolute personality.”363 Having just finished his treatment
proper on the ethical Trinity in §31B, Dorner declares, “In what precedes, the eternal trinitarian
process (Proceß) has been so considered that the absolute divine personality is the result
(Resultat) of its three principles or factors. And thus no one of these principles has of itself a
claim to the personality, which is rather their result (Resultat)…”364
Dorner recognizes the peculiarity of his descriptions on this point and recognizes that
they could imply that, because the divine persons actualize the absolute personality, once it is
actualized the divine persons would cease existing. He insists this is not the case: “It is requisite
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to know that these three modes of the divine being do not become extinct in their product, the
divine personality, but that they eternally endure…”365
Rather, Dorner sees the relationship between the divine persons and the divine
personality as reciprocal. He says that the divine personality
is their [viz., the trinitarian persons’] eternal result; it does not succeed in time the three
principles in God, but like them is eternal. And being existent, it will produce them.
Indeed, the cooperation of the eternally present personality of God is necessary to the
process, which eternally renews its self-production. The divine unity eternally posits
Himself in a threefold manner for the purpose of this eternally living self-production. . . .
Therefore God is to be thought conscious and personal in the eternal activity of the
reproduction of His personality. He is personal in the three hypostases, as He is personal
by their means.”366
He also describes their reciprocity this way: “The constitution of the divine life is an organism
ever producing itself by means of the trinitarian members, and subsisting by their reciprocal
conditioning. Its unity and eternal result is the absolute personality. But on the other hand, this
result is eternally present, and therefore also cooperative in the self-production.”367 In these two
passages, Dorner seems to be saying that the divine personality is both a result of the trinitarian
persons (and so occurs by means of them) and is nonetheless present in them (such that, although
it is a result, it is not successive to them). How can this be the case?
There is a reciprocity between the divine personality and the trinitarian persons, wherein
the absolute personality is both the result of the individual persons and yet is eternally present
within them, because the divine functions after the manner of an organism. As Dorner puts it,
“Just as in every organism we know the single members serve for the production or
reproduction of the whole, and that the complementary mode of consideration is no less
necessary, according to which the whole, the organism, which enters as a result, precedes
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the parts, or according to what is contrived and reproduced by the members, lives within
them as the power of the whole and gives each its parts, so is it also here. The everpresent result precedes the eternal process of renewal, co-operates and lives in the
function of the single members as the power of the whole which makes those functions
possible.”368
The relation between the absolute personality and the trinitarian persons is such that, on the one
hand, the whole is present in the parts in that the parts serve to realize the whole, and on the other
hand, the parts are in the whole, in that the whole cannot be realized without the parts.

4. God is Love
4.1 Love as the Unity of Freedom and Necessity
As we will see below, Dorner argues that, through this union of freedom and necessity,
love can be predicated of God. Love, Dorner says, “is the unity of ethical necessity and freedom,
because it wills the ethically necessary as such, that is, with consciousness and absolute
desire.”369 According to Dorner, ethical freedom, ethical necessity, and their unity are precisely
the means by which love is actualized. And, because each person of the Trinity exemplifies one
of these, it is by means of the persons of the Trinity that divine love is actualized.
Love – the freely-willed, conscious union with an other and the proper willing of self that
describes the inner life of the Trinity – therefore describes God. As Dorner puts it, “God, who is
love through the three trinitarian principles, necessarily loves Himself primarily. The primary
love loves the primary goodness, which is God Himself, and thus the factors also by means of
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which God is eternally absolute love; what has been previously described is nothing but the
process of the divine self-love, which embraces all divine perfections.”370
We examined above that the union of divine freedom and necessity consists in God freely
and willingly being just towards Himself. Because love consists in the unity of ethical freedom
and necessity, God’s free and willing justice towards Himself is simply divine self-love. As we
will see below, God’s freely-willed justice towards Himself – the divine self-love – means that
the ethical aspects of God take primacy over the physical and logical aspects of God.

4.2 Love as the Primary Attribute of God
Having arrived at the ethical conception of God, SCD I §32.4 is focused on how
everything is put in a new light by the doctrine of divine love. He notes, “From this point we
must now glance backwards at the divine attributes, which will appear in a new light and in a
new connection. For they will all appear in a close unity, as necessarily verified and guaranteed
by the absolutely supreme instance…which God as personal love necessarily and eternally has
and wills for the eternal self-production of His own absolute ethical personality.”371 Love,
therefore, is the supreme divine attribute, that which unifies all other divine attributes. Indeed,
Dorner states that love is the only satisfactory description of God. As he puts it, “Love is the
supreme, the only adequate definition of the essence of God, or definition of God, if it is rightly
thought, namely, if it is thought as that unity of the ethically necessary and the free”372
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In chapter four, we saw how Dorner sought to follow Schleiermacher in privileging the
ethical over the physical and logical attributes of God. Here in §32.4 he invokes him
approvingly: “The scriptures ascribe the highest dignity to love. They never call God
omnipotence, immensity, etc., but they do say θεὸς ἀγάπη. . . . Schleiermacher, otherwise
inclined to regard the divine attributes as distinct in our thought only, says for all that of love at
the end of his Glaubenslehre, ‘God is love.’”373
Love is the only adequate definition of God, according to Dorner, because it is normative
over all other divine attributes. The physical and intellectual attributes, says Dorner, are related
to love
as presuppositions or means. As presuppositions they are not so related as if they had the
absolutely sufficient ground of their necessity even apart from love and in themselves, or
as if, regarded from the highest point of view, they were coordinate with love in God, or
as if love were their product. Not life nor power, nor even knowledge, is an absolute end
in itself, but only goodness. They therefore exist for love, as means thereto as the
absolute end, and only find in love their absolute necessity or verification; they are willed
by the eternally effected and yet eternally self-renewing divine love as the means for its
eternal self-production, and if a world exists, for the approving of love. They have in
love, as their highest causa finalis, so also the norm of their working.374
Here we need not give an exhaustive treatment of how all the divine attributes relate to
one another in light of the privileging of the ethical. It is helpful, nonetheless, to at least briefly
examine some of these relationships, if only to fill-in our understanding of what Dorner is doing.
Of the physical attributes, Dorner says that “[i]f [they] are also to be placed in the light of divine
love, it is of great importance that they be thought in their working or in their actual being to be
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dependent upon love, but not that God or the divine activity be allowed to be necessitated by
them.”375
Thus, the mere ability that the physical attributes provide can in no way force God to act
as beholden to them. God has control over His attributes. Regarding, for example, the physical
attribute of infinity, Dorner notes, “There is…no necessity in Him, not even because of His
infinity, to be everywhere the same, to will and to work on His side everywhere and always only
the same. Rather, if His love so desires, is a system possible of diverse revelations and modes of
the divine being in the world, and even the singularity of His efficient being in one revelation,
such as Christendom believes to exist in Christ.”376 And of omnipotence, he says, “As far as
God’s might or omnipotence is concerned, there is in God no dark, irresistible, or necessary
force, and not for a moment a superabundance, urged of itself or independently to realization, so
that God, to will an ordered world, must restrain or limit it; God’s infinite fulness of life is
illuminated and controlled by the might of His own love.”377 The same can be said for the logical
attributes: “Knowledge does not exist in God for its own sake, whilst love is an absolute end in
itself. Indeed, knowledge only perfects itself in God by means of love.”378
Having examined how love is the primary divine attribute, we can now examine how this
characterizes the relationship between the divine and the creaturely. As we will see below,
Dorner understands love to involve a proper relation to another and to oneself. In other words,
proper love of self and of others stipulates how one relates to others, since one’s relation to
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others involves both oneself and an other. God’s relation to the created order must be
characterized by a divine love for the created order but, just as much, God’s relation to the
created order must be characterized by a divine love for the divine.

4.3 Love as Self-Preservation and Self-Communication
“In order rightly to understand the nature of love,” says Dorner, “these two elements must
be united, and must be viewed as forming together a solid unity of blended opposites, viz. the
choice of self, which we may call self-love, and an opening out to others in participation and
impartation.”379 Because most characterizations of love focus on the latter feature, it is worth
explaining why Dorner chooses to mention the former.
As we have seen, love occurs when one wills a particular good. But for Dorner, in a
relation between personal subjects, between the self and the other, the other in this relation is not
the only objective good. The self is also a good; the self has objective value. Given the
objectivity of one’s own value, one ought to treat oneself as the objectively valuable thing that it
is. To love oneself, therefore, means that a subject wills itself in accordance with its own
objective value. Or in negative terms, in a relation with an other that is characterized by love, the
self does not violate its own intrinsic worth.
Of course, Dorner is not advocating a love of self to the exclusion of love of others.
Rather, Dorner is insisting that proper love unites love of self with love of other, where one is not
forfeited for the sake of the other. Love “unites microcosmically in itself what otherwise appears
only isolated, or in one-sided preponderance – existence for one’s self and existence for
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others.”380 Rightly-ordered love, then, requires that both self and other are loved in their proper
proportions. This Dorner refers to respectively as ‘self-preservation’ and ‘self-communication.’
The act of treating an other as an end satisfies the first requirement of love, namely, ‘an
opening out to others in participation and impartation.’ Thus, trinitarianly rendered, the Son’s
free obedience to the Father is just the Son’s ‘opening out’ of Himself to the Father. And so the
Son’s free obedience to the Father, ethically rendered, is just God willing His own goodness –
willing Himself – as His own end.
In this same act the second requirement of love, namely, ‘the choice of self,’ is also
satisfied. Because love requires that the subject treat itself in accordance with its own objective
value, and because the end which God wills is just Himself, God treats Himself in accordance
with His own objective value. Because the Son is God and the Father is God, the Son’s free
obedience to the Father is, ethically rendered, God’s willing Himself as His own end.
Because God is most properly understood as love, self-preservation and selfcommunication, as aspects of love, are constitutive of God’s relation to an other, viz., the created
order. Our final task, therefore, will be to examine how God’s self-communication and selfmanifestation is manifest in relation to the created order. In short, we will see how Dorner
characterizes the relation between the divine and the created such that God can love the created
order and also love Himself, that God can give Himself to the created order without losing
Himself to it.
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4.4 Divine Self-Communication and Self-Preservation vis-à-vis Creation
Although God, as love, will necessarily manifest the components of self-preservation and
self-communication, one problem immediately arises. We saw above that, as the ‘absolute
personality,’ God is His own primary object of love. An important objection to Dorner is that, if
God is His own primary object of love, then God would no longer be able to communicate
Himself to that which is not Himself. As His own primary object of love, it seems that is God
capable only of self-preservation. “God’s self-preservation would, it is true, be secured,” says
Dorner, “but God by His absolute self-love would be enclosed, so to speak, in His own
exaltation, and would thus again become a single being instead of the universal principle, His
love again lacking perfection, namely, communicability.”381
However, this worry is met. Because the Father is goodness, and because the Son freely
wills goodness, God, in willing Himself, thereby wills goodness itself. “For since God loves
Himself, He loves goodness as such or generally; He is Amor Amoris; He loves it therefore, not
merely as it is in Himself, in His own personality as distinguished from everything else whether
possible or actual, but He rejoices in a life of love as such, i.e. He loves His goodness in itself
with a universal love.”382 In willing the good that just is Himself, God wills goodness as such,
and not goodness only insofar as it is limited to Him. Goodness as such is universal, and so it
extends to God and anything else insofar as it originates in God:
Goodness in itself as such is not particular, but its desire is to be and dwell everywhere,
where there is a possible abode for it, and therefore to be efficient. God as holy love, and
therefore self-willing and self-loving, desires Himself also to be communicable transeunt
love, and with the volition of His self-preservation (as the universal goodness) there is
also supposed the volition of His communicability. Therefore, although He is
transcendent by virtue of His relation to Himself in ethical self-preservation, He is
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nevertheless, if there is anything distinct from Himself, able to exist in that distinct
thing.383
Although, therefore, God is His own primary object of love, this fact actually enables God to be
the universal principle of love for all that is not God.
Since we have established that God can communicate Himself to creation, we will now
look at how God does so in love, that is, how God engages creation through the union of selfpreservation and self-communication. We saw above that God freely wills the good that He
Himself is (the Son’s embrace of the Father). Further, we saw that God is the highest good, and
thus a good which cannot be violated, a good which is always treated justly. So, in willing the
good that He Himself is, even God Himself cannot violate His own goodness. In other words,
even God cannot treat Himself unjustly.
The inviolability of the good that is God means that God cannot dilute this good for the
sake of something else, i.e. God will not make Himself a means for some other end (e.g.,
creation). As Dorner puts it,
The love of God is essentially holy; it desires and preserves the ethically necessary or
holy, which God is. . . . By virtue of His necessary self-preservation, which is at the same
time His holy self-love, there can be in God no activity of love to the detriment of His
self-preservation. Justice is eternally secured in the divine love. God can never sacrifice
what is holy, what is ethically necessary, for the sake of approving His love, whether by
communication or participation or pardon. For the ethically necessary is the basis in the
triune God which can never be shaken.384
Thus, creation is no less a locus for divine justice than God Himself:
But finally, if a world exists, its constitution is not indifferent to God as the just God, but
there is an internal necessity that He should know that the same righteousness which is in
Him – indeed, which is He – is effective in the world. . . . And yet further, God desires,
when He wills a world, not merely an involuntary regulation of the world by His just will,
as the ultimate law of its being and its order; He also desires, by virtue of His love of
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justice, that His desire and love of justice should exist in free spirits without Himself a
multiplied life and love of justice, which is nothing but the spiritual existence of justice in
the world. If, that is to say, there is a world of spiritual being without God, He cannot
desire the justice which is in Him, and which is Himself, to exist simply in Himself; for
justice cannot be a private property, so to speak; according to its idea, it is constituted a
universal good for the reason where it is found. As self-willing justice, therefore, as the
energetic will of His own self-preservation, God cannot be indifferent as to whether the
world corresponds to this justice or not. There would be no earnest pursuit of justice on
God’s part if He merely wished to be just Himself, and was indifferent as to the
maintenance of the absolute good of justice without Himself.385
Since in creation this good can never be diluted for the sake of something else, there is no
toleration of a lesser goodness in creation.
Now that we have examined God’s self-preservation in the created order, we can now
examine God’s self-communication. In beholding the good, God sees its communicable
(universal) character, i.e. God sees the good as good even for that which is not God. Dorner
states, “The divine self-love comprehends, it is true, everything in God in just self-preservation,
but it is an ethical self-love, and this by no means limits God to Himself, by no means keeps Him
enclosed by His transcendence, but is perfectly compatible with the tendency to selfcommunication, to immanence in another.”386
Goodness as such is therefore goodness for everything, i.e., universally. God, as the good,
then, is also universally good and thereby communicable. Dorner continues, saying, “Goodness
in itself as such is not particular, but its desire is to be and dwell everywhere, where there is a
possible abode for it, and therefore to be efficient. God as holy love, and therefore self-willing
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and self-loving, desires Himself also to be communicable transeunt love, and with the volition of
His self-preservation (as the universal goodness) there is also supposed the volition of His
communicability.”387
Because God understands Himself and wills Himself as that which is both the inviolable
good and the universal good, God’s interaction with creation expresses this unity: God
communicates to creation this inviolable, yet universal good; that is, God communicates Himself.
For Dorner, this unity of self-preservation and self-communication helps avoid two unacceptable
alternatives to the God-creature relationship: pantheism and deism.
Divine self-preservation avoids pantheism because it prevents God from being identified
with creation: “[God’s] transcendence and self-preservation is the necessary postulate of His
self-communication and immanence in the world. For only because God has absolute selfpossession by means of His perfect self-consciousness and His self-love is He master of Himself,
and certain that in His self-communication He will not, as all pantheistic systems think, lose
Himself in what is different to Himself.”388
On the other hand, divine self-communication avoids deism because it enables God to
interact with creation: “Deism emphasizes by its incommunicable God the divine exaltation, the
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divine self-preservation, which stands estranged and cold over against the world; pantheism
emphasizes the process of living divine self-communication in the world, but its God loses
Himself therein. . . . They are positively transcended by the trinitarian apprehension of the ethical
being, that is to say, of love, which desires itself as necessary and as free, that is, which even in
self-love wills love, and even in self-communication has and wills itself, and in both is amor
amoris.”389 Because God is triune, God therefore has perfect self-consciousness and self-love.
Because God has perfect self-consciousness and self-love, God has perfect self-possession. And
such perfect self-possession allows God to engage in the finite while preserving His
transcendence. God’s communicability and transcendence are therefore possible because God is
triune.
Dorner supplies various examples of how this unity of self-preservation and selfcommunication is manifest in the divine-creature relationship. For our purposes, we need not go
through them all.390 We need only to look at the greatest example, that of divine incarnation. In
the incarnation, argues Dorner, we behold divine self-communication and divine selfpreservation, both in unity. Thus, in speaking of the incarnation as an act of God’s selfcommunication, Dorner says, “Christendom knows in Christ not merely a transitory divine act,
which has nothing to do with the internal divine essence, but the highest and permanent divine

389

SCD I §31b.4 (p. 447).

One particularly interesting example is that of human freedom: “since God must as the ethical God remain like or
true to Himself, even in His self-approving, in willing anything ethical outside of Himself He wills a portrayal of His
ethical Trinity, of the ethically necessary, of the free, and of their union. . . . He accordingly gives to everything its
own (suum cuique), and therefore regards the free as free; and thus the regulation for the divine communication is
supposed, that it should not impart itself to the creature in a manner injurious to freedom, in a physical process, by
force or by magic” (SCD I §32.4 [pp. 456-57]). “The design of God’s love in regard to the rational creature, in
conformity with its own pure goodness, must be to bestow on the creature itself, and call forth in it, the sentiment of
love. It is not therefore an object of love to God’s self-communication, save insofar as He views it as destined to be
a subject of love, and thus desires it for its own sake. Thus, in the ethical character of the divine self-communication
the comparative independence of the creature is secured; and the divine life remains with distinct from the creature”
(SCD II §33.5 [pp. 18-19]).
390

214

self-revelation, an act which, because it is self-communication, becomes the divine being in the
world which could have received this being in no other way”391
As fully transparent of the divine essence, we see in the incarnation both God’s selfpreservation and self-communication: “And this new idea is given to faith embryonically in
Christ who, coming from God and leading to God, on the one hand confirms the distinction
between God and the world; whilst, on the other hand, the immanence of God in the world is
given in Him as a matter of fact in absolute form.”392 Here, Dorner parses the two-natures
doctrine in terms of self-preservation and self-communication. Christ’s divine nature ‘confirms
the distinction between God and the world,’ which is God’s self-preservation; Christ’s human
nature is ‘the immanence of God in the world,’ which is God’s self-communication.
Christ, as the incarnation of the One who freely offers His obedience to the Father
through the Spirit, reveals the Trinity as the unity of freedom and necessity. My hope is that,
over the past three chapters, Dorner’s theological genius has become apparent. Genius, however,
is no guarantee of truth. Our final task, therefore, is to evaluate Dorner’s understanding of the
Trinity, along with Staudenmaier’s.
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CONCLUSION

Staudenmaier and Dorner, as I hope to have shown, utilized the Trinity in very interesting
ways. They took one of the most pressing philosophical issues of the nineteenth century – that of
subjectivity – and sought to integrate it into two robust visions of the Trinity. As a conclusion, I
will offer a brief evaluation of their trinitarian theologies. From this, it will be apparent how
novel their understandings of the Trinity were in comparison to those who preceded them.
Because we have covered so much ground, it will be helpful to offer a summary of each
thinker’s trinitarian thought. For Staudenmaier, God is to be understood as personal subject – an
irreducible individual in possession of intelligence and will. Personal subjectivity, however,
requires otherness, in that it requires something beyond the individual person as such in order to
actualize her subjectivity. Although the created order would offer an otherness to the divine,
Staudenmaier wants to maintain that God does not actualize His subjectivity by means of the
otherness of the created order. To do so, Staudenmaier reasons, would entail that God was not an
individual free from the created order, for the created order would be constitutive of God’s
subjectivity. Instead, God must possess subjectivity immanently. The otherness which is required
to actualize subjectivity, therefore, must be present in the divine immanently.
The trinitarian persons, who are distinct from one another, are that by which otherness is
immanently present in the divine. In being other to one another (that is, in being personally
distinct from one another), the divine persons mutually actualize the individual personal
subjectivities of one another. In actualizing the individual personal subjectivities of one another,
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the divine persons actualize divine subjectivity, insofar as divine subjectivity refers to the divine
persons considered collectively. Therefore, it is because God is a Trinity of irreducibly distinct
persons that divine subjectivity becomes actualized.
For Dorner, God is to be understood as an ethical subject. Fully-realized ethical
subjectivity requires of the subject that she will the good, but that she do so freely. To put it in
Hegelian terms, fully-realized ethical subjectivity requires that the free subject see herself in the
good which makes an ethical demand on her. The ethical subject is therefore a locus wherein
ethical freedom and ethical necessity are united. For God to be an ethical subject, or to have fully
realized His own ethical subjectivity, therefore requires that God freely will the good which is
His own being.
This union of freedom and necessity demands a trinitarian structure (viz., the presence of
freedom, the presence of necessity, and the presence of something by which they can united). In
the case of the nondivine, the union of freedom and necessity creates no immediate metaphysical
paradoxes: the creature is confronted with the ethical necessity of the good, which is
ontologically distinct from her, and she freely wills to submit to the demands of the good.
In the case of the divine, however, matters are different. The ethical necessity of the good
which makes a demand on the subject is one and the same with the being of the one who is to
freely will this good. The good in which ethical necessity consists cannot be other than God, for
then there would be a good greater than God Himself. The subject which is to freely will this
good cannot be other than God, for then all notion of ethical subjectivity in God would be lost.
The paradox, therefore, is how both ethical necessity and ethical freedom can coexist in the
divine.
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Since the union of freedom and necessity forms a trinitarian structure, it is because God is
a Trinity of irreducibly distinct persons (each of whom is ascribed one of these ethical
components) that ethical subjectivity – the union of freedom and necessity – can be actualized in
the divine. And it is because God possesses ethical subjectivity that He can love.
The concerns of Staudenmaier and Dorner were not miles apart, for they both deal with
divine subjectivity broadly speaking. For Staudenmaier, the central concern was how the divine
could be free vis-à-vis the nondivine while nonetheless remaining a fully-constituted personal
subject. For Dorner, however, the central concern was how freedom and necessity could be
united in the Godhead. Thus, the differences between the two fall mainly on what each
emphasized. Staudenmaier was focused on divine subjectivity per se, whereas Dorner was
focused on one particular aspect of divine subjectivity, viz., the ethical aspect of subjectivity.
Both theologians, I will argue below, shared a particular conception of the Trinity, one that
consisted in two levels: the divine persons considered as individuals, and the divine persons
understood collectively. The critique that I will make is that, because the divine persons were the
means by which subjectivity was actualized in both Staudenmaier and Dorner, there is a
discrepancy between these two levels which threatens the coherence of Staudenmaier’s and
Dorner’s renderings of the Trinity.
For Staudenmaier, insofar as the term “God” refers to the collectivity of divine persons,
“God” thereby denotes a personal subject, i.e. an agent in whom lie the personal characteristics
of being-for-self, intellect, and will. As a personal subject, “God” therefore possesses otherness
in and of Himself, i.e. possesses subjecthood immanently. This is why, as we saw, God does not
need the otherness of the created order in order to possess subjectivity.
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Because of the distinctions of the divine persons of the Trinity, the divine persons
provide the immanent otherness that is a feature of the divine. Each person of the Trinity is a
personal subject in His own right, in that each person of the Trinity possesses being-for-self,
intellect, and will as an individual. It is in their presence to one another that otherness is present
to each, and it is in their mutual recognition (to put it in Hegelian terms) that their personal
subjectivities are actualized.
The individual members of the Trinity, because each has an actualized subjectivity
(through the others), collectively form a personal subject. Thus, there are two levels of personal
subjectivity in the divine: (1) the level of the individual divine persons, where personal
subjectivity is ascribed to each, and (2) the level of the Trinity as a whole, where personal
subjectivity is ascribed to the collectivity of the divine persons. It is through the presence of
personal subjectivity at the level of the individual divine persons that personal subjectivity is a
feature at the level of the Trinity as a whole.
Although personal subjectivity is ascribable at the level of the individual divine persons
as well as the level of the Trinity as a whole, there is an important difference. Each individual
member of the Trinity is in possession of subjectivity – or is a personal subject – by means of
that which is external to Him as an individual, viz., by the other two members of the Trinity
(since the members of the Trinity are personally distinct from one another). However, the Trinity
is in possession of subjectivity by means of that which is internal or immanent to it, viz., the
collectivity of the divine persons. Thus, the individual members of the Trinity need otherness
vis-à-vis themselves as individuals in order to be personal subjects, whereas the Trinity as such
does not need otherness vis-à-vis itself in order to be a personal subject (and hence does not need
the created order in order to be a personal subject).
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Therefore, the individual divine persons are the means by which possession of immanent
subjectivity is actualized at the level of the Trinity as a whole. Staudenmaier’s remarks on this
score indicate that the divine persons are in a sense preceded by a principle of subjectivity, a
principle which demands that it be actualized, and so demands that the divine essence contract
itself into three persons. In other words, Staudenmaier indicates that the divine seeks to actualize
itself as a personal subject, and does so in and through the subjectivity of the persons of the
Trinity. This suggests that since the principle of subjectivity seeks actualization in and through
the members of the Trinity, and so by means of them, it logically precedes them. Further,
because subjectivity at the level of the Trinity is actualized by means of the divine persons, as
actualized it logically succeeds the divine persons, being their product.
There is a similar rendering of the Trinity in Dorner. For Dorner, insofar as the term
“God” refers to the collectivity of the divine persons, “God” thereby denotes an ethical subject,
i.e. a subject in whom lies a unity of freedom and necessity. Further, because of the distinctions
of the persons of the Trinity, the divine persons are capable of providing the distinct components
of ethical subjectivity, viz., freedom, necessity, and the means by which the two are united. More
specifically, each divine person, as personally distinct from the other two, is capable of
possessing a component of ethical subjectivity which the other two cannot possess: the Father
possesses the ethical component of necessity, the Son possesses the ethical component of
freedom, and the Holy Spirit is the bond of freedom and necessity.
The individual members of the Trinity, because each possesses a component of ethical
subjectivity which is unique to Him, collectively form an ethical subject. Thus, as with
Staudenmaier, there are two levels to consider in the divine: (1) the level of the individual divine
persons, where a fully-formed ethical subjectivity cannot be ascribed to each divine person, but
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only one component of ethical subjectivity can be ascribed to each; and (2) the level of the
Trinity as a whole, where ethical subjectivity is ascribed to the collectivity of the divine persons.
It is through the presence of each ethical component at the level of the individual divine persons
that ethical subjectivity is a feature at the level of the Trinity as a whole.
Unlike in Staudenmaier’s rendering of the Trinity, where personal subjectivity is
ascribable both to each divine person as an individual, as well as to the Trinity as a whole, in
Dorner ethical subjectivity is not ascribable at both levels. If an ethical subject is that in whom
there lies a unity of freedom and necessity, then neither the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy
Spirit considered on His own can be referred to as an ethical subject, since each individual
member of the Trinity denotes a component of ethical subjectivity rather than the whole.
Therefore, the individual divine persons are the means by which possession of ethical
subjectivity is actualized at the level of the Trinity as a whole. Again in a way similar to
Staudenmaier, Dorner’s remarks indicate that the divine persons are in a sense preceded by a
principle of subjectivity, a principle which demands that it be actualized, and so demands that the
divine essence contract itself into three persons. In other words, Dorner indicates that the divine
seeks to actualize itself as an ethical subject, and does so in and through the persons of the
Trinity. Since the principle of subjectivity seeks actualization in and through the members of the
Trinity, and so by means of them, it logically precedes them. And further, because subjectivity at
the level of the Trinity is actualized by means of the divine persons, as actualized it logically
succeeds the divine persons, being their product.
In both Staudenmaier and Dorner, therefore, there is a principle which dictates that the
divine actualize itself either in terms of personal subjectivity (in the case of Staudenmaier) or in
terms of ethical subjectivity (in the case of Dorner). And in both, the divine must actualize itself
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as the Trinity. The process of actualization therefore yields three distinct components: [A] the
principle of subjectivity which is to be actualized; [B] the divine persons (insofar as they are
individuals) as the means by which subjectivity comes to be actualized; [C] the resulting subject
(personal or ethical) as the collectivity of the divine persons.
It stands to reason that, because they are the means of actualization, the divine persons
(insofar as they are individuals) must be construed not simply as distinct, but different from, [A]
the principle of subjectivity which is to be actualized and [C] the resulting subject (personal or
ethical) as the collectivity of the divine persons. Unfortunately, neither Staudenmaier nor Dorner
make any comments on this specific issue. Certainly they understand this principle of
subjectivity as part of God’s being in some way, but precisely in what way is the issue.
The divine persons, as the one God, share one and the same essence. Put differently, their
identification as “God” is dependent upon their being identified with the divine essence. Given
their identity with the divine essence, this poses a problem for how the principle of subjectivity is
related to the divine. If the divine persons (insofar as they are individuals) are different from both
[A] the principle of subjectivity which is to be actualized and [C] the resulting subject
understood as the collectivity of the divine persons, then as identical with the divine persons, the
divine essence is different from [A] and [C]. That is, the divine essence cannot be identified with
this principle of subjectivity.
Since “God” refers either to the divine essence as such, or to the divine persons insofar as
they possess the divine essence, and since this principle of subjectivity can be identified with
neither the persons nor the essence, this raises the question as to how this principle of
subjectivity fits into the divine. If “God” refers to that which can be identified with the divine
essence, and this principle of subjectivity cannot, then the principle of subjectivity is alien to the
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divine. If “God” includes this principle of subjectivity, then “God,” on this rendering, denotes a
composition of two things: a Trinity of persons (who share one and the same essence) and a
principle which transcends or in some way precedes them.
One possibility, though, is that we have misinterpreted how these components relate to
one another. Perhaps the subjectivity of the divine is to be regarded as identical to the divine
essence. This interpretation has the advantage that, since the divine essence denotes what is
common amongst the divine persons, it also succeeds in denoting the resulting subject, since this
is understood as the collectivity of the divine persons. Further, with this interpretation, it would
be the case that the divine essence demands that it actualize its subjectivity, and does so by
contracting itself into three persons. In contracting itself into three persons, the principle of
subjectivity (as identical with the divine essence on this construal) would seem to be identical
with the divine persons.
The problem with this construal, though, is that the divine persons are nonetheless the
means by which subjectivity is actualized. This seems to be strongly supported in both
Staudenmaier’s and Dorner’s texts. And as means, the divine persons can be identified neither
with [A] the principle of subjectivity, itself identical to the divine essence, which is to be
actualized, nor [C] the resulting subject (personal or ethical) as the collectivity of the divine
persons. But if [A] the principle of subjectivity which is to be actualized cannot be identical with
[B] the divine persons (insofar as they are individuals), and yet if, on this construal, [A] is just
the divine essence, then the divine essence cannot be identical with the divine persons. And if the
divine essence cannot be identical with the members of the Trinity, and if it is in virtue of
possessing this essence that the members of the Trinity are God, then the members of the Trinity
cannot be identified as God.
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It is evident, then, that both of these trinitarian renderings are problematic: the first gives
us an identity between the divine persons and the divine essence, but also gives us an element
that can be identified with neither; the second leaves us with the divine essence as not identical
with the divine persons. The root of the problem seems to lie in the basic assumption that the
divine persons are a means of actualization for divine subjectivity. The very notion of a means of
actualization requires that those means be transcended by something greater than themselves, by
that which they serve to actualize (in this case, collective subjectivity, either personal or ethical).
Indeed, one basic tenet of Christian trinitarian doctrine is that there is no “God” above and
beyond the divine persons, for the divine persons are God.
The trinitarian novelty of Staudenmaier and Dorner, therefore, seems to lie in this notion
of the members of the Trinity being a means of actualization for divine subjectivity. And this
notion that the members of the Trinity be a means of actualization is itself rooted in the notion
that the Trinity provides a certain function. However, when the Trinity provides a function, it
thereby becomes subordinated to that service to which it provides (in this case, the realization of
divine subjectivity). In other words, by providing a function, the Trinity – and so the divine
persons – becomes the means to an end which is greater than itself. But as the Christian faith
teaches, it is precisely the divine persons – the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit – who are the
ultimate end.
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